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Management of operational security constraints is one of the important tasks 
performed by system operators, which must be addressed properly for secure and 
economic operation. Constraint management is becoming an increasingly complex and 
challenging to execute in modern electricity networks for three main reasons. First, 
insufficient transmission capacity during peak and emergency conditions, which 
typically result in numerous constraint violations. Second, reduced fault levels, inertia 
and damping due to power electronic interfaced demand and stochastic renewable 
generation, which are making network more vulnerable to even small disturbances. 
Third, re-regulated electricity markets require the networks to operate much closer to 
their operational security limits, which typically result in stressed and overstressed 
operating conditions.  
Operational security constraints can be divided into static security limits (bus voltage 
and branch thermal limits) and dynamic security limits (voltage and angle stability 
limits). Security constraint management, in general, is formulated as a constrained, 
nonlinear, and nonconvex optimization problem. The problem is usually solved by 
conventional gradient-based nonlinear programming methods to devise optimal non-
emergency or emergency corrective actions utilizing minimal system reserves. When 
the network is in emergency state with reduced/insufficient control capability, the 
solution space of the corresponding nonlinear optimization problem may be too small, 
or even infeasible. In such cases, conventional nonlinear programming methods may 
fail to compute a feasible (corrective) control solution that mitigate all constraint 
violations or might fail to rationalize a large number of immediate post-contingency 
constraint violations into a smaller number of critical constraints.  
Although there exists some work on devising corrective actions for voltage and 
thermal congestion management, this has mostly focused on the alert state of the 
operation, not on the overstressed and emergency conditions, where, if appropriate 
control actions are not taken, network may lose its integrity. As it will be difficult for 
a system operator to manage a large number of constraint violations (e.g. more than 




minimum subset of critical constraints and then use information on their type and 
location to implement the right corrective actions at the right locations, requiring 
minimal system reserves and switching operations. Hence, network operators and 
network planners should be equipped with intelligent computational tools to “filter 
out” the most critical constraints when the feasible solution space is empty and to 
provide a feasible control solution when the solution space is too narrow.  
With an aim to address these operational difficulties and challenges, this PhD thesis 
presents three novel interdependent frameworks: Infeasibility Diagnosis and 
Resolution Framework (IDRF), Constraint Rationalization Framework (CRF) and 
Remedial Action Selection and Implementation Framework (RASIF). IDRF presents 
a metaheuristic methodology to localise and resolve infeasibility in constraint 
management problem formulations (in specific) and nonlinear optimization problem 
formulations (in general). CRF extends PIDRF and reduces many immediate post-
contingency constraint violations into a small number of critical constraints, according 
to various operational priorities during overstressed operating conditions. Each 
operational priority is modelled as a separate objective function and the formulation 
can be easily extended to include other operational aspects.  
Based on the developed CRF, RASIF presents a methodology for optimal selection 
and implementation of the most effective remedial actions utilizing various ancillary 
services, such as distributed generation control, reactive power compensation, demand 
side management, load shedding strategies. The target buses for the implementation of 
the selected remedial actions are identified using bus active and reactive power 
injection sensitivity factors, corresponding to the overloaded lines and buses with 
excessive voltage violations (i.e. critical constraints). The RASIF is validated through 
both static and dynamic simulations to check the satisfiability of dynamic security 
constraints during the transition and static security constraints after the transition. The 
obtained results demonstrate that the framework for implementation of remedial 
actions allows the most secure transition between the pre-contingency and post-
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
This introductory chapter provides a general overview of the thesis. It discusses the 
motivation and objectives followed by contributions of the thesis.  
1.1 Introduction  
Planning and operation of modern electricity networks are becoming an increasingly 
complex task. While the network designers must analyse several relevant technical and 
non-technical operating conditions during the planning stage, the network operator 
should operate their networks closer to their operational security limits. This is to meet 
the requirements of re-regulated market’s and to cope with increased uncertainties 
associated with changing type and nature of demand and renewable generation. These 
security limits are typically expressed as bus voltage and branch thermal limits (i.e. 
steady state security limits), as well as voltage and angle stability limits (i.e. dynamic 
security limits). A secure system must always satisfy static security limits at all steady 
states and dynamic security limits during the transition between any two successive 
steady states. Violation of any security limit may constrain the power flow or power 
transmission across the corresponding buses.  
The management of the security constraints, involving their identification and 
corrective actions, is commonly referred to as security constraint management (SCM) 
[1], which is one of the critical tasks performed by network operators and planners and 
is usually formulated as a nonlinear constrained optimization problem. 
1.2 Need for Advanced Computational Tools for SCM 
Electricity networks are one of the most complex man-made systems. They were 
designed and built decades ago, according to the existing and projected power flows 
at that time, which means the large centralized generation was planned and installed 
to follow the direction of load growth. However, the generation in modern electricity 
networks is now changing its direction to load, due to the increased penetration of 
renewable generation, both at transmission and distribution levels. This frequently 
results in a situation in which the demand in a specific area cannot be offset by the 
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local generation and the (apparent)power flow into that area is limited by the 
corresponding flowgate/branch capacity. In addition, the operators are forced to 
operate the networks closer to their operational security limits, in order to defer 
network investments and maximize the benefit in the re-regulated electricity market.  
• Unlike conventional synchronous generators which are electromechanically 
coupled together and to the network, most of the distributed generators are 
coupled only electrically via power electronic interface. Across the world 
(especially in developed countries), conventional power stations are either 
getting closed or their share is getting down to meet the sustainable energy 
goals and to provide the room for (decentralised) renewable generation. This 
has resulted in the reduction of inertia, damping and fault levels in modern 
electricity networks. Moreover, the low-frequency electromechanical 
oscillations among the conventional/synchronous generators (which were 
previously damped effectively) may not be damped effectively under the 
reduced inertia and damping environment. Hence, modern electricity networks 
are more vulnerable to even small disturbances as these disturbances could 
propagate to a larger distance or they could even lead to system instability 
under the presence of low-frequency oscillations.  
In prevailing industrial terminology, SCM, as a process of analysing and adjusting 
controls to mitigate steady state and dynamic security limits, can be further divided 
into congestion management (CM) and volt-var control (VVC). SCM process typically 
involves two stages: a) identification of violated security constraints, and b) activation 
of appropriate corrective actions for resolving violated constraints. 
If the existing control reserves, following a disturbance, are not sufficient to realize a 
feasible generation dispatch for which all security constraints are satisfied, the network 
will be forced to operate with many branch thermal violations (overloads) and bus 
under/over voltages. This particular state of operation is considered as an overstressed 
operating condition in this thesis and is a part of emergency operating state.  
System corrective controls to mitigate constraint violations can be classified into non-
emergency corrective controls (NECC) and emergency corrective controls (ECC). 
ECCs are called only when all NECC are last and/or inefficient to resolve constraint 
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violations.  Stressed operating condition is characterised by the violation of at least 
one security constraint and several other constraints are close to their allowable limits 
but all the constraint violations can be mitigated through available NECC. 
Overstressed operating conditions involve violation of at least one security constraint 
which cannot be resolved by any available NECC. 
Under these overstressed operating conditions, if proper emergency control action is 
not promptly activated, the protection system could trip the corresponding overloaded 
lines and transformers, as well as disconnect under/over voltage (generator or load) 
buses which may finally lead to instability.  
Calling for additional reserves across many network locations may not be the effective 
way to resolve congestions both from economic and technical viewpoints. The 
activation of reserves at many locations implies higher operational costs, resulting in 
increased electricity prices. Furthermore, increased switching actions may build 
adverse network dynamic effects, rather than aiding the (over)stressed system.  
The SCM is formulated as a nonlinear constrained optimization problem and is usually 
solved using conventional (deterministic) gradient-based numerical approximation 
algorithms. These algorithms, though robust, when dealing with overstressed 
operating conditions may fail to find a feasible solution for supplying all connected 
customers, even if there is one, or unable to identify the critical operating constraints, 
if there is no such feasible solution.  
Hence, system operators and planners should be equipped with advanced 
computational tools to diagnose the overstressed operating conditions, rationalize the 
critical operating constraints from many violated constraints, devise and implement 
the effective remedial actions (e.g. using available emergency reserves or ancillary 
services). Such a tool can enhance the decision-making capability at control centres. 
Even if the last recourse to prevent the network instability is load shedding, such a tool 
will help operators to find the most optimal locations and amounts of the load to shed. 
One of the main aims of this thesis is development of a general computational 
framework that will allow to address operational difficulties and challenges related to 
overstressed power supply systems.  
1.3 Research Motivation and Objectives                                                                                    
4 
 
1.3 Research Motivation and Objectives   
The motivation for the presented work was driven by the three following main aspects.  
a) While most of the earlier research in power system optimization has focused on 
developing efficient algorithms for the optimization of feasible mathematical 
models, little attention has been paid to diagnose or localize the infeasibility in 
nonlinear optimization models in power system engineering. For example, the 
nonconvergence of OPF algorithms due to infeasibility is a quite common issue 
[2] and is still insufficiently addressed in open literature [3]. Although there exist 
methods to diagnose the infeasibility in linear optimization models, there is no 
commonly accepted method to diagnose the infeasibility in nonlinear optimization 
models (in general) and constraint management problem formulations (in specific) 
[4]-[6]. From the system planning and operation viewpoints, infeasibility 
localization is especially important, as it helps finding the critical assets in the 
system. 
b) Although extensive efforts are made on solving power system optimization 
problems using metaheuristic algorithms, their practical implementation is still 
underway, even for the offline analysis in commercial power system simulators 
[7]. Moreover, most of the existing metaheuristic methods are focused on 
optimizing an objective function over feasible search spaces, rather than infeasible 
search spaces. Being stochastic in nature, metaheuristic algorithms in these cases 
may be better than conventional methods in diagnosing infeasibility.  
c) The vector space spanned by the available controls at a specific time is denoted as 
the control space of the system at that time. These controls could be preventive or 
corrective, and corrective controls could be nonemergency or emergency controls. 
Fundamentally, the system operating condition (and therefore security of the 
system) at any time depends on the domain of this control space. While a non-
empty (i.e. feasible) space indicates the ability of the system to mitigate all active 
constraint violations, an empty (i.e. infeasible) control space indicates the inability 
of the system in mitigating all active constraint violations. Accordingly, an 
infeasible control space situation is considered as the overstressed operating 
condition in this thesis. 
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While most of the previous work on constraint management has focused on 
mitigating constraints during feasible control space situations, limited work exists 
in the open literature on mitigating constraint violations for infeasible control 
spaces. Some of the transmission constraints are non-manageable during 
overstressed operating conditions due to insufficient control capability. In these 
cases, the trivial solution is to increase the dimension of the control space by 
adding emergency reserves (so-called remedial actions): addition of some extra or 
disconnection of some existing active and/or reactive generation, network 
reconfiguration, demand side management, load shedding, etc.  
Most of the existing remedial actions are developed in offline studies and 
configured to specific events with a fixed level of control. In other words, they are 
activated by the predefined events, rather than the critical reasoning of the 
situations and corresponding consequences. Moreover, these actions are entirely 
focused on technical feasibility and pay no or very small attention to the economic 
feasibility of the solution. Hence, there is a need to devise and implement remedial 
actions as and when required with adjustable control capability.   
Given the above motivations, the main objective of the thesis is to develop a 
computational framework that could help operators in managing the violated security 
constraints, especially during overstressed system operating conditions, and in that 
way improve the decision-making capability at control centres.  
1.4 Problem Statement and Contributions  
The research work presented in this thesis aims to answer following general question: 
Considering an electricity network which is already operating, or 
expected to operate under stressed and overstressed conditions, with 
many active constraint violations and with exhausted controls, how can 
we select and implement optimal and most effective remedial actions at 
minimal locations with minimal emergency reserves and with minimal 
switching actions?  
In this perspective, this thesis provides the following contributions:  
a) Infeasibility Diagnosis and Resolution Framework (IDRF): IDRF presents a 
metaheuristic methodology to localize and resolve infeasibility in nonlinear 
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optimization problem formulations (in general) and in constraint management 
problem formulations (in specific). 
b) Constraint Rationalization Framework (CRF): Effectively, CRF extends IDRF 
and reduces number of many immediate post-contingency constraint violations 
into a small number of critical constraints, according to various operational 
priorities during the overstressed operating conditions. Each operational priority is 
modelled as a separate objective function and the presented formulation can be 
easily extended to include other operational aspects. 
c) Remedial Action Selection and Implementation Framework (RASIF): Based 
on the developed CRF, RASIF presents a methodology for optimal selection and 
implementation of the most effective remedial actions, utilizing various ancillary 
services, such as reactive power compensation, distributed generation control, 
demand side management and load shedding strategies. 
The results from the research in this thesis have been published in seven conference 
papers [7]-[13] and one Journal paper [14]. Moreover, two journal papers [15-[16] are 
in preparation. I am the lead author and main contributor to all these publications.   
1.5 Research Methodology and Scope  
The research methodology is executed in four sequential phases: 1) problem modelling 
phase, 2) infeasibility analysis phase, 3) constraint rationalization phase and 4) 
remedial action implementation phase.  
Problem modelling phase: In this phase, SCM problem is formulated as a nonlinear 
constrained optimization problem and a set of mathematically feasible and infeasible 
operating conditions are created on various IEEE test systems. Based on the resulting 
optimization formulations, SCM problems are divided into two types: 
manageable/feasible and non-manageable/infeasible SCM cases. In general, an 
optimization problem becomes infeasible if there is no solution satisfying all the 
constraints. The minimal subset of constraints that causes a conventional algorithm to 
report infeasibility is named as the minimal intractable subset of constraints (MISC) 
[17]. In the context of power supply system analysis in this thesis, MISC is denoted as 
the critical operating constraint set (CCS) and its members are designated as critical 
operating constraints (CCs,) as these constraints restrict the operator to devise a 
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feasible dispatch that satisfies all the security limits. While MISC is defined mainly 
for the purpose of diagnosing and resolving infeasibility from a “mathematical sense”, 
the CCS is defined to find the “bottlenecks” in the power system. 
Feasibility analysis phase: This phase focuses on solving both types of SCM 
problems using conventional and metaheuristic algorithms. It demonstrates that 
conventional algorithms, though robust, are unable to solve and debug the infeasible 
SCM models. It also reveals that metaheuristic algorithms may be able to resolve the 
infeasible models in terms of identifying the most critical non-satisfiable constraints 
(i.e. MISC). As the critical constraints are the root causes for the infeasibility, an 
infeasible SCM model can be made feasible by removing or relaxing these critical 
constraints. Based on this fact, an infeasibility diagnosis and resolution framework 
(IDRF), using modified metaheuristic algorithms and constraint handling functions, is 
developed to localize and resolve infeasibility.  
Constraint rationalization phase: While for a given infeasible operational point the 
size and index of MISC are unique from pure infeasibility viewpoint (i.e. with 
infeasibility suitably formulated as an objective function), the size and index of the 
critical constraint set can be varied based on the operational priorities or objectives of 
the system operator and economic/market conditions at a given time. For example, the 
system operator may want to find critical constraint set corresponding to the specific 
objective function: maximization of lead-time for the next line outage due to the 
thermal violation. The identification of the locations and causes of critical operating 
constraints is particularly important as they are crucial in helping system planners and 
operators in deciding the location, type and amount of controls/reserves to be 
implemented to return the system into a feasible operating region (maintain system 
integrity). Given this fact, a novel constraint rationalization framework (CRF) is 
developed in this phase to compute the critical constraint set corresponding to five 
distinctive types of operational priorities. However, it should be noted that the 
introduced CRF framework can be easily extended to other operational priorities, as 
required or suitable.  
Remedial action implementation phase: This phase focuses on devising most 
effective remedial actions to mitigate constraint violations during overstressed 
1.6 Outline of the Thesis                                                                                    
8 
 
operating conditions (i.e. infeasible SCM cases). A novel remedial action selection and 
implementation framework (RASIF) is developed for optimal selection and 
implementation of these most effective remedial actions for resolving constraint 
violations in infeasible SCM cases. Four types of remedial actions: reactive 
compensation, distributed generation control, demand-side-management, and load 
shedding are analysed. The reactive compensation that employed here as the remedial 
action falls under the emergency corrective controls and is used only when the non-
emergency reactive compensation either completely used or insufficient. The target 
buses for the analysed remedial actions are selected using active and reactive power 
injection sensitivity factors, corresponding to critical operating constraints (identified 
in constraint rationalization phase). The RASIF is validated through both static and 
dynamic simulations to check its ability to satisfy all relevant static and dynamic 
security constraints during and after the transition from pre-contingency to post-
contingency states. 
Research Scope: The scope of this thesis falls under the intersection of power system 
computation and optimization, and operations research. It analyses the overstressed 
operating conditions in a power system with relevant mathematical models; and 
develops a computational framework to improve the decision-making capability of 
energy control centres to mitigate the overstressed operating conditions. Although the 
work is mainly focussed on transmission networks, the developed approaches could 
be easily applicable to distribution networks with minor modifications. 
1.6 Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized into seven chapters as follows. 
Chapter 1: This introductory chapter gives a general overview of the thesis. It 
discusses the motivation and objectives followed by contributions of the thesis.  
Chapter 2: This chapter provides an introduction and theoretical background to 
security constraint management.  
Chapter 3: Presents a mathematical and analytical formulations of security constraint 
management and then discusses working principles, merits, and demerits of various 
solution algorithms.   
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Chapter-4: Prepares and validates a list of feasible and infeasible SCM cases for 
several standard test networks. These cases will be used in later chapters to 
demonstrate the applicability of the proposed approaches.  
Chapter 5: Presents an infeasibility diagnosis and resolution framework to identify 
the minimum intractable subsystem of constraints (MISC) and resolve the infeasibility 
in infeasible SCM formulations by either penalizing and relaxing MISC.  
Chapter 6: Presents a metaheuristic framework for identifying the critical operational 
security constraints during the overstressed system operating conditions because of 
which a feasible dispatch cannot be realized. The constraint rationalization is carried 
out by considering the different priorities of the operator.  
Chapter 7: Using the results from the constraint rationalization framework and 
injection sensitivity factors, this chapter presents a novel remedial action framework. 
Five distinctive types of remedial actions are analysed here. Full time domain (system 
dynamics) simulation with the remedial actions is also presented, to check the 
satisfiability of dynamic security constraints during the transition from pre- to post-
contingency states.  
Chapter 8:  Discuss the conclusions and further directions (and implications) of the 












Chapter 2  
Overview of Security Constraint Management 
Methodologies 
This chapter provides an introduction and theoretical background to security 
constraint management. 
2.1. Introduction  
Arguably, the secure operation of modern electricity networks has now become an 
even more important and critical issue than ever before, which is mainly due to the 
new challenges faced by market and system operators in terms of increased penetration 
of renewable generation, market re-regulation and limited investments in system 
(transmission and distribution network) capacity enhancement. In particular, market 
re-regulation and reduced capacity investments require the system-operators to operate 
their networks closer to the operational security limits, in order to maximize the 
revenues while utilising available system assets. On the other hand, increased 
penetration of inverter-interfaced renewable generation effectively makes networks 
more vulnerable to even small disturbances, due to reduced system inertia, damping 
and fault levels.  
Security of an interconnected electricity network can be defined as an ability to survive 
imminent disturbances (e.g. a contingency) without interrupting the customer service 
(i.e. disconnection of load) [18]-[19]. When a contingency happens, the power flows 
are re-routed, based on the physical/electrical characteristics of the re-configured 
network. While a pre-contingency network can enable the exchange of these power 
flows between the generation and demand nodes without violating operational security 
limits of any of the transmission asset, the post-contingency network may, or may not 
be able to exchange the re-routed power flows without violating some operational 
security limits.  
Once the network operates beyond operational security limits, system security will be 
degraded. As these security limits influence system security and constrain the power 
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flows, the situation representing the violation of a security limit can be considered as 
a “security-constraint” on electricity transmission. System operators should ensure (to 
the highest possible extent) that these security limits are always respected for every 
dispatch scheme. The prolonged operation beyond security limits may lead to cascaded 
tripping of components and blackout. The prompt and adequate management of these 
security constraints is equally important for a fair operation of competitive electricity 
markets, as well as for maintaining network integrity and security [20]. The following 
sections provide a detailed discussion and literature review of security constraint 
management.  
2.2. Definition and Classification of Transmission Constraints  
Although the outcome of a transmission constraint is the same for all networks, 
different ISOs employ slightly varied definitions of a transmission constraint. Some of 
the definitions are provided below. 
A transmission constraint is defined as any limit on the ability of the national electricity 
transmission system, or any part of it, to transmit the power supplied onto the national 
electricity transmission system to the location where the demand for that power is 
situated (National Grid, UK) [21]. 
A transmission constraint is defined as occurring: ‘where the transmission system is 
unable to transmit the power supplied onto the transmission system to the location 
where the demand for that power is situated (Ofgem, UK) [22]. 
A transmission constraint is any limit on the ability of the transmission, or any part of 
it, to transmit power to a location which demands it (ELEXON, UK) [23]. 
A transmission constraint is a constraint on the transmission network between the 
subsystems or between areas within a subsystem (ENTOSE, Europe) [24]. 
A transmission constraint is a local limitation in the transmission capacity of the grid 
(Transpower, New Zeeland) [25]. 
A transmission constraint is a physical or operational limitation on the ability of a line 
or piece of equipment, set to limit power flows to a safe level (DOE, USA) [26].  
A transmission constraint is a limitation on the transmission network’s capability to 
deliver electrical power, which prevents one or more market generators from 
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generation at any desired output, up to their maximum capacity (AEMO, Australia) 
[27]. 
Given the above definitions, this thesis uses following definition: A transmission 
constraint between two nodes in the electricity network is defined as a limit on power 
exchanges between those nodes.  
Depending on the generation and demand patterns, and occurrences of outages in the 
system, constraints may arise and disappear in real-time [28]. From grid operations 
viewpoint, transmission constraints are activated by the violation of two types of 
operational security limits [28]-[30]: steady-state security and dynamic security limits 
(Table 2.1). These limits are called security limits, because their violation imposes a 
constraint on electricity transmission and system security depends on the satisfiability 
or non-satisfiability of these limits. A security limit, unless violated, cannot impose a 
constraint on electricity transmission in the network. The severity of a violated 
constraint generally depends on the amount of violation, location and consequence of 
the constraint, existence of other constraints, actual demand-generation pattern, and 
availability of the control and reserve resources.  
Steady state security limits are the operating limits that must be satisfied during the 
steady-state operating conditions and are generally related to pre-disturbance state and 
post-disturbance state in which all transients and dynamics during the transition have 
ended. Steady-state security constraints become active when there is a violation of 
steady-state security limits. Violated steady-state security limits can constrain the 
electricity transfer among different nodes during the steady-state operating conditions. 
Thermal limits relate to the thermal capacity of a transmission branch (e.g. 
transmission line, transformer, etc), ensuring that steady-state power flow through 
every branch is below its thermal rating. Operation beyond the thermal rating may 
trigger the protection and trip the corresponding equipment from the system. Similarly, 
steady-state voltage at each network node should be in the allowed or acceptable 
voltage margin, because consumers’ equipment, as well as utility equipment, may 
operate inefficiently, or not operate at all (e.g. electromagnetic compatibility limits 
would be violated) if voltages are outside this acceptable range.  
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Dynamic security limits are the limits that must be satisfied during the system 
transition between the two successive and different steady-state conditions. The 
transition involves the occurrence of a disturbance or large change in the system and 
subsequent application of some corrective control actions. System can transfer to a 
different steady-state safely if and only if the voltage and angle stability limits are 
fulfilled during the transition; otherwise, the system could end up in another disturbed 
state, which could potentially lead to a disconnection of a part of the system, or 
complete system collapse.  
Table 2.1 Classification of security limits 
Steady State Security Limits Dynamic Security Limits 
Branch thermal limits 
Bus voltage limits 
Angle stability limits 
Voltage stability limits 
2.3. Origins of Constraint Violations 
Typically, system constraints are imposed by the violation of security limits, and there 
are two general situations in which constraints might occur. First, demand in an area 
cannot be offset by the localized generation and at the same time import into that area 
is limited by the capacity of importing circuits. Second, generation in an area cannot 
be offset by the localized demand and at the same time export out of that area is limited 
by the capacity of exporting circuits.   
In modern electricity networks, there exist several reasons because of which security 
limits are frequently getting violated. Some of these reasons are mentioned below. 
Direction of generation to load: Most of the transmission and distribution circuits in 
the today’s power systems are designed and built back in the 20th century, according 
to the original power flows of that time [31]. The direction of generation capacity (i.e. 
installation) was planned to follow the direction of load growth [31]. However, 
generation in modern power systems changed its direction to load because of which 
the existing circuits are unable to carry the modified power flows, especially during 
peak-load and disturbance conditions. This further results in underutilization of some 
circuits and overloading and frequent tripping of some other circuits as well as bus 
voltage violations.  
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Occurrence of contingencies: Although utilities implement best preventive actions 
to avoid the occurrence of contingencies, contingencies do happen in power systems. 
While some outages are planned for maintenance activities, many of the outages are 
unplanned and unexpected. Contingencies are so far considered as the result of 
component and system faults, but, from cyber security viewpoint, they can be initiated 
irrespective of faults by cyber intruders [32].  
Penetration of power electronic interfaced renewable generation: Modern power 
systems feature ever increasing penetration of power electronic interfaced renewable 
generation both at transmission and distribution levels. While this helps in meeting the 
requirements for sustainable energy supply, it significantly reduces system inertia, 
damping and fault levels, and increases the generation uncertainty. This makes modern 
electricity networks more vulnerable to even small disturbances which may lead to 
equipment contingencies (e.g. tripping of inverter-interfaced generation) and hence 
transmission congestion [33].  
Re-regulated Markets [34]-[36]: Until the end of the 20th century, power systems 
were mainly regulated by government entities. Governments took the responsibility 
for maintaining quality, security, and reliability of electricity service by making 
needed investments and performing all the necessary functions. Nowadays, however, 
power systems and electricity markets are privatised for the reasons of more efficient 
and optimal use of system assets. In a re-regulated environment, private investors can 
take independent decision according to their own assessments rather than those of the 
government re-regulated bodies. System operators are forced to operate their networks 
near to, or at its physical security limits, in order to increase their profit margin. This 
results in the highly stressed and overstressed power systems, in which a small 
disturbance can result in unavailability of many system components and lead to 
emergency operating conditions (and existence of many security constraints or impose 
many security constraints).  
Limited and delayed investment in transmission expansion: While there is a 
significant increase in demand and renewable generation penetration in recent years, 
transmission circuits have not been upgraded accordingly, or there are significant 
delays in upgrading and re-enforcing due to environmental restrictions and limited 
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investments [37]-[40]. Insufficient funding, frequently changing regulatory 
frameworks with reduced incentives, and increased financial risk are some of many 
factors limiting the investments in transmission expansion [38]-[40].  
As the cost of managing possible constraints violations in some cases is lower than 
further investment in the transmission network, operating the system closer to some of 
security limits/constraints might be an economically efficient option.  
2.4. Consequences of Constraint Violations 
Violated constraints must be resolved as and when they arise, as otherwise there will 
be suboptimal power flows across interties, equipment damages, supply interruptions, 
and even blackouts. For example, a line outage due to a fault can result in overloading 
of other lines, which may be eventually tripped. Other lines are then overloaded, and 
a cascade of disconnections might be set in motion [41]. 
Independent system operators (ISO) or Transmission system operator (TSOs) procure 
various ancillary services, in order to manage the constraints during all system 
operating conditions and to control/balance power flows from the generation points to 
the load points. ISO/TSOs pay millions of dollars as constraint payments to ancillary 
service providers every year. For example, National Grid (UK) paid around £340M 
pounds as constraint management payments [21]. Hence, constraint management at 
lower cost is particularly important and any progress in this area could result in 
significant savings to network operators, which will further result in reduced energy 
prices to consumers. 
2.5. Security Constraints versus Operating Conditions 
Strictly speaking, every disturbance or a change in control action shifts the operating 
point from one location (i.e. present operating point) to another (i.e. the future 
operating point). The shift in the operating point may be small or large, depending on 
the severity of the disturbance. For example, a minor change in demand typically 
causes a small shift, while tripping of the major load or generation typically moves the 
operating point farther away from the previous location.  
If the future operating point meets a predefined (technical and/or economic) 
performance criteria, there is no need to take any preventive or corrective actions. If 
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not, the operator should implement relevant preventive/corrective actions in adequate 
or available time for their activation and realisation, to bring the system back to the 
previous operating point, or safely transit the system to another acceptable, i.e. secure 
operating point. However, until and unless the response of the network is known at 
numerous operating points, or states in a multi-dimensional operating space, system 
planners cannot devise proper guidelines and system operators cannot implement 
required corrective and preventive actions in a prompt and confident manner. 
Therefore, it would be important to decompose multi-dimensional operating space into 
a set of operating regions, so-called classification of operating points.  
2.5.1. Classification of Power System Operating States 
The classification of system operating points, or system states, plays a key role in 
power system planning and operation, as it helps planning engineers and operators in 
designing and implementing proper control strategies for several expected, unexpected 
and undesired operating points. The framework for classifying operating points is 
initially proposed in [42] and then extended in [43]. As references [42]-[44] suggest, 
all possible operating points can be classified into five broad categories, based on the 
degree to which the system adequacy and security were satisfied. While the adequacy 
is expressed through power balance constraints (also called equality or adequacy 
constraints), security is expressed through operational security limits (also called 
inequality or security constraints).  
A. Normal State (N) 
At the normal operating point, both adequacy and security constraints are satisfied, 
indicating that generation can meet the demand without violating any operational 
security limit of any asset (i.e. none of the security constraint is active). In the normal 
operating region, consisting of normal operating points, the system is considered to 
have sufficient level of security reserves to withstand every single contingency with 
or without the implementation of any manual or automatic corrective action. Hence 
this operating state is also considered as a “secure” state. 
B. Alert state (A) 
In alert operating state, both adequacy and security constraints are still satisfied, but 
the existing reserve margins are such that some disturbance (if it takes place) could 
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result in a violation of at least one security constraint. Alert state is an indication that 
the system is vulnerable to failures and requires implementation of necessary 
preventive actions to avoid security constraint violations. The system enters the alert 
operating region whenever the security reserves fall below some threshold value, or 
the probability of occurrence of disturbance with a strong negative impact increase. 
C. Emergency state (E) 
If a sufficiently severe disturbance takes place before (or despite of) implemented 
preventive actions, the system enters the emergency operating region. In this region, 
adequacy constraints are still satisfied, but at least one security constraint is violated. 
For example, some transmission lines might be operating beyond their 
allowed/emergency rating and some bus voltages are above/below their threshold 
voltage limits. However, the system could be still intact, at least for some time. In this 
lead time, operators must devise proper (emergency) corrective controls (so-called 
remedial actions) to prevent network breakdown and equipment damage. Emergency 
corrective control actions include load shedding, active and reactive reserves 
switching, network reconfiguration, generator re-dispatching, activation of demand-
side manageable loads, etc. 
D. Extreme Emergency state (ExE) 
If emergency corrective actions are not implemented in time or are ineffective, or a 
severe subsequent disturbance takes place, the protection systems will start to 
disconnect network components due to excessive stress or moving of operating points 
outside of allowed and safe ranges. This operating region is considered as the extreme 
emergency operating region. In this region, both adequacy and security constraints are 
violated, and the system is no longer intact, as protection has disconnected some loads 
and/or system components. Some system components will be either disconnected by 
protection or will be working beyond their emergency rating. Both situations typically 
result in a loss of major portions of the network supplying larger amounts of total 
system load. At this stage, further emergency corrective control actions should be 
directed toward preserving the system from the total collapse. 
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E. Restorative state (R)   
In emergency state, the equality and inequality constraints are violated, while the system 
is breaking up into independent parts, resulting in the formation of “islands” that may or 
may not be energized. Once the collapse had been halted, if there were any remaining 
components working within rated capability, or if some equipment had been 
successfully restarted following the prevention of the system collapse, system could 
enter the restorative operating region. The corresponding control actions (i.e. restorative 
controls) in this region are aimed to pick up all or most of the lost load and to reconnect 
islanded parts. Following implementation of restorative controls, system should transit 
to alert, or to normal operating point, depending on the circumstances and considered 
time period. 
Some researchers divided the emergency conditions into further types. In [45], 
emergency states are divided into steady state emergency and dynamic emergency 
(instability) states. In steady state emergency state, steady state security constraints are 
violated, but the system can still maintain the stability. In the dynamic emergency state, 
dynamic security constraints are violated, and the system cannot maintain the stability. 
Accordingly, the steady-state emergency condition may be tolerated for a reasonably 
long period, allowing the emergency corrective actions to be taken. The dynamic 
emergency condition takes place in a short period of time and unless a proper fast 
corrective action is taken, the system ends up in a restorative state [46].   
In [47], emergency states are also divided into steady state and dynamic emergency 
states, but definitions are slightly different. The system is in a steady state emergency 
when it cannot serve all the load, or when it can serve all the load, but some security 
constraints are violated. The system is in a dynamic emergency state when the 
synchronous operation is threatened, or frequency is decreasing due to insufficient 
generation to match the load.  
Classification of emergency conditions into correctable emergency state and non-
correctible emergency state is given in [48]. The correctable emergency state is the 
one at which all the load is supplied but some operating limits or security constraints 
are violated. However, these violations can be corrected by appropriate corrective 
controls without loss of load. The non-correctable emergency state is the one at which 
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all the load is supplied, and some operating limits are violated. But these violations 
cannot be corrected without loss of load. 
2.5.2. Stressed and Overstressed Operating Conditions 
The existing operating point classifications have neither defined the stressed and 
overstressed operating conditions, nor they say where these conditions fall within the 
existing framework. Although some aspects of the analysis in existing literature 
concentrated on “stressed systems”, e.g. [49]-[51], there was neither a concrete 
definition of a ‘stressed system’, nor a method for quantifying the level of stress [52]. 
Different people/organizations have differently perceived stressed and overstressed 
operating conditions [51]-[64]. Moreover, the concept of stressed and overstressed 
events is seen differently by industry and academia.  
In the majority of the existing literature, [51]-[54], it is said that the system is stressed 
when it is operating near to its operational limits, but how close to the limit is 
considered as “close” has not been discussed. In some other literature, the operating 
conditions that lead to voltage instability are considered as stressed conditions [55]-
[56]. But this approach has mostly concentrated on voltage security, rather than on 
both thermal and voltage security. Heavy loading (e.g. near to max demand) conditions 
are considered as stressed and even overstressed conditions in some other works [57]-
[60], although a system with transmission capacity higher than the maximum demand 
should supply this maximum demand with no constraint violation. National Grid (UK) 
consider that the system is stressed when the capacity margins are less than 20%, or 
when the demand control instruction is inevitable; the system is highly stressed when 
the capacity margins are less than 10% [61]-[62]. According to PJM [63], the operating 
conditions where the ancillary services are insufficient, or the prices are very high to 
maintain the network balance are considered as stressed operating conditions. 
According to EPRI [64], the operating conditions at which the intervention of remedial 
actions is necessary to maintain the energy balance are considered as stressed operating 
conditions.  
The previous definitions or assumptions have not properly linked the stressed and 
overstressed operating conditions into existing operating point classification 
framework and have not provided a methodology to diagnose them. Traditional 
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security constraint management procedures are not associated with tools that can 
detect and diagnose the stressed and overstressed operating conditions, as confirmed 
by the number of blackouts [51]. Hence, there is a need for mathematical approaches 
and tools to detect and diagnose these stressed and overstressed conditions, as the 
system is more vulnerable to even small disturbances and the probability of cascaded 
outages is significantly higher during the stressed and particularly overstressed 
operating conditions. The required approaches must be simple, intuitive, practical, and 
easy to visualize, so that operators can use it and respond quickly by issuing proper 
control actions.  
This thesis proposes such a simple methodology based on the status of steady state 
security constraint violations. The proposed approach considers steady state security 
limits as stress indicators (Table 2.2) and divides the operating region into unstressed, 
stressed, and overstressed regions. A description on how to relate these definitions to 
existing operating point classification framework is also provided (Figure 2.1).  
Table 2.2 System Stress Indicators 
Stress 
Indicator 






Line Loading Thermal Local flows of active 
powers 
Angle and frequency 
instability 
Bus Voltage Electrical Local flows of 
reactive powers 
Voltage collapse or voltage 
instability 
Unstressed system: is the system at an operating point where all steady state security 
constraints are satisfied. Additionally, the differences between their present values and 
maximum and minimum allowed values are sufficiently large, so there will be no 
further security constraint violations for any credible contingency related to that 
operating point. This could be also denoted as the “normal” system operation state. 
Stressed system: is the system operating at a point where at least one of the security 
constraints is violated and several other security constraints are close to their allowed 
limit values, but the network can still maintain the energy balance. For example, the 
loading of a line is above its maximum limit, but the system can be brought back to 
the normal unstressed operating point by adjusting (non-emergency) corrective 
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controls to reduce line loading without violating any further constraint. This could be 
denoted as the “emergency” operating state of the system. 
Overstressed system: is the system at an operating point at which at least one of the 
violated security constraints is critical. At this operating point, the system energy 
balance is lost, and system cannot be brought back to the normal state with the existing 
corrective controls. The system can only be brought back with prompt activation of 
emergency controls. This could be denoted as transitional state between emergency 
and extreme emergency state, where prolonged operation at over stressed condition 
leads to extreme emergency state.   
Network operators can employ the proposed classification of system stress to identify 
the stressed and overstressed operating conditions as well as to implement the relevant 
mitigative actions (Figure 2.1). 
 













































Fr/UnFrD - Foreseen/Unforeseen disturbances; PvC - Preventive controls
ECC/NECC - Non-emergency/emergency corrective controls
RC - Restorative controls; PrA - Protective Actions
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2.6. Security Assessment  
Security assessment is one of the most important tasks in power system planning and 
operation. Following a disturbance, different components will respond differently, 
depending on location and time of occurrence of disturbance, which will shift the 
system to a new operating point. At post-disturbance operating point, system may or 
may not violate the steady state security limits (branch thermal limits and bus voltage 
limits) and dynamic security limits (voltage and angle stability limits), while 
transferring from present to future steady state operating point.  
The purpose of the security assessment is to check whether the present operating point 
is secure or not, by estimating the degree to which the static and dynamic security 
limits are satisfied and devise proper preventive and corrective control actions, if 
necessary. This is achieved by analysing/simulating all credible contingencies at 
present operating point and checking the satisfiability of security limits at the 
corresponding post-contingency operating points [65].  
Static security assessment and dynamic security assessment are two main subfields of 
security assessment [66]. While static security assessment evaluates the satisfiability 
of steady state security limits, dynamic security assessment evaluates the satisfiability 
of dynamic security limits during the transition [67].  
In general, system security assessment is divided into three parts: a) system 
monitoring, b) contingency analysis, and c) security actions [68].  
2.6.1 System Monitoring 
System monitoring provides the network operators with relevant and up to date 
information on the system. Usually, SCADA system captures the component status 
information (e.g. on/off status of circuit breakers, switches, positions of OLTC, etc.), 
as well as other relevant information (i.e. generation, consumption, voltages, etc). This 
information is then used for the state estimation, together with network topology 
processor, in order to produce the “best estimate” (in a statistical sense) of the current 
system operating point [68].  
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2.6.2 Contingency Analysis 
Contingency analysis is further classified into three categories: contingency definition, 
screening, and evaluation. Contingency definition prepares the list of all credible 
contingencies for various network configurations and operating conditions. The 
credible contingencies are the contingencies with a high probability of occurrence. 
Typically, utility companies provide the component-failure rates. While the 
contingency screening filters critical contingencies from all credible contingencies, 
contingency evaluation performs detailed assessment of these critical contingencies, 
using full ac-power flow algorithms and time domain simulations.  
2.6.3 Security Controls 
Although network-operators try to run the network always within the normal and 
secure operating region, unplanned and unexpected disturbances do happen, and 
system may enter unsecure region of operation. Network operators, in these situations, 
should take control actions, so called security controls, to reinstate the security of the 
system. Traditionally, security controls have been divided into two main categories: 
preventive and corrective security controls [66]. While preventive controls are 
implemented before the occurrence of the disturbances to prepare the system to face 
these disturbances in a satisfactory way, corrective controls are implemented after the 
occurrence of disturbances, to both minimize the consequences and return the system 
back to secure operating region [70].  
Corrective controls can be divided into non-emergency, emergency, and restorative 
corrective controls. The objective of the non-emergency corrective controls (NECC) 
is to return the system to the normal operating region following a disturbance or 
contingency. The objective of the emergency corrective controls (ECC) is to return the 
system to normal or at least alert operating region from emergency conditions, while 
minimizing the impact of emergencies. Emergency control actions are usually 
automatic but are sometimes also operator initiated. The objective of the restorative 
controls is to restore supply to all disconnected loads by re-connecting all disconnected 
islands and to bring the system back to normal, or at least alert operating condition.  
Non-emergency corrective controls generally include: generation rescheduling, 
network reconfiguration, reactive compensation, etc; emergency corrective controls 
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include: direct and indirect load shedding, generation shedding, emergency generation 
connection, shunt capacitor or reactive switching, network splitting, etc [66], [70].  
2.7. Security Constraint Management (SCM) 
The mathematical procedure to check the degree of satisfiability of security limits is 
known as security assessment, or security analysis, and is further divided into static 
and dynamic security assessment. Static security assessment checks the satisfiability 
of only steady state security limits, while dynamic security assessment checks the 
satisfiability only dynamic security limits.  
Steady state security analysis is performed for a specific the operating point, while the 
dynamic security analysis is performed during the transition between two operating 
points. If all the steady state security constraints are satisfied at an operating point, the 
operating point is considered as “steady state secure”. If all the dynamic security 
constraints are satisfied during the transition from the present operating point to 
another point, the transition between these two operating points is “dynamic secure”. 
A system is secure if steady-state security constraints are fulfilled both at pre- and 
post-disturbance operating points, and if dynamic security constraints are fulfilled 
during the transition to post-disturbance operating point.   
Neglecting small load and generation variations, a static secure system, will continue 
to stay at same steady-state-secure operating point as long as no disturbance that can 
push the system to another operating point takes place. There is no need to check the 
satisfiability of dynamic security constraints, unless there is a considerable shift in the 
operating point. While all transitions are possible from mathematical analysis 
viewpoint, some transitions are not possible on the physical system (Table 2.3). For 
example, a dynamic insecure transition never leads to a static-secure operating point, 
it leads to much more severe static-insecure operating point or blackout. 
From the point of real-time or near-real-time operation, the management/resolution of 
the security constraints are denoted as security constraint management, or transmission 
security constraint management, or simply transmission constraint management. ISO 
or TSOs procure various ancillary services to manage the constraints during all 
conditions and balance the load.  
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N-1 secure system may achieve 
this. 
(Default control is enough, or no 
control is needed) 
Static 
secure 






Default control is not enough. 
Applied control is not enough 
State change happens 
Static 
secure 






This transition is not possible in a 
real system because steady state 
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but control failed.  
System reaches insecure state. 
State change happens. May lead 
to Emergency state. 
Static 
insecure 






This transition is not possible in 
real system, because steady state 












but control failed. 
System reaches insecure state. 
State change happens. May lead 
to Emergency state. 
OP-operating point; N,A, E and ExE – Normal, alert, emergency, and extreme emergency states 
In the first instance, before any constraint becomes active, operators always try to 
implement preventive actions to avoid the occurrence of the constraints. But, as 
mentioned, some unplanned/non-credible disturbances might occur suddenly, leaving 
no time for the operator to implement preventive actions and some constraints become 
active. Operators are in-charge to control these situations, as they can use any sort of 
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resources within their boundary (considering their costs) to control these situations. 
Generally, operators will try to use the (non-emergency) corrective controls (primary, 
secondary, tertiary active and reactive controls) available on hand to restore the 
security. But there exist situations (e.g. some severe contingency events) in which the 
available non-emergency corrective controls are not sufficient to devise a feasible 
dispatch. In these cases, the operators go for more expensive emergency corrective 
controls (e.g. load shedding, curtailment of wind generation, corrective controls in 
neighbouring network operator’s area) to restore the static security through a 
successful transition.  
The easiest solution to mitigate constraints violations is to activate all possible controls 
(both NECC and ECC) at all possible locations, but this solution may not be techno-
economically efficient. For example, if a situation involves too many active constraints 
(e.g. more than 10), the corrective actions devised using this analogy will be extremely 
expensive. In fact, these costs down the line are imposed on consumer electricity bills. 
A tool which guides the operator to identify the critical active constraints out of all 
active constraints, and also aids operator to identify the potential solutions and 
potential locations (and the cost of each solution as a lookup table), would significantly 
improve the decision-making capability of operators. In the worst case, if no solution 
possible, it would help operators calculate the minimum amount of load to be 
disconnected to avoid the system collapse due to cascaded tripping, and blackout or 
instability. Moreover, such a tool will improve the confidence of operators on their 
decision. They can say to the market operators that they have tried all resorts, and all 
have failed.  
2.8. Process of Constraint Management  
This thesis proposes a modified security constraint management procedure to mitigate 
the overstressed operating conditions. While Algorithm 2.1 presents the overview of 
the existing constraint management procedure followed by the system operators and 
engineers, Algorithm 2.2 details the modified procedure proposed in the thesis. The 
important difference between the existing and modified procedure is the constraint 
rationalization. 
2.8 Process of Constraint Management                                                                                    
27 
 
Algorithm 2.1: Existing SCM procedure  
1) Identify the violated security limits i.e. active security constraints  
2) Select the available (non-emergency) corrective controls  
3) Formulate SCM problem with selected controls  
4) Solve SCM problem using an algorithm  
5) If the problem is solved go to Step 7, else go to Step 6. If the SCM case is 
feasible, problem will be solvable, else unsolvable (i.e. system operating under 
overstressed conditions).  
6) Add (emergency) corrective controls (i.e. remedial actions) and go to Step 3 
7) Check the dynamic security of transition  
8) If the dynamic security check passed, go to Step 10, else go to Step 9 
9) Change the selected controls and then go to Step 3 
10) Implement new control settings and resolve all active constraints 
If the system is operating under the non-overstressed conditions, SCM problem 
becomes feasible and there exists a solution since non-emergency corrective controls 
are adequate to resolve all active security constraints. If the system is operating under 
overstressed operating conditions, SCM problem becomes infeasible, there exists no 
solution with the non-emergency corrective controls. Prolonged operation under these 
conditions can potentially lead to cascading outages and partial/complete blackout. 
The system must require the activation of emergency corrective controls to resolve the 
constraint violations during these overstressed conditions.  
Existing constraint management procedure selects and issues the emergency corrective 
controls (so-called remedial actions) based on the occurrence of predefined events and 
the level of control is fixed. But the proposed constraint management procedure first 
identifies the critical constraints that are the root causes for developing overstressed 
operating conditions. These critical constraints, from the network viewpoint, are the 
most stressed assets (e.g. overloaded branches). Using the locations of these critical 
assets, modified procedure devises the location, type and amount of emergency control 
action. The detailed discussion and benefits of the modified procedure are presented 
with numerous examples in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
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Algorithm 2.2: Modified SCM Procedure  
1) Identify the violated security limits i.e. active security constraints  
2) Select the available (non-emergency) corrective controls  
3) Formulate SCM problem with selected controls  
4) Solve SCM problem using an algorithm  
5) If the problem solved go to Step 8 else go to Step 6. If the SCM case is feasible 
problem will be solvable else unsolvable (i.e. system operating under 
overstressed conditions).  
6) Activate constraint rationalization and find the critical active constraints 
according to operator priority 
7) Using the locations of critical constraints, identify the type, amount, and location 
of (emergency) corrective controls and then go to Step 3.  
8) Check the security of dynamic transition  
9) If the dynamic security check passed go to Step 11 else go to Step 10 
10) Change the configuration of selected controls and then go to Step 3 
11) Implement new control settings and resolve all active constraints 
2.9. Classification of SCM cases  
The mathematical relevance of overstressed conditions can be observed in both static 
and dynamic analysis of the considered system. From steady state viewpoint, 
mathematical formulation of the relevant constraint management problem becomes 
infeasible, and the corresponding numerical algorithm either non-converge, or diverge 
due to ill-conditioning of underlying matrices, or inability to select proper initial 
values. From dynamic analysis viewpoint, the numerical integration may also become 
infeasible due to inability of finding feasible initial values from steady state analysis, 
or numerical infeasibility.  
Considering the above, SCM problem formulations are divided into feasible and 
infeasible SCM cases in this thesis. While feasible SCM case has zero active 
constraints that cannot be resolved by available/modelled non-emergency corrective 
controls, infeasible SCM case has at least one active constraint that cannot be resolved 
by available non-emergency corrective controls. Hence, these cases are also called as 
manageable and non-manageable SCM cases in prevailing industrial terminology.  
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The mathematical formulation of an SCM problem is feasible if it has a solution (i.e. 
NECC solution) satisfying all constraints, and infeasible if it does not have any 
solution satisfying all equality and inequality constraints simultaneously. This 
judgment assumes that there is an algorithm which can find the solution (if there is 
one), or otherwise notify there is no solution. If the violated constraints are divided 
into critical and noncritical constraints, manageable SCM case always has zero number 
of critical constraint violations, while the non-manageable case always has a nonzero 
number of critical constraint violations. This situation happens during overstressed and 
emergency operating conditions, where either the available non-emergency corrective 
controls are insufficient, or the location of the available controls is not suitable for 
resolving all constraint violations.  
2.10. Literature Review  
The background literature of the thesis span across four different fields: overstressed 
operating conditions, infeasibility diagnosis in nonlinear OPF programs, constraint 
rationalization and remedial action schemes. As the thesis takes motivation from 
different fields, it would be difficult to provide a coherent discussion of the background 
literature in one place. Hence, I intentionally decided to present the detailed literature 
in related chapters where it appropriate. Nevertheless, the brief overview of the 
literature and where the detailed literature is available is explained below.  
Over stressed operating conditions [49] - [64]: Although some studies focussed on 
stressed and overstressed power systems, there was neither a concrete definition of a 
‘stressed system’, nor a method for quantifying the level of stress. The existing 
operating point classification framework has neither defined stressed and overstressed 
conditions nor it said where these conditions fall within the existing framework and 
how to diagnose and model these conditions. So, there is an obvious need to define as 
well as link these conditions to the existing operating point classification framework. 
With an aim to address this gap, this thesis proposed a simple methodology to define 
stressed and overstressed operating conditions in Section 2.5.2 and the detailed 
literature is also provided there itself.  
Infeasibility diagnosis in nonlinear OPF programs [3-6, [10,12, 14, 17, 48, 71-89]: 
Although there exist methods to diagnose the infeasibility in liner OPF programs, no 
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reliable method exists for diagnosing infeasibility in nonlinear OPF programs. Chapter 
5 presents a detailed literature review of the infeasibility diagnosis in nonlinear OPF 
programs and proposes an infeasibility diagnosis and resolution framework (IDRF) 
with an aim to address the research gap in existing literature.  
Constraint rationalization [28, 43, 81, 90-99]: While most of the existing literature 
on constraint management has focussed on resolving constraint violations through 
various controls, very few works focussed on identifying the critical constraints based 
on operator priorities (especially during overstressed operating conditions) and use the 
knowledge of critical constraint to devise most effective corrective actions. Chapter 6 
presents a detailed literature review and proposes a constraint rationalization 
framework (CRF) to identify the critical constraints during overstressed conditions.  
Remedial action schemes [3,4, 14, 21, 28, 51, 100-127]: Most of the previous RASs 
are designed based on planning analysis and they are event-driven and fixed. As the 
system evolves over time, these RAS may be ineffective from the technical and/or 
economic viewpoint. Consequently, there is an obvious need to devise response-driven 
driven RAS in the operations environment, using system physical models and/or real-
time measurements. Chapter 7 presents a detailed literature as well as proposes a 
remedial action selection and implementation framework (RASIF) to devise the most 
effective response-driven RAS during to mitigate overstressed conditions.   
2.11. Conclusions 
Constraint management is one of the continuous and fundamental tasks done by system 
operators. Independent system operators spend millions of dollars in procuring various 
constraint management services to mitigate constraint violations. This chapter, based 
on the satisfiability of steady state security constraints, presented a simple 
methodology to define as well as diagnose the stressed and overstressed operating 
states. These definitions were made in align with the existing classification of system 
operating states. The main reasons for the constraint violations in modern electricity 
networks and the impact of constraint violations are discussed. Finally, this chapter 
explained that these overstressed operating conditions can be interpreted as infeasible 
mathematical formulations of the SCM problems.  
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Chapter 3  
SCM Problem Formulation and Solution Algorithms 
This chapter presents a mathematical and analytical formulations of security 
constraint management and then discusses working principles, merits, and demerits of 
various solution algorithms.   
3.1 Introduction 
The management of the steady state security constraints, involving their identification 
and corrective actions in case they are violated, is referred to as security constraint 
management (SCM) [1]. SCM remains to be one of the critical tasks performed by the 
engineers and network operators during the system planning and operations. In 
general, SCM is formulated as a nonlinear constrained optimization problem and can 
be solved by either conventional (gradient-based) approaches, or non-conventional 
(metaheuristic) approaches [7]. The rest of this chapter explains the detailed modelling 
of the SCM problem and the relevant solution algorithms employed in this thesis.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the problem 
formulation. Section 3.3 provides key insights into the problem formulation. An 
overview of solution algorithms is discussed in Section 3.4 and detailed discussion of 
implemented solution algorithms is presented in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 discusses the 
employed penalty functions in the thesis, and Section 3.7 concludes the chapter. 
3.2 SCM Problem Formulation 
The objective of an SCM problem is to find the optimal control solution that resolve 
all constraint violations while minimizing the cost of achieving that solution. SCM can 
be mathematically formulated as a nonlinear, nonconvex and constrained optimization 
problem, (3.1) - (3.3). It should be noted that the SCM mathematical formulation is 
similar to Optimal Power Flow (OPF) formulation in power systems. OPF is one of 
the fundamental mathematical formulations in power system engineering and most of 
the network-level planning and operational problems can be analysed using OPF 
formulation, and SCM is no exception to that.  
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𝑚𝑖𝑛.    𝑓(𝑥0, 𝑢0) (3.1) 
𝑠. 𝑡.    𝑔(𝑥𝑐, 𝑢0) = 0 (3.2) 
ℎ(𝑥𝑐, 𝑢0 ) ≤ 0, 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 = {0,1, 2, …𝑁𝑐} (3.3) 
where: x, u: state and control variables, c: contingency index (zero for base case), C: 
set of credible contingencies, f: objective function, g: equality constraints, h: inequality 
constraints. 
The main difference between general OPF formulation and SCM formulation is the 
objective function (f) and inequality constraints (h) of interest. General OPF 
formulation analyses the network with a range of objective functions, e.g. fuel cost, 
(3.4), emission, (3.5), loss (3.6), etc, which may or may not include transmission 
security constraints (static and dynamic security limits). But, SCM formulation 
focuses on finding a feasible and (if possible) optimal corrective control solution at 
optimized control priority or objective (e.g. cost of feasible control solution, (3.4), 
available lead-time for next contingency, disconnected load, etc). Chapter-6 provides 
a detailed discussion on employed control priorities in this thesis.  
𝐹𝑇 =∑[𝑎𝑖𝑃𝐺𝑖
2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑃𝐺𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑁𝐺
𝑖=1
]   $/ℎ (3.4) 
𝐸𝑇 =∑[𝑑𝑖𝑃𝐺𝑖
2 + 𝑒𝑖𝑃𝐺𝑖 + 𝑓𝑖
𝑁𝐺
𝑖=1











   𝑀𝑊 (3.6) 
Equality constraints, (3.2), are represented by the nodal power balance equations, 
(3.7)-(3.8). Inequality constraints, (3.3), represent equipment operating limits: 
generator real and reactive power limits, (3.9)-(3.10), transformer tap setting limits, 
(3.11), and branch thermal rating limits, (3.12), as well as bus voltage limits, (3.13). 
𝑃𝐺𝑖 − 𝑃𝐷𝑖 − 𝑉𝑖∑𝑉𝑗
𝑁𝐵
𝑗=1
[𝐺𝑖𝑗 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝜃𝑖 − 𝜃𝑗) + 𝐵𝑖𝑗 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝜃𝑖 − 𝜃𝑗)] = 0 (3.7) 
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𝑄𝐺𝑖 − 𝑄𝐷𝑖 − 𝑉𝑖∑𝑉𝑗
𝑁𝐵
𝑗=1
[𝐺𝑖𝑗 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝜃𝑖 − 𝜃𝑗) + 𝐵𝑖𝑗 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝜃𝑖 − 𝜃𝑗)] = 0 (3.8) 
𝑃𝐺𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑃𝐺𝑖 ≤ 𝑃𝐺𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, …𝑁𝐺 (3.9) 
𝑄𝐺𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑄𝐺𝑖 ≤ 𝑄𝐺𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, …𝑁𝐺 (3.10) 
𝑇𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑇𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑖 = 1, 2, …𝑁𝑇 (3.11) 
𝑆𝑙𝑖 ≤ 𝑆𝑙𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑖 = 1, 2, …𝑁𝐿 (3.12) 
𝑉𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑉𝑖 ≤ 𝑉𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑖 = 1, 2, …𝑁𝐵 (3.13) 
Where: 𝑃𝐺𝑖 , 𝑄𝐺𝑖 – real and reactive power output of generator 𝑖, 𝑃𝐷𝑖 , 𝑄𝐷𝑖 – real and 
reactive demand at bus 𝑖, 𝑉𝑖, 𝜃𝑖 – Voltage magnitude and phase angle at bus 𝑖, 𝐹𝑇 , 𝐸𝑇 
– total fuel cost and emission, 𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 – total active power loss in the system,  𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖,  𝑐𝑖 
– fuel cost coefficients of generating unit 𝑖, 𝑑𝑖, 𝑒𝑖, 𝑓𝑖 - Emission coefficients of 
generating unit 𝑖, 𝑁𝐵, 𝑁𝐺 , 𝑁𝐿- Number of buses, generators and branches, 𝐺𝑖𝑗, 𝐵𝑖𝑗 – 
conductance and admittance of a line connecting buses 𝑖 and 𝑗. 
3.3 Insights into the Problem Formulation 
This section explains some fundamental definitions and concepts of optimization that 
are important to understand the methodologies proposed in this thesis.  
3.3.1 Feasible and Infeasible Search Space  
A feasible search space is the set of all possible (i.e. physically feasible) operating 
points that satisfy all stipulated constraints. Every point in the feasible search space 
could be a solution to the problem, and the optimization algorithms explore this 
feasible search space to find the most optimal point. If the constraints are contradictory 
(e.g. satisfaction of one constraint requires violation of other constraint), there are no 
points that satisfy all the constraints and thus the feasible region is the null set. If the 
feasible region is a null set, then the search space is said to be infeasible [17, 128, 129]. 
3.3.2 Feasible and Infeasible Problem Formulation 
SCM problem formulation is said to be feasible if there exists a solution which satisfies 
all equality and inequality constraints simultaneously and infeasible if there exists no 
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such solution. This judgment assumes that there is an algorithm which can find a 
feasible solution (if there is one), or else report infeasibility (if there is no solution). 
In general, an optimization model can become infeasible due to following three 
reasons:  
Infeasibility due to formulation or data errors: Modeller or analyst mistakes (e.g. 
misplacement of upper and lower limits of a specific constraint), or corrupted data (e.g. 
data received from SCADA system may be wrong because of bad data or corrupted by 
cyber attacker) can lead to infeasible formulation [4, 17]. In this case, optimization 
algorithm either throws an error due to numerical failure (e.g. calculation of a square 
root of a negative value), or reports infeasibility. This infeasibility can be denoted as 
“data infeasibility” and it is the most common infeasibility in SCM formulations. Most 
of the commercial optimization solvers, as well as power system optimization software 
have embedded techniques to detect and resolve data infeasibility. 
Infeasibility due to scaling issues: Sometimes, even though there are no modelling 
and data mistakes, the algorithm may still report infeasibility due to scaling issues. For 
example, bad scaling of Lagrangian and penalty multipliers for equality and inequality 
constraints may lead to the ill-conditioning of involved matrices (e.g. Jacobian). When 
this happens, matrix inversion algorithms may fail, and optimization algorithms halt 
the progress, as the corrections required to update the search variables for the next 
iteration cannot be calculated. This infeasibility is denoted as “scaling infeasibility”. 
Scaling infeasibility is not common, because most of the commercial solvers 
implement preconditioning of variables to prevent scaling issues.  
Infeasibility due to infeasible search space: If the search space becomes infeasible, 
the algorithm reports infeasibility, as there is no solution which satisfies all constraints. 
This infeasibility is denoted as “true infeasibility” because this is the only type of 
infeasibility that represents the actual infeasibility in the problem formulation. 
Accordingly, data and scaling infeasibilities are denoted as “false infeasibilities”, as 
these does not represent the actual infeasibility. In case of data and scaling issues, there 
exists a solution, but optimization algorithms are unable to find that solution because 
of the data errors and/or scaling issues.  
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In case of true infeasibility, the gradients of the active inequality constraints and the 
gradients of the equality constraints become linearly dependent. That is why the 
Newton matrix (or equivalent that involves solving KKT conditions via gradient based 
equation solvers) becomes singular or has extremely high condition number. When 
this happens, matrix inversion algorithms may fail and hence optimization algorithms 
had to halt the progress, as they cannot calculate the corrections to update the search 
variables for the next iteration. 
In general, true infeasibility happens when the required resources are greater than the 
available resources, or when there are conflicting requirements. For example, an SCM 
solution algorithm will report a true infeasibility when the available controls are 
insufficient to devise a feasible dispatch that respects all security constraints [4]. This 
situation typically happens during stressed and overstressed operating conditions, 
when available controls are exhausted, and some constraints cannot be satisfied [4, 
130]. As mentioned in Chapter 2, modern electricity networks are frequently operated 
under stressed and sometimes under overstressed operating conditions, in order to meet 
the market requirements and to integrate more renewable energy.  
Moreover, the increased penetration of renewable energy can change the direction and 
levels of power flows across several branches, and the existing networks may not be 
able to carry these changed power flows. Hence, the increased levels of renewable 
generation (with no further investment in transmission) can potentially lead to 
infeasible power flows. This thesis focuses on true infeasible SCM formulations 
related to the occurrence of overstressed operating conditions. 
3.3.3 Infeasibility Detection and Certification 
It is necessary to detect and certify/confirm infeasibility, to avoid spending large 
computational times on trying to find a solution which does not exist. If the 
infeasibility is confirmed, an optimization algorithm can concentrate on feasibility, 
rather than optimality. It is quite complex to prove infeasibility in nonlinear 
optimization problems, compared to linear optimization problems. This becomes much 
severe when the problem is nonconvex, and the constraints are nonlinear functions 
[17]. Metaheuristic algorithms can be used to solve find a reasonably good solution to 
these kinds of problems although they may not provide (global) optimal solution.  
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Infeasibility diagnosis in nonlinear optimization is still an immature research topic and 
more reliable and accurate methods are needed to find and decide infeasibility [131]. 
While there exist reliable certificates (e.g. Farkas lemma) to prove global infeasibility 
in linear optimization problems, a very few certificates exist to prove even local 
infeasibility for nonlinear optimization problems. Moreover, these certificates are 
applicable to nonlinear problems with specific structures (e.g. convex problem). A 
more detailed information on infeasibility certificates for nonlinear optimization 
problems can be found in [132]-[135].  
As mentioned earlier, infeasibility conditions/status can be observed by checking the 
linear independence of gradients of active inequality constraints against the gradients 
of equality constraints [82, 89, 136], or by checking the condition number of Newton 
matrix. If the condition number of Newton matrix is close to singular, it can be 
confirmed that the problem is infeasible.  Moreover, use of more than one solver can 
help, as it is unlikely that two or more solvers will make a wrong judgement on 
infeasibility [137]. 
It should be noted that the aim of this thesis is not to develop any infeasibility 
certificates. Hence, in this thesis the proof of the infeasibility of the considered SCM 
formulations is obtained: a) by checking the condition number of Newton matrix, b) 
by solving SCM problems with different open-source and commercial solvers. This 
will be discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5.  
3.3.4 Infeasibility Diagnosis and Localization 
Given an infeasible model, it is very important to localize the infeasibility in order to 
make engineering decisions with reduced risk and cost. In the case of infeasible SCM 
problems, it would be useful to know the locations of underlying constraints, so that 
appropriate corrective actions may be taken. In general, an optimization model for 
power system analysis will become infeasible due to only a small set of non-satisfiable 
constraints [100]. Once these constraints are identified, infeasibility can be resolved 
by either relaxing them, or by placing (planning stage) or activating (operational stage) 
additional resources at the effective locations.  
Hence, the infeasibility diagnosis of SCM model can be expressed as following 
question: what is the smallest set of security constraints to be resolved, so that the 
3.3 Insights into the Problem Formulation                                                                                    
37 
 
remaining constraints constitute a feasible set? In that context, this thesis adopts the 
concept of the minimum intractable subsystem of constraints (MISC, defined below) 
from optimization theory and implement it to infeasible SCM problems. From the 
point of infeasible SCM modelling, MISC is redefined as the critical security 
constraint subsystem, or simply critical constraint subsystem (CCS).  
Minimum Intractable Subsystem of Constraints (MISC): A minimal set of 
constraints causing a given optimization solver to report infeasibility under a given set 
of parameters and variable settings (including initial points, tolerances, termination 
conditions, etc.) [138]. It is also defined as the smallest subset of constraints whose 
removal makes the remaining model feasible, or whose relaxation makes the original 
model feasible [139]-[140]. In order to make an infeasible problem feasible, all 
constraints in MISC should be removed or relaxed simultaneously from the problem 
formulation. 
Irreducible Infeasible Subset (IIS): The (small) subset of constraints that is itself 
infeasible but becomes feasible if one or more constraints are removed from it. It is 
also called irreducible inconsistent subset. It is important to note that there exist more 
than one IIS for a given infeasible problem, and each IIS may share some similar 
constraints. So, several IIS’s need to be calculated and post-processed to find the 
MISC. Currently, efficient implementations for IIS isolation are only available for 
linear optimization [141].  
Critical Constraint Set (CCS): The minimum set of security constraints that prevents 
the operator from devising a feasible dispatch for a given operating priority is defined 
as CCS in the thesis. Remaining constraints are treated as noncritical and represented 
by noncritical constraint set (NCCS). While the constraints in CCS are denoted as 
critical constraints (CCs), constraints in NCCS are denoted as noncritical constraints 
(NCCs). The violations of CCs are represented by critical constraint violations (CCVs) 
and the violations of NCCs are represented by noncritical constraint violations 
(NCCVs). 
From the operational viewpoint, critical constraints can help operators in two potential 
ways: 
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a) Operators can call for additional (e.g. emergency) control reserves at the locations 
which are more efficient for removing the critical constraints, so that SCM can be 
performed with reduced risk and/or cost.  
b) If additional reserves are not available, the operator can relax these critical 
constraints by a specific amount, until the additional reserves come online, or until 
the original problem is resolved (e.g. faulted line back into service).  
There are reliable methods to find MISC for linear optimization problems, but not for 
nonlinear nonconvex optimization problems, because calculation of MISC is an NP-
hard problem [139]. Hence, existing methods can calculate mostly an IIS rather than 
MISC for nonlinear nonconvex optimization problems. Moreover, the existing 
methods make several assumptions on problem formulations (e.g. the problem needs 
to be quadratic and convex) [142].  
Infeasibility diagnosis is one of the important and under-addressed issue in power 
system optimization models, especially nonlinear OPF formulations [2]-[5]. There are 
very few works on infeasibility diagnosis in nonlinear OPF formulations, focusing on 
constraint relaxation, soft penalization, and virtual generators (detailed literature is 
covered in Chapter 5) [6, 73, 81, 83-89].  
Chapter 5 proposes a metaheuristic framework to analyse infeasible SCM cases. The 
framework does not make any assumptions on problem formulation and considers the 
SCM problem as a nonlinear and nonconvex optimization problem. The framework 
can reliably find the MISC for most of the infeasible cases, and resolve infeasibility 
by either relaxing or penalizing the MISC. This approach of debugging infeasible SCM 
and OPF models through identification of MISC, to the best of author’s knowledge, is 
introduced for the first time in this thesis.   
3.3.5 Infeasibility Measures 
From an optimization perspective, the inclusion or exclusion of objective function does 
not modify the search space of the original infeasible problem. Hence, in the case of 
an infeasible optimization problem, the objective of the optimization process is to 
minimize the infeasibility measure. Infeasibility measures quantify the severity of 
infeasibility. There exist few infeasibility measures in the literature and the most 
popular ones are explained below. 
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For ease of explanation, consider only a set of inequality constraints:  
𝑥𝑖 < 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑖 |  𝑥 = 1,2,3, …𝑁 (3.14) 
Constraint 𝑥𝑖 is said to be violated if 𝑥𝑖 > 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑖, and if a constraint is violated, 
















a) The number of infeasibilities (NINF): The total number of constraints whose 











c) The sum of squares of infeasibility (SSINF): the sum of squares of violation of 






3.4 Solution Methods 
SCM problem, (3.1)-(3.3), is a constrained optimization problem that constitutes a 
function to be optimized and a set of equality and inequality constraints to be satisfied. 
The constraints can be of a bound or functional type, and functional constraints can be 
linear or nonlinear. Bound constraints can be enforced on either independent variables 
or dependent variables. Independent variables are simply the control/search variables 
(e.g. generator bus voltage, generator active power, etc.) that can be directly controlled 
by the optimization method. Dependent variables are the variables that cannot be 
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directly controlled by the optimization algorithm, but they are the outcomes during the 
optimization process (e.g. load bus voltage).  
Let say the optimal value of the objective function (𝑓) is 𝑓∗ at the optimal control point 
(𝑈∗) in an n-dimensional control space. Then, SCM problem can be treated as a search 
problem with objective to find the 𝑈∗ that provides 𝑓*. In general, any search method 
starts from an arbitrary control point (𝑈0) in the control space and reaches 𝑈
∗ by 
incrementally moving from one location to another location in the control space. Based 
on the way the incremental movement is directed, search methods are divided into 
direct and indirect search methods.  
Direct search methods, as the name says, directly regulate the incremental movement 
(mostly) by stochastic principles. These stochastic principles do not rely on any 
topological information of the problem being optimized, except the value of the 
objective function. In indirect search methods, as the name says, the incremental 
movement is guided by the gradients of the objective function and constraint functions. 
That is why indirect search methods are denoted as gradient-based approaches, and 
direct search methods are denoted as gradient-free approaches in the literature. 
Gradient-based approaches are also called conventional methods, while gradient-free 
approaches are called non-conventional or metaheuristic methods.  
None of the indirect/conventional or direct/metaheuristic methods can solve a 
constrained problem in its original formulation, (3.1)-(3.3), as most of these algorithms 
are developed to solve only unconstrained optimization problems. Hence, irrespective 
of type of the approach to be implemented, the fundamental step in solving any 
constrained optimization problem is to convert the constrained optimization problem 
into an unconstrained optimization problem, so that the existing unconstrained 
optimization algorithms can be applied.  
This conversion process involves addition of equality and inequality constraints to the 
main objective function using (interior/exterior) penalty functions. The resulting 
augmented function is the summation of main/original objective function and penalty 
for violated constraints. The augmented objective function is denoted as Lagrangian 
function (L, in case of gradient-based algorithms) or penalized objective function 
(POF, in case of metaheuristic algorithms), based on the way constraints are handled.  
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The objective of the modified problem is to minimize the Lagrangian or penalized 
objective function. Optimum of Lagrangian function (L) and original objective 
function (f) are identical when the penalty for violating constraints becomes zero (i.e. 
none of the constraints are active/unresolved in the final solution). Direct and indirect 
search algorithms employ different steps to minimize the Lagrangian function. 
Metaheuristic methods minimize the penalized objective function directly by 
continuously modifying the search variables within the given bounds using stochastic 
principles. In other words, direct search algorithms start with an initial solution vector 
(guessed or random) and continuously shift the solution vector from one point to 
another in n-dimensional control space, as long as the objective function reduces, while 
penalised constraints are met. The point to note is that the trajectory of the solution 
vector is guided by stochastic principles, which are independent of the problem. 
Conventional methods, unlike metaheuristic methods, cannot minimize the 
Lagrangian function (or any function, in general) directly, because there is no 
conventional method that can solve an inequality. Hence, conventional methods rather 
than directly minimizing the Lagrangian, they first derive a set of nonlinear or linear 
equations (so-called optimality conditions) using principles of calculus. Later, they 
repeatedly solve these equations using equation solvers (e.g. Newton Raphson 
method) as long as the objective value reduces, and constraints are met. 
3.4.1. Overview of Conventional Algorithms 
Conventional optimization methods are general purpose search methods, which can be 
applied to a wide variety of optimization problems. They use deterministic rules (e.g. 
line or trust region search, [143]) to explore the search space of the problem.  
Their solution process involves various stages (Figure 3.1): a) Lagrangian formulation, 
b) Optimality conditions derivation, and c) Solution of optimality conditions. The 
original problem undergoes a couple of transformations before being solved, because 
each stage may require usage of another method or solver. The description of the 
various stages is given below. 
a) Lagrangian or KKT formulation: This phase transforms the original constrained 
optimization problem into an unconstrained optimization problem using various 
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penalty functions. The resulting formulation is denoted as Lagrangian or KKT 
formulation of original constrained optimization problem. There are two general 
types of penalty functions: interior penalty functions and exterior penalty 
functions. 
b) Derivation of optimality conditions: This phase derives optimality conditions for 
the unconstrained optimization problem in KKT formulation phase. This process 
requires the calculation of gradients and Hessians of the objective and constraint 
functions. The outcome of the process is a set of nonlinear equations, and some 
conditions to confirm the optimality after solving the nonlinear equations.  
c) Solution of optimality conditions: This phase repeatedly solves the set of 
nonlinear equations until the optimal feasible point is found. The nonlinear 
equation set is generally solved by an equation solver, unless they can be solved 
analytically. If the equations are solved by equation solvers (e.g. Newton Raphson, 
Gradient method, etc.), this phase further requires the gradients of the equations 
and a good initial point. 
 
Figure 3.1 Various stages in conventional algorithms 
As the conventional methods rely on gradients of the objective and constraints 




Select Equation Solver &
Solve optimality conditions
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may diverge or report infeasibility due to improper or poor initial point, especially for 
narrow feasible spaces (e.g. power system optimization model under peak load 
conditions). Moreover, conventional methods cannot diagnose and localise the 
infeasibility if the nonlinear optimization problem is or becomes infeasible.  
3.4.2. Overview of Metaheuristic Algorithms 
Metaheuristic methods are general purpose search algorithms, which can be also 
applied to a wide variety of optimization problems. Metaheuristic methods can be 
considered as “black-box”, or “problem-independent and plug-and-play type” 
algorithms, as they rarely rely on the nature of the considered problem. 
Like conventional methods, metaheuristic algorithms also cannot solve the constrained 
optimization problems directly. The original formulation must be transformed into an 
unconstrained optimization problem using penalty functions (Figure 3.2). This step is 
essentially the same as the Lagrangian formulation in conventional methods, but the 
resulting objective function is called Penalized Objective Function (POF). While 
conventional algorithms employ deterministic rules to explore the problem space, 
metaheuristic algorithms employ guided stochastic search.  
Metaheuristic algorithms initially generate a random feasible set of decision vectors, 
which are called “population”, “swarm”, etc. Afterwards, they apply various stochastic 
manipulations or operations (depending on the formulated algorithm) to find the next 
solution point(s) in the search space. This process is repeated until the predefined 
termination criterion is met. 
In general, metaheuristic algorithms can be classified into three groups: evolutionary 
computation, swarm intelligence, and physics inspired algorithms. This thesis 
implements three algorithms: genetic algorithm from evolutionary computation, 
simulated annealing from physics inspired algorithms, and particle swarm 
optimization from swarm intelligence algorithms to analyze SCM problem.  
Unlike conventional methods, metaheuristic algorithms are insensitive to the selection 
of initial values, but like conventional algorithms, they can also find (near) optimal 
solutions. Despite their advantages, however, none of the metaheuristic algorithms has 
seen a practical implementation in the power industry, even for off-line analysis of 
electrical networks. The two most likely reasons for this are: a) from algorithm 
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implementation perspective, metaheuristic algorithms are computationally more 
intensive and generally lack a clear analytical understanding and ensuring of 
convergence criteria, and b) from practical implementation perspective, there is still 
no clear set of instructions that could inform network planners and operators for 
exactly what system studies and under what system operating conditions metaheuristic 
algorithms could provide real benefits over conventional methods. Conversely, this 
thesis shows some of the realistic benefits of metaheuristic algorithms. 
 
Figure 3.2 Various stages in metaheuristic algorithms 
a) Evolutionary Computation  
The family of algorithms that is designed based on the simplified simulation of 
biological evolution are denoted as evolutionary computation, or simply evolutionary 
algorithms [36]. The evolution of population over the generations is simulated using 
the evolutionary principles: natural selection, recombination, and mutation. In 
biological evolution, population undergoes natural selection, recombination and 
mutation, and then next generation population is created. As in the nature, the 
evolution process repeats until only the best performing individuals survive in the last 
considered generation.  
Start
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The simulation of evolutionary process can be used to find high quality solutions to an 
optimization, or search problem [144]. The candidates in the population set represent 
a set of solutions to the given problem. Evolutionary algorithms are considered 
population-based metaheuristic algorithms, because a set of population is used to 
perform parallel search to find the optimal solution.  
In evolutionary algorithms, a set of solution candidates (i.e. initial population) is 
generated randomly and then the initial population undergoes through natural 
selection, recombination, and mutation to produce the next generation of population. 
A fitness function is used to evaluate the “quality” of solutions, which helps during the 
selection process. The overall evolution process will be carried out repeatedly until 
some stopping criteria are met. The stopping criteria can be: maximum number 
generation, (pre)specified solution accuracy, computational time, etc.  
The idea of using evolutionary principles to solve a problem date back to 1950s [145]. 
While there are numerous evolutionary algorithms and researchers are continuously 
trying to develop novel evolutionary algorithms (Table 3.1), few of these algorithms 
(e.g. evolutionary programming, genetic programming, genetic algorithm, and 
evolutionary strategy) are popular and have been applied to several problems. A more 
detailed information on evolutionary computation algorithms can be found in [144].  
Table 3.1 A List of Evolutionary Algorithms 
Genetic Algorithms (GA) 
Genetic Programming (GP) 
Evolutionary Programming (EP) 
Evolutionary strategies (ES) 
Differential Evolution (DE) 
Natural evolution strategies (NES) 
Memetic Algorithms (MA) 
Cultural Algorithms (CA) 
Covariance matrix adaptation evolution strategy (CMA-ES) 
b) Physics Inspired Algorithms  
Physics-inspired metaheuristics algorithms are designed based on the simplified 
simulation of a physical process or phenomenon. These algorithms employ basic 
principles of physics (e.g. Newton's gravitation law, motion law, etc.) to simulate a 
phenomenon [146]. For example, simulated annealing algorithm employs thermo-
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dynamic principle to simulate the annealing process in material science field. The list 
of popular physics inspired algorithms is given in Table 3.2. A more detailed 
information on physics inspired algorithms can be found e.g. in [146]-[147]. 
Table 3.2 List of Physics Inspired Algorithms 
Name of Algorithm Field of inspiration 
Simulated Annealing Thermodynamics  
Colliding Bodies Optimization (CBO) Newton’s laws of motion 
Gravitational Search Algorithm (GSA) Newton’s gravitational force 
Central Force Optimization (CFO) Newton’s gravitational force 
Space Gravitation Optimization (SGO) Newton’s gravitational force 
Gravitational Interaction Optimization (GIO) Newton’s gravitational force 
Big Bang–Big Crunch search (BB–BC) Celestial mechanics and 
astronomy 
Black Hole Search (BHS) Celestial mechanics and 
astronomy 
Galaxy-based Search Algorithm (GbSA) Celestial mechanics and 
astronomy 
Artificial Physics-based Optimization (APO) Celestial mechanics and 
astronomy 
Integrated Radiation Search (IRS) Celestial mechanics and 
astronomy 
Electromagnetism-like Optimization (EMO) Electromagnetism 
Charged System Search (CSS) Electromagnetism 
Hysteretic Optimization (HO) Electromagnetism 
Ray Optimization (RO) Optics 
Harmony Search Algorithm (HSA) Acoustics 
Water Drop Algorithm (WDA) Hydrology and hydrodynamics 
River Formation Dynamics Algorithm 
(RFDA) 
Hydrology and hydrodynamics 
Water Cycle Algorithm (WCA) Hydrology and hydrodynamics 
c) Swarm Intelligence Algorithms  
The family of algorithms based on the simulation of collective, or social behaviour of 
the individuals (i.e. particles, or agents) with the environment, or with each other 
within a given social system, are denoted as swarm-intelligence based optimization 
algorithms. The agents are typically distributed over the environment and hence their 
cooperation leads to collective intelligence [148]. The list of popular swarm 
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intelligence algorithms is mentioned in Table 3.3, while more information on swarm 
intelligence algorithms can be found in [149]-[150]. 
Table 3.3 List of Swarm Intelligence Algorithms 
Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) 
Ant Colony System (ACS) 
Stochastic Diffusion Search (SDS) 
Bacteria Foraging (BF) 
Artificial Bee Colony (ABC) 
Glow-worm Swarm Optimization (GSO) 
Cuckoo Search Algorithm (CSA) 
3.5 Penalty Functions 
Constraint handling is crucial for the performance of an optimization algorithm. A 
poor constraint handling may drive the search into the suboptimal or infeasible region, 
which is more likely when the search space is limited (e.g. contingency analysis). As 
most of the optimization algorithms in original form can only be applied to 
unconstrained problems, constrained problems must be transformed into an 
unconstrained problem. While the equality constraints are always modelled with 
Lagrangian multipliers, inequality constraints are modelled mostly with penalty 
functions.  
Penalty functions transform the original constrained problem into a sequence of 
unconstrained problems by adding/subtracting a certain value (i.e. penalty) to/from the 
objective function based on the amount of constraint violation. When all the solution 
candidates are feasible, the optimum unconstrained optimization problem will also be 
a local optimum for the original constrained optimization problem.  
In general, irrespective of conventional and non-conventional methods, there exist two 
types of penalty functions: exterior and interior penalty functions [151]. Interior 
penalty functions initially guide the unconstrained search (mostly) from a feasible 
region and then force the search to stay away from the constraint boundary by applying 
a penalty. The more the distance from the interior of the boundary the less penalty will 
be applied. The penalty will be extremely high when the search is on the boundary or 
exterior of the boundary. Thus, if a solution starts within a feasible region subsequent 
points are forced to be within the feasible region since the constraint boundaries act as 
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barriers during the optimization process. That is why interior penalty functions are also 
called as barrier and hard penalty functions.  
Exterior penalty functions initially guide the unconstrained search (mostly) from an 
infeasible region and then force the search to move towards feasible region by applying 
heavy penalties. As the exterior penalty functions accept the infeasible points more 
than the interior penalty functions, these are also called soft penalty functions. The 
main difference between exterior and interior penalty functions is that exterior penalty 
functions penalize only infeasible solutions, but the interior penalty functions penalize 
both feasible and infeasible solutions. Although interior penalty functions work very 
well over soft and hard constraints, they may fail to find a solution when the problem 
is over-constrained with many hard constraints. As the exterior penalty functions are, 
in principle, insensitive to soft and hard constraints, metaheuristic algorithms use these 
functions to model both equality and inequality constraints. 
This thesis employs three types of exterior penalty functions (step, linear and 
quadratic) and one interior penalty function (log barrier) to model inequality 
constraints. But the equality constraints are modelled using Lagrangian multipliers. 
The mathematical formulation of considered penalty functions is explained below 
[151]-[154]. 
Log Barrier Penalty Functions (BPF) 
𝜙𝐵𝑃𝐹 = (
− log(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)  𝑜𝑟 − log (𝑥 − 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) 
1020
|
𝑥 > 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑟 𝑥 < 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑥 < 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑟  𝑥 > 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥
) (3.18) 
 𝑥 ∈ [𝑃𝑔 𝑄𝑔 𝑉 𝑆𝑖𝑗] (3.19) 
 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈ [𝑃𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑄𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝑖𝑗,𝑚𝑖𝑛] (3.20) 
 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∈ [𝑃𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑄𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑆𝑖𝑗,𝑚𝑎𝑥] (3.21) 
 

















𝑃𝑔 < 𝑃𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑔 > 𝑃𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑄𝑔 < 𝑄𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑟 𝑄𝑔 > 𝑄𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑉 < 𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑟 𝑉 > 𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥
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𝐼𝑡𝑟(𝑃𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 − 𝑃𝑔)𝑜𝑟 𝐾𝑃𝑔
𝐼𝑡𝑟(𝑃𝑔 − 𝑃𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥)
𝐾𝑄𝑔
𝐼𝑡𝑟(𝑄𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 − 𝑄𝑔)𝑜𝑟 𝐾𝑃𝑔
𝐼𝑡𝑟(𝑄𝑔 − 𝑄𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥)
𝐾𝑉






𝑃𝑔 < 𝑃𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑔 > 𝑃𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑄𝑔 < 𝑄𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑟 𝑄𝑔 > 𝑄𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑉 < 𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑟 𝑉 > 𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥



































𝑃𝑔 < 𝑃𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑔 > 𝑃𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑄𝑔 < 𝑄𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑟 𝑄𝑔 > 𝑄𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥










𝑃𝑔, 𝑄𝑔, 𝑉, 𝑆𝑖𝑗 – active and reactive generation, bus voltage, MVA flow in a line between 
bus i and bus j 
𝑃𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑄𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑆𝑖𝑗,𝑚𝑖𝑛 – minimum limit on 𝑃𝑔, 𝑄𝑔, 𝑉, 𝑆𝑖𝑗 
𝑃𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑄𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑆𝑖𝑗,𝑚𝑎𝑥– maximum limit on 𝑃𝑔, 𝑄𝑔, 𝑉, 𝑆𝑖𝑗 
𝐾𝑃𝑔
𝐼𝑡𝑟 – Penalty factor for to active power generation violation at iteration 𝐼𝑡𝑟 
𝐾𝑄𝑔
𝐼𝑡𝑟– Penalty factor for reactive power generation violation at iteration 𝐼𝑡𝑟 
𝐾𝑉
𝐼𝑡𝑟– Penalty factor for voltage constraint violation at iteration 𝐼𝑡𝑟 
𝐾𝑆
𝐼𝑡𝑟 – Penalty factor for line MVA flow violation at iteration 𝐼𝑡𝑟 
3.6 Implemented Algorithms 
3.6.1 Newton Raphson Method with Interior and Exterior Penalty 
Functions 
This thesis implements or utilizes a couple of conventional approaches or solvers 
(Table 3.4) to analyse SCM problems. All the utilized approaches, by default, employs 
Newton-Raphson method to solve KKT conditions. The general Lagrangian 
formulation and KKT (or optimality) conditions that are applicable to all types of 
implemented approaches are presented in this section. PSS/E OPF solver, unless 
otherwise specified, is used as the default conventional solver to evaluate the 
performance of proposed approaches in this thesis.  
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Table 3.4 List of Employed Conventional Solvers 
Solver Name Employed Approach Comments  
PSSE  Exterior and interior point method  Siemens [155] 
IPAM Interior point algorithm MathWorks [156] 
MIPS Primal-dual Interior point solver  Matpower [157] 
FMINCON Interior point method MathWorks [156] 
PDIPM Primal-dual interior point method Matpower [158] 
SCPDIPM Step-controlled primal-dual interior point method Matpower [158] 
TRALM Trust region based augmented Lagrangian method Matpower [158] 
3.6.1.1 Lagrangian Formulation 
There exist several ways to formulate the Lagrangian function and hence optimality 
conditions, based on the way the constraints are handled. It is often very difficult for 
power system engineers (especially early state researchers) to make a constructive 
relationship between these formulations as well as to get an intuitive understanding of 
these formulations. With an aim to provide an intuitive understanding, this thesis 
classifies the Lagrangian formulations into three types which are explained below.  
Let’s consider a general nonlinear optimization problem, (3.25)-(3.27). 
 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑓(𝑥) (3.25) 
s.to. 𝑔(𝑥) = 0 (3.26) 
 ℎ(𝑥) < 0 (3.27) 
Where: decision variable 𝑋 = [𝑥]  
A. Traditional Formulation using Lagrangian and KKT multipliers  
This approach does not employ any of the penalty functions to model either equality 
or inequality constraints. But this approach requires both 𝑔 and ℎ to be continuous 
functions (at least the order of two) which may not be possible always (e.g. ℎ may be 
a bound inequality constraint). Moreover, the optimization process, in this case, is 
quite complicated and slow because it requires checking of µ and ℎ regularly.  
 𝐿(𝑥, . ) = 𝑓 + Φ𝑒𝑞(𝑔, λ) + Φ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞(ℎ, µ)  
 ⟹ 𝐿(𝑥, 𝜆, µ ) = 𝑓 + 𝜆𝑔 + µℎ (3.28) 
Where: Φ𝑒𝑞(𝑔, λ) = 𝜆𝑔  
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 Φ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞(ℎ, µ) =  µℎ  
 𝑋 = [𝑥, 𝜆, µ]  
B. Interior Penalty Functions based Formulation 
i) Primal Interior Penalty Methods 
This approach employs Lagrangian multipliers (𝜆) to model equality constraints and 
interior penalty functions to model inequality constraints. This approach does not 
require ℎ be to continuous, but it requires 𝑔 to be continuous. The dimensionality of 
the Lagrangian in this case (3.29) is lower than (3.28) because the number of decision 
variables is less. One should note that µ is a barrier parameter but not the decision 
variable, hence its value is not calculated by the optimization process. The µ starts with 
a very high value and reduced gradually over the iterations by the predefined logic (i.e. 
by the programmer). If ℎ is a functional constraint, in some cases, it might be difficult 
or computational inefficient to calculate its gradient and hessian with logarithmic 
function included. This problem can be avoided by converting functional inequality 
constraint into an equality constraint through slack (or dual) variables, which is 
discussed in the next approach.   
 𝐿(𝑥, . ) = 𝑓 + Φ𝑒𝑞(𝑔, λ) + Φ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞(ℎ, µ)  
 ⟹ 𝐿µ(𝑥, 𝜆 ) = 𝑓 + 𝜆𝑔 + µlog (−ℎ) (3.29) 
Where: Φ𝑒𝑞(𝑔, λ) = 𝜆𝑔  
 Φ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞(ℎ, µ) = µlog (−ℎ)  
 𝑋 = [𝑥, 𝜆]  
ii) Primal-Dual Interior Penalty Methods  
This method reformulates the original optimization problem by converting functional 
inequality constraints into equality constraints through slack variables (shown below). 
Later on, this method employs Lagrangian multipliers to model (modified) equality 
constraints and Log barrier penalty functions to model inequality bound constraints. 
Same as before, µ is a barrier parameter but not a decision variable.  
ℎ < 0 ⟹ ℎ + 𝑠 = 0;  𝑠 > 0  𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑓(𝑥) 
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𝐺(𝑥, 𝑠) = {
𝑔
ℎ + 𝑠
} = 0 ⟹ 𝐺(𝑥, 𝑠) = 0 
𝐻(𝑠) = {−𝑠} < 0  𝐻(𝑠) < 0 
 𝐿(𝑥, . ) = 𝑓 + Φ𝑒𝑞(𝐺, λ) + Φ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞(𝐻, µ)  
 ⟹ 𝐿µ(𝑥, 𝜆, 𝑠) = 𝑓 + 𝜆𝐺 + µlog (−𝐻)  
 ⟹ 𝐿µ(𝑥, 𝜆, 𝑠) = 𝑓 + 𝜆𝐺 + µlog (𝑠) (3.30) 
Where: Φ𝑒𝑞(𝐺, λ) = 𝜆𝐺  
 Φ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞(𝐻, µ) = µlog (𝑠)  
 𝑋 = [𝑥, 𝜆, 𝑠]  
C. Exterior Penalty Functions based Formulation  
i) Primal Exterior Penalty Methods 
This approach uses Lagrangian multipliers (𝜆) to model equality constraints and 
exterior penalty functions to model inequality constraints. Anyone of the three exterior 
penalty functions: step (SPF), linear (LPF), and quadratic penalty functions (QPF) can 
be employed in this case. It should be noted that µ is neither a decision variable nor a 
barrier parameter. It represents the penalty coefficient for violating a specific 
inequality constraint. It could be fixed or dynamic (e.g. gradually increases), 
nevertheless its value is decided by a predefined logic rather than the optimization 
process.   
 𝐿(𝑥, . ) = 𝑓 + 𝛷𝑒𝑞(𝑔, 𝜆) + 𝛷𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞(ℎ, µ)   
 ⟹ 𝐿µ(𝑥, 𝜆) = 𝑓 + 𝜆𝑔 + 𝛷𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞(ℎ, µ) (3.31) 
Where: 𝛷𝑒𝑞(𝑔, 𝜆) = 𝜆𝑔  
 𝛷𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞
𝑆𝑃𝐹 (ℎ, µ) = {   
0 
µ 
   |   
  ℎ < 0
  ℎ > 0
}  
 𝛷𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞
𝐿𝑃𝐹 (ℎ, µ) = {   
0 
µℎ 
   |   
  ℎ < 0
  ℎ > 0
}  




𝑄𝑃𝐹(ℎ, µ) = {   
0 
µℎ2 
   |   
  ℎ < 0
  ℎ > 0
}  
 𝑋 = [𝑥, 𝜆]  
ii) Primal-Dual Exterior Penalty Functions  
This method, same as primal-dual interior penalty methods, reformulates the original 
optimization problem by converting functional inequality constraints into equality 
constraints through slack variables (shown below). Later on, this method employs 
Lagrangian multipliers to model (modified) equality constraints and one of the three 
exterior penalty functions to model inequality bound constraints. Again, µ is neither a 
decision variable nor a barrier parameter. While the barrier parameter basically starts 
with a high value and gradually decreases (ideally becomes zero at a feasible optimal 
solution), penalty coefficient can be either fixed or gradually increases until the 
constraints are satisfied. But once a constraint is satisfied, penalty coefficient for that 
constraint becomes zero.  
ℎ < 0 ⟹ ℎ + 𝑠 = 0;  𝑠 > 0  𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑓(𝑥) 
𝐺(𝑥, 𝑠) = {
𝑔
ℎ + 𝑠
} = 0 ⟹ 𝐺(𝑥, 𝑠) = 0 
𝐻(𝑠) = {−𝑠} < 0  𝐻(𝑠) < 0 
 𝐿(𝑥, . ) = 𝑓 + 𝛷𝑒𝑞(𝐺, 𝜆) + 𝛷𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞(𝐻, µ)  
 ⟹ 𝐿µ(𝑥, 𝜆, 𝑠) = 𝑓 + 𝛷𝑒𝑞(𝐺, 𝜆) + 𝛷𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞(𝐻, µ)  
 ⟹ 𝐿µ(𝑥, 𝜆, 𝑠) = 𝑓 + 𝜆𝐺 + 𝛷𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞(𝐻, µ) (3.32) 
Where: 𝛷𝑒𝑞(𝐺, 𝜆) = 𝜆𝐺  
 𝛷𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞
𝑆𝑃𝐹 (𝐻, µ) = {   
0 
µ 
   |   
  𝐻 < 0
  𝐻 > 0
}  
 𝛷𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞
𝐿𝑃𝐹 (𝐻, µ) = {   
0 
µℎ 
   |   
  𝐻 < 0
  𝐻 > 0
}  
 𝛷𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞
𝑄𝑃𝐹(𝐻, µ) = {   
0 
µℎ2 
   |   
  𝐻 < 0
  𝐻 > 0
}  
 𝑋 = [𝑥, 𝜆, 𝑠]  
3.6.1.2 Optimality Conditions and Newton Step 
This section derives the optimality conditions for one type of Lagrangian function and 
similar conditions can be easily derived for other Lagrangian functions.  
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Consider a Lagrangian function as below 
 𝐿(𝑥, 𝜆, µ ) = 𝑓 + 𝜆𝑔 + µℎ (3.33) 
Taking the partial derivatives of (3.33) with respect to each of the variables yields the 
first-order optimality conditions: 
 𝐿𝑥 = 𝑓𝑥 + 𝜆𝑔𝑥 + µℎ𝑥 = 0 (3.34) 
 𝐿𝜆 = 𝑔 = 0 (3.35) 
 𝐿µ = ℎ = 0 (3.36) 
The above equations represent a family of nonlinear equations which must be solved 
to find a stationary point (this may or may not be the optimal). In general, Newton 
Raphson (NR) or similar equation solvers are used to solve these equations. In order 
to apply the NR, (3.33) -(3.35) must be linearized with respect to each variable. This 
is also equivalent to Taylor series expansion of (3.34)-(3.36), but only first two terms 
are considered. 
⟹ 𝐿𝑥 + 𝐿𝑥𝑥 ∆𝑥 + 𝐿𝑥𝜆∆𝜆 + 𝐿𝑥µ ∆µ + ⋯ = 0 
⟹ 𝐿𝜆 + 𝐿𝜆𝑥 ∆𝑥 + 𝐿𝜆𝜆∆𝜆 + 𝐿𝜆µ ∆µ + ⋯ = 0 















𝑓𝑥𝑥 + 𝜆𝑔𝑥𝑥 + µℎ𝑥𝑥 𝑔𝑋 ℎ𝑥
𝑔𝑥 0 0





] = − [




 𝐽∆𝑋 = 𝐵 (3.38) 
Where: J – Newton Jacobian, B – correction matrix, ∆𝑋 – correction for 𝑋. 
For any initial solution 𝑋, the next point (𝑋′) can be calculated as follows 
 𝑋′ = 𝑋 + ∆𝑋 (3.39) 
Equation (3.38) and (3.39) represents the Newton steps. If 𝑋∗ = [𝑥∗, 𝜆∗, µ∗] is a local 
optimum for the problem, it must satisfy the following optimality conditions [157]-
[159].  





∗) = 0 (3.40) 
Primal feasibility conditions: 
 𝑔(𝑋∗) = 0 (3.41) 
 ℎ(𝑋∗) < 0 (3.42) 
Dual feasibility conditions: 
 µ > 0 (3.43) 
Complementary slackness condition:  
 µℎ(𝑋∗) = 0 (3.44) 
3.6.2 Genetic Algorithm   
Genetic algorithm is an evolutionary algorithm inspired by the Darwinian principle of 
natural evolution of species through (genetic) selection [160]-[161]. The initial 
principle of the genetic algorithms is proposed in 1975 [162]. Since then, researchers 
proposed numerous variations of the genetic algorithms, making genetic algorithms as 
the most widely known and applicable type of metaheuristic algorithms [163]. Over 
the last couple of decades, genetic algorithm has been applied to solve numerous 
optimization problems in power systems engineering: unit commitment [164], 
economic dispatch [165], optimal power flow [166], volt/var control [167], 
transmission expansion planning [168], capacitor placement [169], etc.  
Genetic algorithm (GA) begins with an initial population of individuals, often created 
randomly. The set of solution candidates are denoted as chromosomes or phenotypes 
and each chromosome could be a potential solution to a given problem. The elements 
of chromosome are denoted as genes and the number of genes is equal to the number 
of decisions, or search variable. In canonical GA, each gene is represented by a string 
of binary bits. The initial population undergoes through genetic operations (selection, 
crossover, and mutation) to produce the next generation of the population. New 
population again undergoes through genetic operations to produce further generation 
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and the process is repeated until some predefined stopping criteria are met (Algorithm 
3.1).  
In each generation, fitness of every individual is evaluated, typically regarding the 
value of the objective function to be optimized. During the selection process, a 
proportion of individuals, denoted as intermediate population, are stochastically 
selected from the current population. The chromosomes or individuals with a higher 
fitness have more chance to be selected for reproduction than with lower fitness. Pair 
of randomly chosen parents from the intermediate population are combined through 
crossover operation to reproduce the offspring. In other words, crossover operation 
modifies the chromosomes between the parents to create offspring. Crossover 
operation is repeated until the size of the offspring becomes equal to the size of the 
population. Mutation operation involves alteration of one or more genes of 
probabilistically chosen chromosome from the offspring. The modified offspring after 
the mutation operation is considered as new generation of population. There are 
numerous types of selection, crossover, and mutation operators in existing literature, 
with the notable ones mentioned in Table 3.5. This thesis implements a real-coded 
genetic algorithm and the main steps involved in implementing GA to SCM problems 
are explained as Algorithm 3.1. 
Table 3.5 Types of selection, crossover, and mutation operators 
Selection Types [170] Crossover Types [171] Mutation Types [172] 
1. Roulette-wheel selection 
2. Rank selection 
3. Tournament selection 
4. Truncation selection 
5. Reward-based selection 




4. Linear  
1. Bit spring 
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Algorithm 3.1: Genetic Algorithm Implementation to SCM Problem 
  1: Define problem settings: list of control variables, objective function, type of 
penalization 
  2: Formulate original (unpenalized) and penalized (Lagrangian) objective functions 
  3: Set GA parameters: population size, and types of selection, crossover, and 
mutation  
  4: Generate initial population (i.e. initial solution set) 
  5: Execute power flow and compute original objective value  
  6: Evaluate constraints: record violated constraints and violation amount  
  7: Compute penalized objective value  
  8: 𝑾𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆 none of the termination criteria is met 𝒅𝒐 
  9:    Perform selection operation 
10:    Perform crossover operation 
11:    Perform mutation operation  
12:    Update population  
13:    Execute power flow and compute original objective at updated population 
14:    Evaluate constraints: record violated constraints and violation amount  
15:    Compute penalized objective value  
16: 𝒆𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆  
17: Output: control variable setpoints, objective value, and active constraints with 
violation amount 
3.6.3 Simulated Annealing  
Simulated annealing (SA) is a physics-inspired metaheuristic algorithm, which mimics 
the annealing process in metallurgy. Annealing involves heating up a material until it 
melts and cooling it down slowly [173]. The heating and controlled cooling of a 
material is aimed to increase the size of its crystals and reduce imperfections. The 
energy gained by heating enables atoms to change their configurations freely, while 
the controlled slow cooling-schedule guide the atoms to ultimately form the lowest 
energy configuration. While the controlled slow cooling brings the material to a highly 
ordered crystalline state of lowest energy, rapid cooling yields imperfections and glass-
like intrusions inside the material [174]. 
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In [175], simulated annealing process is initially proposed to find the minimum of a 
function as an equivalent to finding the lowest energy configuration. From the 
optimization viewpoint, the configuration indicates a solution in the search space, with 
the lowest energy configuration indicating the corresponding value of the fitness, or 
objective function. The algorithm starts with a random solution with a high 
temperature and then decreases the temperature gradually in steps. This temperature 
loop is like the iteration count in normal optimization algorithms. Initially, the random 
solution (𝑋0) is considered as the best solution and the related fitness value is 
considered as the best objective value. At each temperature, metropolis algorithm is 
simulated some number of times to find the thermal equilibrium corresponding to that 
temperature.  
Metropolis algorithm generates random solutions (i.e. trail solution 𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙) in the 
neighbourhood of current solution (𝑋𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡) and evaluates the fitness values of 
these solutions. The movement of atoms from the current configuration (or 
state/solution) to trail configuration is decided by Boltzmann distribution. In other 
words, the acceptability of the trial solution as a next solution is decided by Boltzmann 
distribution.  
According to Boltzmann (3.18), the transition or acceptance probability (𝑃𝑎) is equal 
to one, if the trail solution has lower fitness value (i.e. objective function value) than 
the current solution; and is equal to a value between zero and one, if the trial solution 
has higher fitness value than the current solution. A trial solution is accepted only when 
the transition probability is equal to or greater than a random value (generated between 
zero and one). This implies that some trial solutions are still accepted, even though 
they do not provide a better fitness value. Where 𝑘 in (3.18) represents Boltzmann 
constraints and is set to one.   










The ability to accept worse solutions is an inherent feature of simulated annealing, 
which enables it to escape from local optima. The acceptability of worse solutions 
depends on the cooling schedule: acceptance ratio is big at a high temperature (ideally 
one, at infinite temperature) and small at low temperature (ideally zero, at zero 
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temperature). Theoretically, an optimal solution is guaranteed if the cooling schedule 
consists of infinite number of steps [173]. The maximum number of temperature steps 
is a trade-off between the solution accuracy and computational time. The overall 
search process will stop/terminate according to a pre-defined criterion (e.g. fitness 
value lower than a threshold value, computational time limit, etc.). The mathematical 
process of SA is explained in Algorithm 3.2. 
Over the last few decades, simulated annealing algorithm has been applied to solve 
numerous optimization problems in power systems engineering: unit commitment 
[176], economic dispatch [177], optimal power flow [178], reactive power planning 
[179], etc. A more detailed survey of SA applications in power systems engineering is 
available in [180]-[181].  
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Algorithm 3.2: SA Algorithm Implementation to SCM Problem 
  1: Define problem settings: list of control variables, objective function, type of 
penalization 
  2: Formulate original (unpenalized) and penalized (Lagrangian) objective functions 
  3: Set SA parameters: Initial temperature (𝑇0), Boltzmann’s constant (k), 
temperature reduction factor (𝑡𝑟)  
  4: Execute power flow at the solution and compute original objective value (𝑓0) 
  5: Evaluate constraints: record violated constraints and violation amount  
  7: Compute penalized objective value (𝐹𝑜) at  (𝑋𝑜) 
  8: 𝑾𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆 none of the termination criteria met 𝒅𝒐 
  9:     𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑖 = 1: 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
10:          Generate new (random) solution (𝑋𝑖) 
11:          Evaluate 𝑋𝑖: execute power flow and compute objective value (𝑓𝑖) 
12:          Evaluate constraints: record violated constraints and violation amount  
13:          Compute penalized objective value at 𝑋𝑖: 𝐹𝑖 
14:          𝒊𝒇 𝐹𝑖 < 𝐹𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑋𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝑋𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝐹𝑖  𝑓𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝑓𝑖  𝒆𝒍𝒔𝒆 
15:               Generate a random number 𝑅(0,1) 
16:               Inferior solution acceptance probability: 𝑃𝑎 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 ( ( 𝐹𝑖 − 𝐹0)/𝑘𝑇) 
17:               𝒊𝒇 𝑃𝑎 > 𝑅: 𝑋𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝑋𝑖 ;   𝐹𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝐹𝑖  ;   𝑓𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝑓𝑖   𝒆𝒍𝒔𝒆   
16:                    𝑋𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝑋𝑜;  𝐹𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝐹0 ;  𝑓𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝑓𝑜 
17:               𝒆𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒇 
18:          𝒆𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒇 
19:      𝒆𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓  
20:      Reduce the temperature: 𝑇 = 𝑡𝑟𝑇 
21: 𝒆𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆 
22: Output: control variable setpoints, objective value, and active constraints with 
violation amount 
3.6.4 Particle Swarm Optimization 
Particle Swarm Optimization is a swarm-intelligence based metaheuristic algorithm 
inspired by the social or collective behaviour of birds-flocking or fish-schooling. PSO 
algorithm is proposed in [182] and since then numerous variations are proposed by 
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researchers. Over the last couple of decades, PSO has been applied to solve numerous 
optimization problems in power systems engineering: unit commitment [183]-[184], 
economic dispatch [185], optimal power flow [186], volt/var control [187], etc. A 
survey of PSO applications in power systems engineering is available in [188]-[189]. 
From biological system viewpoint, PSO can be explained as a search strategy followed 
by flock of birds searching for food in an area. While the birds do not know the location 
of the food, they know how far the food is in each iteration. Initially, each bird starts 
the journey from a random location in the given area. The birds who are closer to the 
food send sound signals to all other birds. The bird who sends the loudest signal is 
considered closest to the food and may be considered as lead bird. Hence, the other 
birds modify search direction and try to follow or circle over the lead bird. After 
topologically readjusting their position, they re-start the search. While the searching 
goes, the lead role can be maintained by the previous lead bird or taken by the new 
one, depending on who is closest to the food. This process continues until one of the 
birds finds the food and other birds reach that location.  
From the mathematical implementation viewpoint, in PSO, a set of randomly placed 
particles (X) continuously explore the D-dimensional problem space by changing their 
velocity (V) until meeting a predefined criterion. During the search, each particle 
evaluates objective function at its current location (which could be a solution) and 
determines its further movement by combining its best-fitness location (𝑝𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡, particle-
best-solution) with group best-fitness location (𝑔𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡, swarm-best-solution). The 
particle-best-solution is the best solution (fitness) achieved by an individual particle 
and each particle will have its own particle-best-solution at any time. The swarm-best-
solution is best solution achieved by the total swarm. At any time, there exist only one 
swarm-best-solution, which is one of the particle-best-solutions at that that time.  
The next iteration, 𝑘 + 1, takes place after all particles have moved in the current, kth, 
iteration. As iterations progress, the whole swarm move closer to an optimum of the 
fitness function [190]. The particles’ velocities and positions are updated using (3.19) 
and (3.20). Inertia (𝑤) is used to control the trade-off between swarm exploration and 
exploitation, or global and local search capabilities. The acceleration coefficients 𝐶1 
and 𝐶2 in (4) control the cognitive and social influence on the particle velocity. Two 
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uniformly distributed pseudorandom numbers, 𝑟1 and 𝑟2, introduce randomness in 
particle movement. Main steps involved in implementing PSO to SCM problems are 
explained as Algorithm 3.3. 
𝑉𝑘+1 = 𝑤𝑘. 𝑉𝑘 + 𝐶1𝑟1(𝑋
𝑘 − 𝑝𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡) + 𝐶2𝑟2(𝑋
𝑘 − 𝑔𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡) (3.19) 
𝑋𝑘+1 = 𝑋𝑘 + 𝑉𝑘+1 (3.20) 
Algorithm 3.3: PSO Algorithm Implementation to SCM Problem 
  1: Define problem settings: list of control variables, objective function, type of 
penalization 
  2: Formulate original (unpenalized) and penalized (Lagrangian) objective functions 
  3: Set PSO parameters: swarm size, inertia weight, cognitive and social 
coefficients, etc.  
  4: Initialize swarm particles’ positions (i.e. initial solution set) 
  5: Execute power flow and compute original objective value  
  6: Evaluate constraints: record violated constraints and violation amount  
  7: Compute penalized objective value  
  8: 𝑾𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆 none of the termination criteria is met 𝒅𝒐 
  9:     Compute particle (individual) best and swarm best position 
10:     Update swarm velocity 
11:     Update swarm position (i.e. updated solution set) 
12:     Execute power flow and compute original objective at new swarm positions 
13:     Evaluate constraints: record violated constraints and violation amount  
14:     Compute penalized objective value  
15: 𝒆𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆  
17: Output: control variable setpoints, objective value, and active constraints with 
violation amount 
3.7 Conclusions 
Optimization models, especially SCM models, which are used to make planning and 
operation decisions in modern electricity networks, are becoming progressively larger 
and more complex due to increased interconnections, renewable energy penetration, 
complex controls, and frequent operation under stressed and even overstressed 
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conditions. As models continue to grow larger, they can become infeasible and 
identifying and resolving the infeasibility becomes increasingly difficult. 
It is extremely important to diagnose and localize the infeasibility not only to resolve 
it from optimization viewpoint, but also to identify the bottlenecks in electricity 
transmission and distribution networks, so that appropriate preventive and corrective 
actions can be devised to deal with the constraint violations. The infeasibility report 
generated by the commercial power system solvers (e.g. OPF solvers to solve SCM 
problems) are barely useful to network planners and operators and they should be 
equipped with improved infeasibility diagnosis tools.  
In this context, this chapter presented a detailed discussion of such infeasible SCM 
problem formulations with underlined concepts from the optimization theory. The 
concept of MISC from optimization theory is introduced to help diagnose and localize 
infeasibility in infeasible SCM formulation. A general discussion of both conventional 
and metaheuristic approaches, and a detailed discussion of implemented solution 
algorithms are also presented in this chapter. Next chapter develops a set of feasible 
and infeasible SCM models that are used to validate the MISC identification 
framework proposed in Chapter 5. 
As mentioned earlier, modern electricity networks are increasingly interfaced with 
inverter-interfaced renewable generation and are becoming sensitive to even small 
disturbances. The transitions between different steady-state equilibriums will possess 
completely different dynamics under the reduced inertia and damping environment, 
which may adversely affect the nature of dynamic security constraints that must be 
fulfilled during the transition. Hence, the management of security constraints is going 
to play a key role than ever before in the secure operation of modern electricity 
networks.  
The important point worth mentioning is that the mathematical models representing 
the operation of modern electricity networks are becoming the function of non-smooth 
functions (e.g. mathematical models of inverter-interfaced generation, battery storage, 
etc). This limits the application of conventional gradient approaches to performing 




Chapter 4  
Modelling of Feasible and Infeasible SCM cases 
This chapter presents a list of feasible and infeasible SCM cases for several standard 
test networks. These cases will be used in later chapters to demonstrate the 
applicability of the proposed approaches. 
4.1. Introduction  
An overview of the SCM problem formulation and classification with relevant solution 
algorithms is discussed in previous chapters. It is mentioned that SCM cases can be 
divided into feasible (or manageable) and infeasible (or non-manageable) cases. 
Feasible cases are the cases for which there exists a corrective control solution that 
satisfies all constraints. Infeasible cases are the cases for which there exists no 
corrective control solution (with available/modelled controls) that can satisfy all 
constraints. Hence, the operator cannot devise a feasible generation dispatch and adjust 
available controls without violating at least one security constraint. It is also said that 
conventional optimization solvers are unable to both identify and solve the minimum 
intractable subsystem of constraints (MISC) that is the root cause for infeasibility.  
Before dealing with infeasible models and identifying the MISC using the proposed 
framework, a set of feasible and infeasible SCM cases must be identified and validated. 
This chapter explains procedures to prepare and validate such feasible and infeasible 
SCM cases. While feasible cases can represent both unstressed and stressed operating 
conditions, infeasible cases represent only overstressed operating conditions. 
4.2. Description of Analysed Networks  
Five test networks are analysed in order to illustrate the proposed methodologies and 
demonstrate that the presented approaches can be scaled-up to larger systems. These 
networks are IEEE 14-bus (Figure 4.1), IEEE 30-bus (Figure 4.2), IEEE 39-bus 
(Figure 4.3), IEEE 57-bus (Figure 4.4), and UIUC 150-bus (Figure 4.5). While the 
basic details of the selected networks are shown in Table 4.1, complete information 
(bus and branch data, active and reactive capability limits, etc.) are adopted from [157, 
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191, 192]. Dynamic data, fuel cost coefficients and emission coefficients of different 
generation units are presented in Appendix A. 






Number of Buses 14 30 39 57 150 
Number of Generators 5 6 10 7 27 
Number of Lines 15 35 34 63 157 
Number of Transformers 5 6 12 17 60 
Number of Fixed Shunts 1 2 0 3 3 
Total Peak MW Demand 259 283.4 6097.1 1250.8 12679.89 
Total Peak MVAr Demand 73.5 126.2 1409.5 336.4 3613.765 
















Figure 4.1 IEEE 14-bus Network [191]-[192] 




Figure 4.2 IEEE 30-bus Network [191]-[192] 
 
 
Figure 4.3 IEEE 39-bus Network [191]-[192] 




Figure 4.4 IEEE 57-bus Network [191]-[192] 
It should be mentioned that these networks are analysed with their original 
characteristics and controls except in Chapter-7. In Chapter-7, extra controls 
(distributed generation, reactive compensation, controllable demand) are introduced 
as emergency control reserves. A framework is introduced in Chapter-7 to devise and 
implement remedial actions employing these emergency control reserves. The details 
of these emergency control reserves (type, locations, capacity, etc) are also discussed 
in Chapter-7. 




Figure 4.5 UIUC 150-bus Network [191]-[193] 
4.3. Problem Settings  
Several feasible and infeasible test cases are established by performing contingency 
analysis in PSS/E software [155]. The analysis settings used in the thesis are explained 
below. Unless stated otherwise, these are the default settings for the entire thesis.  
SCM objective functions: SCM problem is solved mainly with two objective 
functions: a) fuel cost minimization (during non-overstressed operating conditions) 
and b) infeasibility minimization (during overstressed operating conditions). Only for 
pre-contingency analysis, SCM problem is also solved to minimize network losses and 
emission. The reason for doing this is to validate the custom-coded metaheuristic 
optimization solvers and compare their performance with conventional solvers.   
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Load modelling: System loads are initially modelled as constant power (CP) models, 
but constant current (CI) and constant impedance (CZ) models were also tried when 
conventional solvers failed to converge with CP model. The purpose of analysing with 
other load models is to relax demanded system powers and recheck the solver's 
judgement on model infeasibility.  
Contingency analysis settings: The power mismatch tolerances are set as 0.01 MW 
and 0.01 MVAR for the base cases and 0.5 MW and 0.5 MVAR for the contingency 
cases [194]. 
Initial values: Pre-contingency operating conditions are inputted as initial values to 
the conventional solvers. If the solver does not converge with these pre-contingency 
operating conditions, flat voltage conditions are also tried, again to avoid the wrong 
judgement on infeasibility. However, initial values for metaheuristic solvers are 
always assigned randomly, as metaheuristic solvers are generally insensitive to initial 
values. 
Optimization solver settings: In the analysis presented in this chapter, seven 
conventional OPF solvers (PSSE, IPAM, MIPS, FMINCON, PDIPM, SCPDIPM, 
TRALM) and three metaheuristic OPF solvers (GA, SA, PSO) are employed in order 
to develop stressed and overstressed operating conditions. All OPF solvers are 
executed on a 64-bit Intel® Core i7-3770, 3.4 GHz CPU desktop PC. The constraints 
in case of metaheuristic solvers are modelled with linear penalty functions (LPF, refer 
to chapter-3). Penalty factors for violating various constraints, and parameter settings 
for metaheuristic solvers are mentioned in Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2 Parameter settings and penalties for GA, PSO and SA 
GA settings PSO settings SA settings Penalty settings 
𝑵𝒑𝒐𝒑=20 𝑵𝒑𝒐𝒑: 20 𝑻𝟎=0.5 𝒑𝒒: 500 
Selection: stochastic  
universal sampling 
𝑪𝟏 = 𝑪𝟐 = 𝟏. 𝟒𝟗𝟒 𝒕𝒓 = 𝟎. 𝟗𝟓 𝒑𝒑: 100 
𝒑𝒄=0.8 𝒘 = 𝟎. 𝟕𝟐𝟗 - 𝒑𝒔: 100 
Mutation: Gaussian - - 𝒑𝒗: 𝟏𝟎𝟎 
Where: 𝑁𝑝𝑜𝑝 – number of population or particles, 𝑝𝑐 – crossover probability, 𝐶1, 𝐶2 – 
acceleration coefficients, 𝑤 – inertia, 𝑇0 – initial temperature, 𝑡𝑟 – temperature 
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reduction rate, 𝑝𝑞 , 𝑝𝑝, 𝑝𝑠 𝑝𝑣 – penalty coefficients for reactive and active power, 
thermal and voltage violations.  
4.4. Procedure for Modelling Feasible and Infeasible SCM 
Cases 
Contingency analysis is employed to prepare feasible and infeasible instances of SCM 
problem. A contingency can happen for two main reasons: a) planned outage of system 
components, e.g. for maintenance and servicing purposes, b) unexpected outage of 
components, e.g. due to system faults or component failures. In general, most of the 
contingencies occur because of system faults and they are more severe than the 
planned outages, which are usually scheduled so there will be no contingencies.  
Although utilities implement several preventive and corrective actions, to prevent the 
occurrence of contingencies and limit their impact if they occur, contingencies do 
happen and pose several problems during the operation. The severity of a contingency 
typically depends on the severity of the relevant fault. A set of SCM cases is developed 
by simulating non-severe and severe contingencies, and it is assumed that all the 
simulated contingencies are the consequences of system faults.  
The detailed procedure is divided into the three following steps: 
a) Preparation of pre-contingency operating conditions: As a base case, OPF 
problem with fuel cost minimization is formulated and solved for all considered 
networks, where computed pre-contingency control set points and operating point 
corresponding to this control solution is considered as a pre-contingency optimal 
operating condition for all considered networks, before simulating any 
contingency.  
b) Simulation and ranking of contingencies: All possible double contingencies are 
simulated on pre-contingency network configurations (the first step) and 
immediate post-contingency (i.e. before activation of any corrective control) 
power flows and bus voltages are computed. Contingency cases are ranked based 
on the number of immediate post-contingency constraint violations.  
c) Selection of feasible and infeasible SCM cases: High-ranked contingencies are 
resolved by adjusting available corrective controls to check whether the operator 
can devise a feasible dispatch, or not. PSS/E OPF solver is used to solve the 
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corrective control problem. The contingencies that can be resolved with 
available/primary corrective controls are considered as manageable or feasible 
SCM cases, because, following these contingencies, the operator can devise a 
feasible generation dispatch and adjustment of controls that can alleviate all active 
constraints. Although there are several such feasible cases for a given network, 
only one feasible case for each test network is selected for demonstration purposes.  
The contingencies that cannot be resolved with any combination and adjustment of 
corrective controls are considered as non-manageable, or infeasible SCM cases. If 
these contingencies happen, it is impossible for the operator to devise a feasible 
dispatch that can alleviate all constraint violations, because no such solution exists. A 
network may have numerous infeasible configurations or contingencies that should be 
avoided. If these configurations happen, operator must implement remedial actions to 
preserve the integrity of the network. Two of such infeasible cases for each considered 
network are selected and analysed in this thesis. 
4.5. Preparation of Pre-Contingency Conditions 
Pre-contingency optimal operating conditions (e.g. generation dispatch) are 
computed by solving the base-case (BC) SCM/OPF problem with fuel cost as an 
objective function. Each base case SCM problem is solved 100 times by each solver 
and the maximum execution time of metaheuristic solvers is set to 8 min. While the 
minimum/optimal objective function value (i.e. fuel cost) over 100 runs is shown in 
Table 4.3, the corresponding generation dispatch is presented in Table 4.4 and Table 
4.5. The results demonstrate that both conventional and metaheuristic solvers are 
returning almost similar generation schedule and fuel cost. The standard deviation of 
minimum objective values over 100 runs for each solver is also shown in Table 4.3. 
While conventional solvers can converge always to the same solution (indicated by 
zero standard deviation), metaheuristic solvers are converging to slightly different 
solutions (indicated by non-zero standard deviation), which is due to their stochastic 
nature, but, these standard deviations are very small.  
The default operating condition of any test network is the pre-contingency optimal 
operating point, as it is optimal and n-1 (corrective) secure. All other operating 
conditions (e.g. overstressed conditions) and other instances of SCM problems (e.g. 
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feasible and infeasible problems) are developed by simulating non-severe or severe 
contingencies at these pre-contingency operating conditions.  


























































































































Table 4.4 Generation (MW) schedule at optimal fuel cost operation (IEEE 14 bus) 
Solver name Bus 1 Bus 2 Bus 3 Bus 6 Bus 8 
PSSE 122.39 29.56 49.15 39.14 22.97 
IPAM 122.55 29.63 49.41 39.80 21.79 
MIPS 122.94 29.63 49.40 39.20 22.14 
Fmincon 122.93 29.63 49.40 39.20 22.14 
PDIPM 122.94 29.63 49.40 39.20 22.14 
SCPDIPM 122.94 29.63 49.40 39.20 22.14 
TRALM 122.94 29.63 49.39 39.20 22.14 
PSO 121.73 30.30 49.26 39.01 22.78 
GA 121.11 29.29 48.73 41.18 22.92 
SA 122.23 29.47 49.13 38.97 23.32 
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Table 4.5 Generation (MW) schedule at optimal fuel cost operation (IEEE 30 bus) 
Solver name Bus 1 Bus 2 Bus 5 Bus 8 Bus 11 Bus 13 
PSSE 177.06 48.67 21.32 21.2 11.87 12.01 
IPAM 177.13 48.70 21.33 21.29 11.92 12.00 
MIPS 177.13 48.70 21.33 21.29 11.92 12.01 
Fmincon 177.13 48.70 21.33 21.29 11.92 12.00 
PDIPM 177.13 48.70 21.33 21.29 11.92 12.01 
SCPDIPM 177.13 48.70 21.33 21.29 11.92 12.00 
TRALM 177.13 48.70 21.33 21.30 11.93 12.00 
PSO 176.86 48.66 21.32 21.32 11.91 12.00 
GA 176.86 48.64 21.32 21.37 11.89 12.00 
SA 177.00 48.71 21.34 21.27 11.80 12.00 
4.5.1 Validation of Metaheuristic Algorithms  
Although the main objective of the formulated SCM problem is to minimize either fuel 
cost (during non-overstressed operating conditions), or infeasibility (during 
overstressed operating conditions), in this section, base-case SCM problem is also 
solved to minimize total network active power losses and emission. This is done to 
validate the performance of custom-coded metaheuristic solvers with respect to 
conventional solvers. Table 4.6 presents the optimal active losses and emission found 
by various solvers. Again, the results demonstrate that metaheuristic solvers most of 
the times provide solutions similar to conventional solvers, assuming that some 
minimum time is allowed for their search/analysis. No emission is calculated for 39, 
57 and 150-bus due to unavailability of relevant emission data.  
Table 4.6 Optimal Loss (MW) and Emission (ton/hr) found by various solvers (N-0) 
Solver IEEE 14 IEEE 30 IEEE 39 IEEE 57 UIUC 150 
 Loss Emission Loss Emission Loss Loss Loss 
PSSE 1.884 144.65 3.041 194.32 26.20 9.23 100.23 
IPAM 1.195 144.58 3.138 194.29 26.30 9.41 100.64 
MIPS 1.195 144.58 3.138 194.28 26.30 9.41 100.64 
Fmincon 1.195 144.68 3.138 194.49 26.30 9.41 100.64 
PDIPM 1.195 144.58 3.138 194.28 26.30 9.41 100.64 
SCPDIPM 1.195 144.58 3.138 194.28 26.30 9.41 100.64 
TRALM 1.360 182.11 3.192 203.43 31.45 10.14 100.65 
PSO 1.240 144.58 3.180 194.26 26.21 9.59 102.16 
GA 1.220 144.59 3.250 194.28 26.35 9.66 102.26 
SA 1.230 144.59 3.100 194.32 26.35 9.55 102.66 
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4.5.2 Computational Performance of Used Solvers 
While it is straightforward to calculate the average computational time required by a 
conventional solver to find the optimal objective value, it is very difficult to find a 
basis on which an average computational time can be calculated for metaheuristic 
algorithms. This is because of the existence of several convergence- and stopping- 
criteria for metaheuristic algorithms.  
To overcome this problem and to compare the computational performance of 
metaheuristic solvers with conventional solvers, two time-performance indices for 
metaheuristic solvers are proposed. 
a) Average time for finding the feasible solution (𝑡𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑠): This is the average time 
required by a metaheuristic solver to find a first feasible, but non-optimal solution 
over a given number of runs. Here, the basis for time calculation is feasibility.  
b) Average time for finding the optimal solution (𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑡): This is the average time 
required by a metaheuristic solver to find an approximate optimal solution over a 
given number of runs. The approximate optimal solution is defined as an 
approximate optimal objective value which is either greater than 99.9% or less than 
100.1% of the average optimal objective value achieved by a conventional solver. 
Here, the basis for time calculation is optimality.  
While Table 4.7 shows the average computational time (over 100 runs) required by 
conventional solvers, Table 4.8 presents the average computational time required by 
metaheuristic solvers to achieve both feasibility and optimality again over 100 runs. 
The results demonstrate that metaheuristic solvers may require heavy computational 
time to find an optimal solution, but they require only up to a few tens of seconds to 
find the feasible solution. 
Table 4.7 Average computational time(s) required by conventional solvers 
Test Case PSSE IPAM MIPS Fmincon PDIPM SCPDIPM TRALM 
IEEE 14 0.038 0.916 0.055 0.069 0.017 0.021 0.049 
IEEE 30 0.036 0.538 0.077 0.063 0.020 0.027 0.109 
IEEE 39 0.081 1.403 0.142 0.108 0.029 0.039 0.238 
IEEE 57 0.082 3.753 0.164 0.098 0.031 0.034 0.096 
UIUC 150 0.085 47.874 1.883 0.153 0.090 0.136 0.365 
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Table 4.8 Metaheuristic solvers computational time (s, average) 
Test 
Case 
To find feasible solution 
(𝒕𝒇𝒆𝒂𝒔) 
To achieve approx. optimal 
solution (𝒕𝒐𝒑𝒕) 
PSO GA SA PSO GA SA 
IEEE 14 7.019 9.077 11.052 54.118 212.462 97.002 
IEEE 30 1.847 3.942 5.923 18.816 72.329 63.531 
IEEE 39 9.572 15.207 9.812 183.775 157.509 138.984 
IEEE 57 7.220 25.441 38.067 57.125 120.356 118.851 
UIUC 150 17.899 22.339 57.898 131.845 87.291 96.623 
Aggregated Average 
(all networks) 
8.7114 15.2012 24.5504 89.1358 129.9894 102.9982 
Following observations can be drawn from the results in Table 4.3 to Table 4.8: 
- For feasible cases, metaheuristic solvers can return almost the same objective value 
and generation schedule as conventional solvers. This confirms that the custom-
coded metaheuristic solvers in this thesis are working in the way as they should be.  
- Metaheuristic solvers are computationally inferior to conventional solvers, as they 
require hundreds (or even thousands) of function evaluations to find an optimal 
objective value. Metaheuristic solver’s computational performance can be 
improved further in two ways: a) by parallelized implementation, and b) by 
implementing them in other efficient computer languages. For example, C++ 
compiler is at least 10 times faster than Matlab compiler.  
- Metaheuristic solvers require heavy computational time to find the optimal 
solution, but they require only a few tens of seconds to find the feasible solution. 
This feature of metaheuristic solvers suggest they would be suitable for resolving 
infeasible SCM models. 
- PSO outperforms over GA and SA in finding the best optimal objective value for 
14, 30 and 57-bus networks. But GA performs better in case of 39 and 150-bus 
networks. 
- Considering the aggregated average time required to find the feasible solution, 
PSO is computationally superior to GA and SA as it requires less time to find a 
feasible solution.  
- Considering the aggregated average time required to find the optimal solution, PSO 
is computationally superior to other metaheuristic solvers.  
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- Considering heavy computational times, at this stage, it is difficult to advocate the 
benefits of metaheuristic solvers over conventional solvers, although both provide 
similar pre-contingency operating conditions.  
4.6. Preparation of Feasible SCM Cases  
A list of feasible SCM test cases, based on the procedure mentioned in Section 4.4, 
is developed by simulating a less severe contingencies (e.g. less severe faults, Table 
4.9). After protection clears the fault, the system is analysed for constraint violations 
immediately after the contingency and before the application of any non-emergency 
corrective controls. This is carried out by solving an unconstrained power flow with 
pre-contingency (optimal) control set points applied on a post-contingency configured-
network. In practical operations environment, immediate post-contingency constraint 
violations are monitored through the SCADA system. If any of the security constraints 
are active or violated, the next step is to mitigate these violations through available 
non-emergency corrective controls. 
The number and type of immediate post-contingency constraint violations in the 
considered networks are shown in Table 4.9, with NUV and NOV standing for the 
number of under and overvoltage violations, while NOL stands for number of branch 
overloading violations. 





Immediate post-contingency constraint 
violations 
NUV NOV NOL Total 
FC1 IEEE 14 L5-6 & L6-11 7 0 3 10 
FC2 IEEE 30 L4-12&T6-9 0 0 3 3 
FC3 IEEE 39 L10-13 & L16-24 3 0 3 6 
FC4 IEEE 57 L3-4 & L8-9 29 0 8 37 
FC5 UIUC 150 L88-89 & L107-146 0 7 5 12 
4.7. Validation of Feasible SCM Cases  
It is quite straightforward to prove the feasibility of an SCM formulation. Feasibility 
is confirmed, if there exists a corrective control solution that resolves all post-
contingency constraints violations. In this context, following the contingency specified 
in Table 4.9, SCM problem is reformulated to include available (non-emergency) 
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corrective controls and solved with several conventional and metaheuristic solvers. 
While Table 4.10 displays the convergence status of the employed solvers, Table 4.11 
presents the corresponding optimal fuel cost to resolve all post-contingency constraint 
violations. The results demonstrate that all optimization solvers can converge and 
provide a feasible solution at which all post-contingency constraint violations are 
resolved. This confirms that the simulated feasible cases are indeed feasible.  
Table 4.10 Convergence status of various solvers for feasible SCM cases 
Test Case PSSE IPAM MIPS FMINCON PDIPM SCPDIPM TRALM PSO GA SA 
FC1 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
FC2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
FC3 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
FC4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
FC5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Table 4.11 Optimal fuel cost value returned by the solvers for feasible SCM cases 
Solver FC1 FC2 FC3 FC4 FC5 
PSSE 886.23 809.42 62256.60 43063.30 12786.80 
IPAM 892.93 813.31 62314.68 43296.48 12787.25 
MIPS 872.67 811.21 62262.52 43097.99 12787.25 
Fmincon 872.67 811.21 62262.52 43097.94 12787.26 
PDIPM 872.67 811.21 62262.52 43097.99 12787.25 
SCPDIPM 872.67 811.21 62262.52 43097.99 12787.25 
TRALM 872.67 811.28 62262.52 43097.98 12789.99 
PSO 868.06 809.22 62347.28 43086.58 12793.16 
GA 865.31 809.23 62312.87 43064.76 12788.49 
SA 868.68 809.51 62388.76 43088.56 12789.83 
4.8. Preparation of Infeasible SCM Cases  
A list of infeasible instances of SCM formulations (Table 4.12) is developed by 
deliberately simulating severe double line contingencies. The list of immediate post-
contingency violations is calculated using the unconstrained power flow analysis, 
similar to feasible cases. These violations are shown in Table 4.12. If the operator tries 
to mitigate these overstressed operating conditions with only available non-emergency 
corrective controls, the resulting SCM formulations become infeasible (i.e. there is no 
solution with these controls that resolves all post-contingency constraint violations). 
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Immediate post-contingency constraint 
violations 
NUV NOV NOL Total 
IC1 IEEE 14 L7-9&L6-13 0 0 4 4 
IC2 IEEE 14 L5-6&L9-14 4 0 7 11 
IC3 IEEE 30 L1-2 & T27-28 4 0 5 9 
IC4 IEEE 30 L4-12 & T27-28 5 0 3 8 
IC5 IEEE 39 L5-6 & L6-7 3 0 6 9 
IC6 IEEE 39 L21-22 & L26-27 0 3 4 7 
IC7 IEEE 57 T7-29 & L8-9 35 0 5 40 
IC8 IEEE 57 T7-29 & L46-47 18 1 1 20 
IC9 UIUC 150 T71-104 & L101-142 0 0 10 10 
IC10 UIUC 150 L99-104 & L99-137 9 0 5 15 
4.9. Validation of Infeasible SCM Cases  
Verification of infeasibility is very important to avoid spending large computational 
times in solving infeasible SCM formulations. Once infeasibility is confirmed, the 
operator can concentrate on resolving infeasible SCM models to find the bottlenecks, 
or to locate the critical constraints causing infeasibility and to devise additional 
emergency controls to resolve them.  
In this section, two indirect techniques are employed to validate the infeasibility of 
infeasible SCM formulations:  
a) by solving the considered test cases with several conventional optimization 
solvers. Infeasibility is confirmed if more than two the conventional solvers either 
reports infeasibility, or fail to converge, as it is unlikely that more than two solvers 
will make a wrong judgement on problem infeasibility.  
b) by checking the condition number of the Newton Jacobian matrix. In this way, the 
linear dependency of the gradients of the active inequality constraints against the 
gradients of equality constraints is checked over the iterations. Infeasibility is 
confirmed if the condition number of Newton Jacobian matrix is close to singular 
(e.g. monotonous increase in condition number over the iterations). This indicates 
the gradients of the active inequality constraints and gradients of equality 
constraints are linearly dependent on one another.  
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As part of the first technique, considered infeasible SCM formulations are solved with 
several conventional and metaheuristic optimization solvers. Table 5.3 presents the 
convergence status of these solvers. The results demonstrate that none of the 
conventional optimization solvers has converged, hence the considered cases are 
infeasible. To reinforce this judgement further, other information related to 
convergence process (e.g. 2-norm of the correction matrix, B) is extracted from one 
solver (PSSE) for one test case (Figure 4.6). 
Table 4.13 Convergence status of optimization solvers for infeasible SCAM cases 
Test Case PSSE IPAM MIPS FMINCON PDIPM SCPDIPM TRALM PSO GA SA 
IC1 X X X X X X X Y Y Y 
IC2 X X X X X X X Y Y Y 
IC3 X X X X X X X Y Y Y 
IC4 X X X X X X X Y Y Y 
IC5 X X X X X X X Y Y Y 
IC6 X X X X X X X Y Y Y 
IC7 X X X X X X X Y Y Y 
IC8 X X X X X X X Y Y Y 
IC9 X X X X X X X Y Y Y 
IC10 X X X X X X X Y Y Y 
X-Indicates nonconvergence; Y-Indicates convergence to an infeasible point 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, most of the conventional solvers utilize Newton-Raphson 
or similar equation solvers to solve the KKT conditions. As part of the implementation 
process, these equation solvers require to solve a linear system of the form 𝐽𝑋 = 𝐵. 
This system is usually denoted as Newton linear system, where J represents Newton 
Jacobian and B represents the correction matrix. Elements of the correction matrix 
drive the corrections in search (primal and dual) variables and the 2-norm of the 
correction matrix is typically calculated to quantify the correction. Zero value of the 
norm indicates no correction.  
When solving feasible problems, the norm should reduce gradually and approach a 
negligible or a prespecified threshold value (indicating true solution). When solving 
infeasible problems, norm gradually increases with no-bound. The same phenomenon 
is demonstrated in Figure 4.6. PSSE even failed to converge with different 
combinations of load models (constant power, CP, constant impedance, CZ, constant 
current, CI) and initial values (pre-contingency optimal point, PC, and flat voltage 
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point, FV). Infeasibility may be further verified with the monotonously increasing 
behaviour of power mismatch values below the prespecified threshold value.  
Another indicator that manifests the infeasibility is the condition number of the 
Newton Jacobian matrix. The condition number for one feasible and one infeasible 
SCM case is extracted from MIPS solver and plotted in Figure 4.7. While the condition 
number is getting reduced or is not blowing-up over the iterations for the feasible case, 
the opposite phenomenon is happening while solving the infeasible problem, which 
indicates solver’s failure to invert the Jacobian matrix. 
While conventional algorithms did not converge for infeasible problems, metaheuristic 
algorithms can converge “at least” to an infeasible operating point. The number of 
constraint violations at this infeasible operating point might be much lower than the 
number of immediate post-contingency constraint violations. In some cases, the active 
constraints at the infeasible operating point provided by the metaheuristic solver may 
be the actual MISC that are causing infeasibility.   
 
Figure 4.6 2-Norm of the correction matrix (BC2 and IC3) 

































































































Figure 4.7 Condition Number of the Newton Jacobian (BC2 and IC3) 
4.10. Conclusions 
This chapter presented a set of feasible and infeasible SCM cases, which will be used 
in the next chapter to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed approaches for 
infeasibility diagnosis and resolution. Overstressed operating conditions, representing 
infeasible SCM cases, are developed by selecting and simulating severe contingencies. 
These overstressed conditions, for a given demand, also represent the infeasible 
network configurations as they might cause the system to lose stability and/or split into 
islands.  
When the problem is feasible, both conventional and metaheuristic solvers can find a 
near optimal control solution that satisfies all constraints. When the problem is 
infeasible, conventional solvers will fail to converge, even to an infeasible control 
solution. However, metaheuristic solvers, although unable to find a completely 
feasible solution with available non-emergency controls, will converge to an infeasible 
operating point, at which the number of active constraint violations may be far lower 
than the number of immediate post contingency constraint violations. The active 
constraints at the infeasible operating point may or may not represent the actual MISC, 
or critical constraints, which will be discussed in depth in Chapter 5.  
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Finally, the information on critical constraints obtained from metaheuristic methods 
may be used by network planners and operators, either to aid the convergence process 
of conventional solvers, or to help with some other applications (e.g. management of 
system outages/faults, optimal load shedding, etc.). Chapter 7 is exclusively dedicated 
to discussing this aspect of the analysis, while the next chapter presents an infeasibility 
diagnosis and resolution framework to efficiently analyse and deal with the infeasible 




Chapter 5  
Infeasibility Diagnosis and Resolution Framework 
The chapter presents a modified metaheuristic approach and a framework based on 
this approach to localize and resolve infeasibility in nonlinear infeasible OPF/SCM 
problems. 
5.1. Introduction 
Optimal Power Flow (OPF) formulation remains to be one of the fundamental 
mathematical formulations for analysis of power systems, as almost all planning and 
operational problems can be analysed using this formulation. In general, SCM 
problems are also modelled with OPF formulation and typically solved with 
conventional optimization solvers (e.g. interior point solvers) [195]-[198]. While 
general OPF formulation focusses on minimizing various objective functions, SCM 
mainly focusses on minimizing either the severity (number and amount) of security 
constraint violations, or the cost of corrective actions to reduce the constraint 
violations. Hence, in this chapter, the terms OPF and SCM will be used 
interchangeably, while the literature review focuses on infeasible OPF formulations.  
From the system operation viewpoint, OPF study aims to compute an optimal control 
solution to improve a system performance function (e.g. generation cost), while 
satisfying all security constraints. From an optimization viewpoint, OPF study 
involves finding an optimum solution to a set of nonlinear algebraic equations 
subjected to a set of equality and inequality constraints. Since its inception, most of 
the earlier research work has concentrated on developing computationally efficient 
mathematical formulations (i.e. to include complex objectives constraints, e.g. 
transient stability constrained OPF using metaheuristic solvers) and solution 
algorithms. However, very limited research work has been done to diagnose and 
resolve infeasibility when an SCM/OPF formulation actually becomes infeasible.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, a nonlinear SCM formulation becomes infeasible due to 
the non-satisfiability of a minimal set of constraints, denoted as “minimal intractable 
subsystem of constraints (MISC)” in optimization theory [17]. A nonempty MISC lead 
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to an empty (feasible) search space but an infeasible model can be made feasible either 
by removing, or relaxing MISC [17]. The SCM formulation aimed at solving a 
planning problem can be infeasible when the available resources cannot meet the given 
requirements. Similarly, SCM formulation aimed at solving an operational problem 
can be infeasible when available controls are insufficient to devise a feasible dispatch. 
This situation happens during the overstressed and emergency operating conditions 
(Chapter 4). Indeed, OPF becomes most valuable in these conditions, as the MISC can 
help operators to mitigate and resolve constraint violations [4]. 
It should be noted that none of the solvers can find a feasible solution to an infeasible 
SCM formulation, as such a feasible solution does not exist. The main point of the 
presented research is to establish a solver which can converge to a “most acceptable 
(or least severe) infeasible solution” in which all constraints, except these belonging 
to MISC, or these belonging to a somewhat bigger constraint set than MISC, are 
satisfied [4, 17]. When solving infeasible SCM formulations, conventional OPF 
solvers generally fail to converge and the information returned by the solver is of little 
use to locate the root causes of infeasibility (i.e. MISC) [4,17, 71]. However, being 
capable of performing random searches, metaheuristic solvers can converge to an 
acceptable infeasible solution and find the corresponding set of problematic 
constraints, which might not be necessarily equal to the MISC, but could be extremely 
useful to identify or estimate (and also locate) the MISC [10]. The main reason is that 
MISC is not known a priori and that there is currently no method or approach which 
can determine exact MISC for an infeasible OPF problem. Therefore, this thesis 
introduces an indirect MISC identification approach, where for a given infeasible 
model, the set of constraints reported as “problematic” by an optimization solver is 
denoted as “problematic constraint set” (PCS). Depending on the size of identified 
PCS, MISC can be equal to PCS, or a subset of PCS.  
However, the cardinality of the PCS to some extent depends on the performance of the 
implemented metaheuristic solver, where some solvers can find a PCS with a fewer 
members and others with more members, where former are obviously better than the 
latter. Moreover, even the same metaheuristic solver, if not implemented properly, can 
report different PCS’s in different runs. Hence, the lower and upper bound on the 
PCS’s are in this thesis denoted as minimum likely size of PCS (MinPCS) and maximum 
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likely size of PCS (MaxPCS). A PCS can represent the actual MISC only when the 
intersection of MinPCS and MISC is equal, or very close to MISC (i.e. when their 
difference is an empty set). As mentioned, MISC cannot be known a priori and this 
can be verified only in an indirect way: MinPCS represents MISC if, and only if, the 
model becomes feasible by simultaneous relaxation or removal of all constraints in 
MinPCS. Even if one constraint in MinPCS is not relaxed or removed from the 
formulation, the model will be still infeasible (Section 3.3.4). This confirms that only 
the constraints in MinPCS are introducing infeasibility into the model.   
The non-convergence of conventional OPF solvers due to problem infeasibility is a 
relatively common and less addressed computational issue in the open literature [3,4, 
72]. Although OPF solvers based on linear models can more readily diagnose the 
infeasibility, there is no widely accepted or standardised methodology to identify the 
problematic constraints in nonlinear models [4]-[6]. As the results in this chapter show, 
the traditional soft constraint handling approach using various exterior penalty 
functions, as well as the constraint relaxation approaches, may not be successful in 
finding the MISC, or even MinPCS [10, 12]. The MISC, or its best representation by 
MinPCS, should be identified for two main reasons [73]: a) to find the minimum 
unfulfilled requirements to be relaxed, or to find the corresponding additional 
resources (minimum amount) for satisfying these constraints; and b) to find the 
minimum violated operational constraints to be relaxed, or to find locations where to 
activate emergency controls to mitigate the violated constraints.  
In this context, this chapter presents an infeasibility diagnosis and resolution 
framework (IDRF), which first identifies the MinPCS as the closest representation of 
MISC by minimizing the infeasibility measures due to constraint violations, and then 
resolves infeasibility either by relaxing the related constraints, or by suitably 
penalizing the MISC. The IDRF focuses on the following problem: given an infeasible 
SCM formulation, how to identify the minimal set of constraints (i.e. MinPCS, or 
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Difference between PCS, MinPCS, MaxPCS, MISC and CCS 
The definitions below are provided solely for the purpose of this PhD thesis. 
Furthermore, the presented work distinguishes between non-emergency corrective 
controls and emergency corrective controls, which are not available in immediate post-
contingency state. 
PCS: The set of constraints reported by an optimization solver at the minimized 
infeasibility measure, rather than for the original objective function of the problem. 
MinPCS and MaxPCS: A metaheuristic optimization solver may not report the same 
PCS in every run, due to a stochastic nature of the search. In addition, the user may 
employ different solvers simultaneously to find the PCS. Assuming the range of 
possible variations in PCS size, the upper bound on PCS is considered as MaxPCS, 
while the lower bound is considered as MinPCS. However, if the user employs only 
one solver and executes that solver only once, the MinPCS and MaxPCS are both equal 
to the PCS reported in that single execution. In the presented analysis, the modified 
metaheuristic solvers can usually return the same PCS in most of the runs when the 
PCS found by the proposed metaheuristic solvers is equal to MinPCS.  
MISC: For a given contingency case, resulting in overstressed system operating 
conditions, this is the absolute minimum set of constraints that makes the search space 
infeasible, or empty. The presented work assumes that MISC could be equal to a 
MinPCS, or that MinPCS is as close as possible, under the limitations of the applied 
metaheuristic solvers, representation of the MISC. The process of finding MISC is to 
identify the least possible number of constraints that cause the infeasibility, which is 
confirmed by the resolving of the infeasibility after these constraints are relaxed, or 
suitably penalised.  
CCS: The minimum set of security constraints that prevents operator from devising a 
feasible dispatch for a given operating priority. The rest of the constraints are treated 
as noncritical.  
While PCS, MinPCS, MaxPCS, and MISC are defined mainly for the purposes of 
diagnosing, identifying, localizing and resolving infeasibility from a “mathematical 
sense”, the CCS is defined to find the “bottlenecks” in the power system. While 
process of identifying PCS, MinPCS, MaxPCS, and MISC involves “minimization of 
5.1 Introduction                                                                                    
87 
 
infeasibility”, the CCS identification process involves “optimization of given operator 
priority”, e.g. minimization of the cost of corrective actions in post-contingency state. 
Literature review: The problem of infeasibility in OPF models was previously 
addressed by some researchers and the majority of the research was carried out during 
the period 1980-2000. The existing literature can be classified into four areas. 
a) Approaches based on constraint handling – this area of research focussed on 
handling the inequality constraints when the problem becomes infeasible. The 
developed approaches are: constraint relaxation [7, 48, 71, 74-80] and constraint 
penalization using linear and quadratic penalty functions [48, 71, 76, 79, 80]. 
While constraint relaxation approach enlarges the search space by expanding (i.e. 
relaxing) the constraint limits (e.g. increasing the line MVA limit to 150%), 
penalization accepts infeasible solutions with a given penalty. The main motivation 
behind these approaches is that only a minimum number of constraints will be 
violated at the final relaxed or penalized solution, which is not always true for 
nonlinear OPF problems. In conclusion, these approaches are mainly concentrated 
on infeasibility resolution, rather than on infeasibility diagnosis, because the 
number of constraint violations at the relaxed or penalized solution may be lower 
than the post-contingency violations, but they may not represent the actual 
minimum set of violated constraints (i.e. not MISC) in all cases.   
b) Approaches based on system controls – this area of research mainly focussed on 
either adding or reducing the volume or number of controls to restore the 
feasibility. From mathematical sense, this is equivalent to increasing the limit of a 
specific variable in an equality constraint equation or adding more variables to an 
equality constraint equation. The main motivation behind these approaches is to 
identify the power deficit buses by increasing either the area or degree of control 
space. The volume of controls can be increased for some controls (e.g. limits of 
generators) and decreased for some other controls (e.g. load shedding). For 
example, the control space is enlarged by increasing the limits of generators 
beyond their rating in [48, 81], or by shedding the load in [48, 74, 75, 82]. The 
buses where the generation limits are violated, or the buses where load shedding 
takes place, are considered as power deficit buses and critical buses for infeasibility 
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resolution. Infeasibility is restored by adding phantom or fictitious generators in 
[83].  
Some authors added slack variables to both equality and inequality constraints and 
corresponding slack penalty values to the objective function to identify the active 
set of violated constraints in the final solution [84]-[86]. This approach, however, 
may not identify the key constraints causing the infeasibility when many slack 
variables are non-zero and might also impose difficulties in selecting the proper 
weighting factors to produce acceptable solutions. Again, these approaches mainly 
focus on non-restrictive (i.e. non-systematic) infeasibility resolution, rather than 
on methodological identification of the minimum number of constraints causing 
infeasibility, because the power deficit buses cannot help diagnosing the MISC. 
Power deficit buses indicate the buses at which energy imbalance takes place due 
to constraint violations, but they cannot say which constraint violations (voltage or 
thermal) causing that energy imbalance. 
c) Approaches based on algorithmic process modification – this area of research 
has focussed on changing the standard process of optimization algorithms. The 
authors in [73] tried to resolve infeasibility in nonlinear OPF algorithms by 
defining threshold limit for each equality and inequality constraint, to identify a 
subset of active inequality constraints. During the iterations, the Lagrangian 
multiplier is fixed whenever it crosses the threshold, resulting in the relaxation of 
the corresponding constraint. This approach, however, needs careful selection of 
threshold values, as it may cause a feasible solution to become infeasible, or 
numerical instability of the algorithm [87]-[88]. Although the authors in [88] 
presented a systematic approach for selecting threshold values, the final solution 
may not be unique for different sets of initial values. 
d) Approaches based on fundamental optimization formulations – this area of 
research has focussed on developing novel problem formulations to handle ill-
posed and infeasible problems. For example, an alternative set of optimality 
conditions (Fritz-John conditions) is derived in [89] to solve OPF formulations 
with ill-posed feasible sets (i.e. not for infeasible sets). The main motivation behind 
this approach is that the standard KKT optimality conditions lead to an ill-
conditioned Newton Jacobian matrix because of which the conventional solvers 
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will fail to converge, and the proposed Fritz-John conditions will resolve that issue. 
However, this approach has to be extended further, as it is not applicable to 
infeasible problems in general form.  
In summary, most of the previous approaches effectively modify the original infeasible 
problem into a feasible one, rather than identifying the MISC, or at least MinPCS. In 
contrast, the proposed IDRF analyses the original infeasible problem in order to 
identify the MinPCS or MISC and then resolve infeasibility based on it.   
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 presents the description 
and list of analysed overstressed SCM test cases. Section 5.3 demonstrates that the 
traditional infeasibility handling strategies cannot identify the MISC. Section 5.4 
presents the modified metaheuristic approaches used in IDRF for identification of 
MinPCS that could represent MISC. Section 5.5 describes the proposed IDRF in more 
detail and Section 5.6 demonstrates the application of the IDRF on different test 
networks, illustrating main conclusions with the corresponding results. 
5.2. Analysed Infeasible SCM Cases 
Several infeasible test cases from Table 5.1 are used to demonstrate the proposed 
framework, which are the same test cases developed and validated in Chapter 4. These 
cases represent the selected overstressed operating conditions for the five test networks 
(IEEE 14, IEEE 30, IEEE 39, IEEE 57, and UIUC 150-bus networks). The aim of the 
IDRF is to find MinPCS from the immediate post-contingency total number of security 
constraint violations (TNSCV) and then evaluate how closely the MinPCS is 
representing MISC. 
It should be noted that this chapter, if and as required, analyzes all or only some of the 
test cases listed in Table 5.1 to demonstrate the specific aspects of the IDRF 
framework. The main reason is to limit the attention and illustrate the main points of 
the approach proposed in this chapter.   
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Table 5.1 List of Analysed SCM Test Cases 
Test Case: Contingencies Network NUV NOV NOL TNSCV 
IC1: T4-9&L6-13 IEEE 14 0 0 4 4 
IC2:T5-6&L9-14 IEEE 14 4 0 7 11 
IC3: L1-2 & T27-28 IEEE 30 4 0 5 9 
IC4: L4-12 & T27-28 IEEE 30 5 0 3 8 
IC5: L5-6 & L6-7 IEEE 39 3 0 6 9 
IC6: L21-22 & L26-27 IEEE 39 0 3 4 7 
IC7: T7-29 & L8-9 IEEE 57 35 0 5 40 
IC8: T7-29 & L46-47 IEEE 57 18 1 1 20 
IC9: T71-104 & L101-142 UIUC 150 0 0 10 10 
IC10: L24-143 & L101-142 UIUC150 3 0 8 11 
Note: Lx-y: Line between bus x and y; Tx-y: Transformer between bus x and y 
5.3. OPF Infeasibility Diagnosis with Existing Approaches 
This section implements the (common) traditional infeasibility handling approaches 
used by power system engineers (specific to OPF problem) and applied 
mathematicians (generally related to nonlinear optimization problems). The 
performance of these approaches is tested against several infeasible cases.  
5.3.1 Approaches from OPF Community  
Traditional approaches to infeasibility diagnosis in conventional solvers can be 
broadly classified into three groups, explained below. 
5.3.1.1 Soft Penalization Approach (via exterior penalty functions) 
This approach considers all constraints as soft, meaning that one or more constraints 
can be violated if they had to be. Every constraint is penalized for violating its limit 
and the aggregated penalty for all violations is added to the original objective function 
(as presented in Chapter 3). Hence, penalization approach replaces the original 
constrained optimization problem with an unconstrained problem, and repeatedly 
solves the problem until all (for feasible problems), or most of the constraints are 
satisfied (when problem remains infeasible). In general, the violated constraints at the 
final solution are considered as the problematic constraints, which are used to localize 
the infeasibility.  
Conventional solvers basically use either linear penalty functions (LPF) or quadratic 
penalty functions (QPF) to implement this approach (Chapter 3). In LPF, constraint 
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violation amount is multiplied by a penalty factor (Kp) and is added to the objective 
function. Similarly, squared violation, multiplied by a penalty factor, is added to the 
objective function in QPF. In further text, several infeasible cases are solved with a 
conventional solver (PSS/E) by implementing this approach. The list of resulting 
constraint violations at final solutions with various penalty factor (Kp) values is shown 
in Table 5.2.  




Kp=10 Kp=100 Kp=1000 Kp=10 Kp=100 Kp=1000 
NVV NOLV NVV NOLV NVV NOLV NVV NOLV NVV NOLV NVV NOLV 
IC1 5 4 0 4 0 4 14 4 0 4 0 4 
IC2 11 4 4 4 4 3 14 4 14 3 2 4 
IC3 13 3 5 2 3 2 24 2 7 2 5 2 
IC4 9 2 5 2 4 2 23 2 5 2 5 2 
IC5 20 3 5 3 13 3 11 1 X X X X 
IC6 39 2 16 3 8 1 14 1 X X X X 
IC7 57 2 33 1 27 1 57 1 23 1 X X 
IC8 57 0 26 0 10 0 57 0 57 0 31 0 
IC9 32 0 48 4 18 0 21 1 X X X X 
IC10 23 2 13 2 14 2 X X X X X X 
NVV – number of voltage violations, NOLV – number of overload violations, X – 
non-converged 
Conventional solvers can always converge to an infeasible solution with LPFs, but 
they still have convergence problems with QPFs. Generally, as the size of the modelled 
network and implemented penalty factors increase, conventional solver with QPFs will 
have smaller chance to converge (except IC8), even to an infeasible solution. This is 
because the quadratic penalty cost (i.e. the product of penalty factor and squared 
violation), for a given constraint violation, will be higher than the linear penalty cost, 
which forces the solver to find a feasible solution which does not exist. The higher the 
penalty cost, the higher the penalization pressure on the solver to find a feasible 
solution. Accordingly, LPFs are better than QPFs in solving infeasible problems.  
The number of constraint violations at the final solution is significantly varying with 
different penalty functions and penalty factors. The violations decrease with increased 
penalty factor for IC1 to IC4. For other cases, the variations are not following any 
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trend, or general rule. This indicates that conventional solvers are more sensitive to 
penalty factors. 
For larger networks (IC7-IC10), the unconstrained solution seems far better than the 
penalized solution, because the numbers of constraint violations after soft penalisation 
are far higher than TNSCV. This indicates the severity of the contingency and the large 
shift in system operating point from the pre-contingency operating point. Probably, 
that is the reason why penalization is converging to a “local solution” (close to the pre-
contingency operating point), which is inferior to unconstrained power flow solution.  
It is also found that the conventional solver could report different sets of violated 
constraints (both in terms of numbers and indices, i.e., locations) with different initial 
conditions. This is obvious, because the solver usually converges to a local optimum, 
which is again close to the initial point. Nevertheless, the number of constraint 
violations in final solutions is still comparable to, or higher than TNSCV. In other 
words, it is clear that this approach is unable to locate/minimise the problematic 
constraints (MinPCS) properly, let alone to identify or correctly represent the MISC.   
In conclusion, the traditional soft penalization approach (via exterior penalty 
functions) cannot help conventional solvers to diagnose the infeasibility in infeasible 
SCM problems (i.e. cannot reduce TNSCV to MinPCS).  
5.3.1.2 Constraint Relaxation Approach 
Constraint relaxation approach widens the search space by decreasing the lower bound 
and/or by increasing the upper bound of the violated constraints. It should be noted 
that constraint relaxation does not increase the dimensionality of the search space, 
which increases only when a new control function/parameter is added to the problem 
formulation. The main motivation behind the relaxation is to extend a feasible search 
space for the conventional solver to find the most optimal feasible solution (within this 
extended feasible search space), which is also assumed to be the most acceptable 
infeasible solution for the original infeasible problem.  
In this section, all thermal branch MVA constraints are relaxed to 200% and the bus 
voltages are relaxed to range [0.8 1.2] pu. The selected infeasible problems are 
reformulated to include this relaxation and solved using a conventional solver (PSS/E). 
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Table 5.3 presents a list of problematic constraints with the constraint relaxation 
approach.  
Unlike in soft penalization approach, the conventional solver can always converge to 
an infeasible solution with constraint relaxation approach. However, relaxation 
approach fails to reduce the number of identified problematic constraints to a lower 
value than TNSCV for most of the cases. The performance of the relaxation approach 
becomes much worse for larger networks. For example, the relaxed solution involves 
voltage violations across all the buses for case IC9 (150 bus network). One should 
remember that this solution is worse for the original infeasible problem, but it is a 
perfectly feasible solution for the relaxed problem. This indicates that the relaxation 
approach is more sensitive to the amount of relaxation and to the indices of relaxed 
constraints. However, it is very difficult to identify the list of the constraints to be 
relaxed and the relaxation amount, prior to the solution.  
In conclusion, the constraint relaxation approach cannot help conventional solvers to 
diagnose or localise the infeasibility in nonlinear SCM formulations.  
Table 5.3 List of Problematic Constraints with Relaxation Approach 
Case NVV NOLV Case NVV NOLV 
IC1 7 2 IC6 20 3 
IC2 7 5 IC7 26 2 
IC3 13 4 IC8 25 0 
IC4 13 3 IC9 150 3 
IC5 20 5 IC10 147 1 
5.3.2 Approaches from Optimization Community 
While the OPF researchers focused on diagnosing infeasibility by minimizing original 
objective function (e.g. fuel cost or losses) plus the penalty cost for violating 
constraints (in a penalization approach), or by relaxing constrains outside of the 
physically possible bounds, optimization researchers focused on diagnosing 
infeasibility by minimizing the “infeasibility measures” (Section 3.3.5). From the 
optimization viewpoint, inclusion or exclusion of an objective function does not 
modify the search space of an infeasible problem, it just changes the way how search 
within it is performed. In other words, the objective function does not play significant 
role in deicing the infeasibility [1]. The main motivation behind minimizing the 
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infeasibility measure is to minimize the active constraints to the least possible value 
(i.e. identify MISC, ideally) in the final solution. In optimization theory, a violated 
constraint in the final solution is denoted as an “active constraint”. 
In this context, selected infeasible cases are reformulated to minimize the two 
infeasibility measures: the sum of infeasibilities, SINF (3.16) and the sum of squares 
of infeasibilities, SSINF (3.17). The reformulated problems are solved with 
conventional solver (PSS/E) and Table 5.4 presents the list of active constraints in the 
final solution.  
The number of active constraints is not reduced significantly when compared to 
immediate post-contingency constraint violations. Indeed, the active constraints in the 
majority of cases are higher than the post-contingency violations, which is in contrast 
with a simple assumption that the size of MISC will be always lower than the number 
of post-contingency violations (TNSCV). Hence, seeing the increase of the number of 
active constraints, it is safe to say that the identified active constraints do not correctly, 
or even approximately represent the MISC (which is also demonstrated later in this 
chapter by showing reduction of the number of active constraints by the proposed 
approach). To sum up, the infeasibility minimization approach, similar to previously 
discussed approaches, cannot help conventional solvers to diagnose the infeasibility in 
nonlinear SCM problems. 
Table 5.4 List of constraint violations with minimized infeasibility measure 
 SINF SSINF 
 NVV NOLV NVV NOLV 
IC1 0 3 0 2 
IC2 0 7 1 7 
IC3 7 5 25 5 
IC4 5 4 5 3 
IC5 23 2 27 1 
IC6 15 4 39 4 
IC7 12 3 40 0 
IC8 12 0 37 0 
IC9 5 7 22 0 
IC10 9 5 9 3 
SINF – sum of infeasibilities; SSINF – sum of squares of infeasibilities  
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5.4. Modified Metaheuristic Approach for IDRF 
While most of the previous researches in metaheuristic optimization has focussed on 
developing algorithms for finding accurate optimal solutions to feasible optimization 
problems, solving (or “debugging”) infeasible optimization problems with 
metaheuristic approaches is not yet explored. This chapter focuses on this unexplored 
field and employs metaheuristic optimization solvers to debug infeasible SCM 
problems and identify the MISC. In other words, metaheuristic solvers are employed 
to find the most acceptable infeasible solution to an infeasible problem.  
Nevertheless, the existing metaheuristic approaches in their original form cannot be 
directly applied to infeasible problems, as they were mainly developed for solving 
feasible problems. Metaheuristic solvers require modifications to their search process 
to debug infeasible problems. For example, most PSO algorithms maintain high 
particle diversity during initial iterations (i.e. to favour exploration) and reduce 
diversity gradually (i.e. to favour exploitation around the optimum) to a minimum 
value. However, infeasible problems always require a high particle diversity to explore 
the new areas where constraint violations can be further reduced.  
In this context, this chapter introduces three modifications (explained below) to the 
basic metaheuristic algorithmic framework, where the resulting approach is simply 
denoted as a “modified metaheuristic approach”.  
5.4.1 Novel Infeasibility Measure 
The existing infeasibility measures (SINF, SSINF) are sensitive to scaling issues, and 
metaheuristic solvers do not perform well in minimizing these infeasibility measures 
in their original form. For example, a small violation of a thermal limit can be 
significantly higher (e.g. hundreds, or even thousands of times) than voltage limit 
violation, which causes an improper or non-uniform treatment of different violations 
caused by different constraints.  
In order to facilitate the uniform treatment of all types of constraint violations and 
prevent the scaling issues in metaheuristic solvers, this chapter proposes a new 
infeasibility measure (denoted as the sum of the percentage of infeasibilities, SPINF, 
(5.2)) based on the calculation of the percentage of infeasibility, (5.1). As it is shown 
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later in this chapter, metaheuristic optimization solvers can successfully search and 













5.4.2 Pre-conditioning of Decision Variables   
In general, in almost all engineering optimization problems, the decision variables 
frequently fall under quite different ranges. In the case of the SCM problem, the control 
variables (e.g. voltage and active power generation) also falls in different ranges. 
These non-uniform ranges often result in a numerical ill-conditioning of underlying 
matrices (in case of conventional optimization solvers), or in an inefficient search (in 
case of metaheuristic optimization solvers), especially if search space is too narrow, 
or infeasible. In PSO, for example, the positions and velocities of the particles are 
updated by inertia, social and cognition coefficients and two random numbers to 
calculate the next position. As the variables lie in different ranges, the applied updates 
are non-uniform and particles might hit the boundary in one dimension, but not in the 
others. Similar description applies to other metaheuristic solvers as well. 
To address this issue, all decision variables are transformed into a new space with the 
same lower and upper limits (0-100 in this thesis) using the linear transformation of 
variables. This pre-conditioning of decision variables resulted in improved 
computational performance and population diversity (in evolutionary algorithms), or 
particle diversity (in swarm intelligence algorithms) over the iterations [14]. 
5.4.3 Modified Personal Best Updating Criteria for PSO  
The implemented PSO uses Newton Raphson Power Flow (NRPF) for evaluating 
solution of each particle. Traditionally, the particle’s personal best is updated when it 
achieves an improvement in the fitness value, but as the algorithm is dealing with 
infeasible problems, there might be cases when the unconstrained power flow may not 
converge. Here, the non-convergence of the power flow is not because of insufficient 
generation in the system, rather it is because of the insufficient dispatch (although there 
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is enough generation to meet demand) assigned to some particles by the PSO solver. 
These particles may be promoted to the next stage if they are not treated properly. To 
avoid this problem, the modified criteria require each particle to satisfy two conditions: 
a) new fitness value is better than the old one, and b) the power flow has converged.  
5.5. Overview of Infeasibility Diagnosis and Resolution 
Framework  
As mentioned, the objective function does not play main role in deciding the 
feasibility/infeasibility of a given optimization problem (in general), or SCM 
formulation (in particular). An SCM/OPF formulation becomes infeasible due to a 
non-satisfiability of typically a small set of constraints, denoted previously as the 
minimum intractable subsystem of constraints (MISC). Accordingly, the size of the 
MISC is practically always lower than the number of immediate post-contingency 
violations (TNSCV).    
When a problem becomes infeasible, OPF solvers should provide the user with an 
information how intractable the problem is and what are the possible reasons for that, 
rather than simply returning a convergency failure message. In that case, an OPF 
program would be more valuable to the operator during these infeasible conditions, 
with an accurate or estimated MISC being very helpful in addressing the key constraint 
violations in a technically and economically efficient manner. Hence, identification or 
at least estimation of MISC is very important both from analytical and operational 
perspectives. 
Existing commercial OPF solvers are not equipped with infeasibility diagnosis and 
resolution framework, so they cannot report anything related to MISC to the 
operator/user. This section presents a novel infeasibility diagnosis and resolution 
framework (IDRF) by employing the specifically modified metaheuristic solvers. Such 
a framework could be of significant help to network operators and engineers in 
handling challenging overstressed situations. By minimizing the modified infeasibility 
measure (SPINF), the IDRF tries to as closely as possible identify the MISC (from the 
mathematical interpretation of infeasibility), and then to resolve the infeasibility by 
either relaxing or penalizing constraints which represent the MISC.  
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5.5.1. Analytical Framework 
The proposed IDRF is illustrated in Figure 5.1 and has the following four main stages:  
1) Loading of infeasible cases – in this stage, the SCM problems that are believed to 
be infeasible by the operator are loaded to the IDRF framework.  
2) Verification of infeasibility – this stage verifies whether the given SCM problem is 
infeasible or not. If infeasible, it proceeds to Stage-3; if feasible, it reports the 
feasibility status to the user and provides an optimal and feasible solution. 
3) Diagnosis of infeasibility – if Stage-2 confirms the infeasibility, this stage 
identifies problematic/critical constraints which represents the MISC and report to 
it to Stage-4, as well as to the user.  
4) Resolution of infeasibility – this stage resolves the infeasibility in the original 
formulation by relaxing or penalizing the constraints that represent the MISC and 
then it solves the reformulated problem and reports the solution, as well as the 
feasible version of the original problem to the user.  
5.5.2. Loading of Infeasible SCM cases  
In practical situations, the operator can forward the infeasible problems to the IDRF 
as and when they arise. However, for demonstration purposes, a set of infeasible cases 
in this section are loaded to the IDRF framework. 
5.5.3. Verification of Infeasibility 
This stage verifies the infeasibility of a given SCM problem by using two indirect 
techniques (Chapter 4): a) by trying to solve the given problem with several solvers in 
parallel, and b) by computing the condition number of Newton Jacobian matrix, J 
(3.38). Condition number is equal to the ratio of the largest to smallest singular value 
in the singular value decomposition of Newton Jacobian matrix (5.3). If all solvers fail 
to converge and condition number is monotonously increasing (e.g. greater than 108, 
[199]), IDRF confirms that the given problem is indeed infeasible and is inputted to 
the further diagnosis and resolution stages. If at least one solver solves the problem, 





Where: 𝐽- Newton Jacobian matrix, 𝜎𝑚𝑎𝑥 – largest singular value of 𝐽, 𝜎𝑚𝑖𝑛 – smallest 
singular value of 𝐽, 𝑘 – condition number of 𝐽 
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5.5.4. Diagnosis and Localization of Infeasibility  
This stage debugs the confirmed infeasible problems with an aim to identify, or as 
closely as possible estimate the MISC. The problems reformulated by changing the 
objective function to proposed infeasibility measure, SPINF (5.2). The reformulated 
problems are solved with one of the solvers from the modified metaheuristic approach. 
However, all three solvers (PSO, GA, and SA) are implemented in this chapter to 
compare the performance of different solvers. The list of active constraints at the final 
solution is reported as minimum problematic constraint set (MinPCS).  
A MinPCS can be characterised by three attributes mentioned below.  
Cardinality, denoted as |MinPCS|: The cardinality of MinPCS is “the number of 
members of MinPCS”, which are nothing else but the number of active/violated 
constraints in the solution corresponding to MinPCS. These constraints could be bus 
under and overvoltages and/or branch overloads.  
Indices of active constraints denoted as IdxCV: These are the indices of violated 
constraints in the solution corresponding to MinPCS. Indices of violated constraints 
are nothing but the line numbers that are overloaded and/or bus numbers that are at 
under or overvoltage. 
Infeasibility Measure, denoted as IM: This is the infeasibility measure (SPINF, 
(5.2)) calculated in the solution corresponding to MinPCS. 
These attributes are used to compare several MinPCS that might be reported by 
different solvers. The one with the lowest cardinality and infeasibility measure is 
considered as the best amongst all MinPCS, i.e. the best representation of MISC, which 
might be the same as MISC. Accordingly, infeasibility diagnosis stage is further 
divided into two distinctive phases: a) MinPCS identification phase – in which 
infeasible cases are solved with metaheuristic solvers to identify all possible 
MinPCS’s, b) MISC estimation phase – in which several MinPCS’s are post-processed 
to find or estimate the MISC.  
a) MinPCS Identification Phase  
Figure 5.2 shows the main steps involved in MinPCS identification process. The search 
process of the metaheuristic solver is guided by the values of SPINF, rather than the 
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gradients of constraints, as in conventional solvers. As the iterations progress, the 
guided stochastic search either leads to zero SPINF, or to the lowest found value of 
SPINF. If SPINF is zero, the problem is said to be feasible, otherwise, the problem is 
infeasible.  
The constraints that contributed to nonzero SPINF in the best final solution from 
multiple runs are the most problematic constraints that are causing infeasibility. These 
constraints cannot be satisfied with modelled controls, and hence they are the most 
likely main causes of the problem infeasibility. However, this needs to be checked and 
verified. Hence, this phase reports these constraints as MinPCS to the MISC 
identification phase. It should be noted that MinPCS identification phase treats all 
constraints uniformly without any penalization. In other words, none of the constraints 
is modelled by penalty functions as the objective is to minimize the violation amount 
(i.e. SPINF). Hence, the sole purpose of minimizing SPINF is only to find MinPCS, 
purely from a mathematical viewpoint of infeasibility.  
  
Figure 5.2 MinPCS Identification Process 
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b) MISC Estimation Process 
This thesis assumes that MISC can be identified, or closely estimated by post-
processing the active constraints in MinPCS. MinPCS and MISC are empty sets when 
the given optimization problem is feasible (i.e. all constraints are fulfilled), and non-
empty sets when the given problem is infeasible (i.e. at least one constraint cannot be 
satisfied). For a given infeasible problem, MinPCS and MISC are equal if and only if 
their difference results in an empty set. In other words, the indices of active constraints 
and their violation amount are the same in both sets. This can be proved very easily, if 
the MISC is known a priori, e.g. from a hypothetical separate “MISC identifier”, but 
in the context of the research presented in this thesis (and also elsewhere in the 
literature) such a MISC identifier is not available. Therefore, it is impossible to assess 
MISC’s set equality with MinPCS. To overcome this problem, this thesis employs an 
indirect approach to prove that an identified “best MinPCS” can represent the MISC.  
The indirect approach is motivated by the fact that “an infeasible model can be made 
feasible by relaxing the constraints in MISC simultaneously”. If the simultaneous 
relaxation of all constraints in MinPCS also makes the model feasible, MinPCS can 
represent the actual MISC. In this context, the indirect approach reformulates the 
original infeasible problem by simultaneously relaxing all the constraints in MinPCS 
by the exact amount with which they are violated in the corresponding solution. The 
reformulated problem is solved again to minimize the infeasibility, SPINF. It should 
be noted that the reformulated problem is different from the original infeasible 
problem, as the bounds on problematic/critical constraints are changed. If there exists 
a solution with zero SPINF, it can be said that the MinPCS under test is best available 
representation of the MISC and it is therefore assumed to be equal to MISC.    
min 𝑓 (5.4) 
𝑠. 𝑡𝑜. 𝑔𝑖 ≤ 0 (5.5) 
𝑃𝐶𝑆 = {𝑔𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝐼} ≤ 0 (5.6) 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑃𝐶𝑆 = {𝑔𝑗|𝑗 ∈ 𝐽} 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐽 ⊂ I (5.7) 
𝑀𝐼𝑆𝐶 = {𝑔𝑘|𝑘 ∈ 𝐾} 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐾 ⊆ J ⊂ I (5.8) 
If (5.4) – (5.5) is feasible:  
|𝑔𝑗| =  0 →  𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑃𝐶𝑆 = ∅ (5.9) 
|𝑔𝑘| = 0 →  𝑀𝐼𝑆𝐶 = ∅ (5.10) 
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If (5.4) – (5.5) is infeasible and if MinPCS represents MISC:  
→ 𝐽 = 𝐾  
→ |𝑔𝑗| = |𝑔𝑘|  
where:  
𝑓 – objective function of the optimization problem (minimization of infeasibility 
measure); 𝑔 – inequality constraints of the optimization problem 
MinPCS – minimum most problematic constraint set representing most problematic 
constraints; 
MISC – minimum intractable subsystem of constraints which are impossible to fulfil 
I – set representing the indices of all constraints of the problem 
𝐽, 𝐾 – sets representing the indices of active constraints in MinPCS and MISC 
|𝑔𝑖| – amount of constraint violation of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ constraint   
5.5.5. Resolution of Infeasibility 
Ideally, when a model is infeasible, the user (e.g. network operator) wants to 
reconstruct a feasible model by relaxing as few constraints as possible and solve the 
problem with conventional solvers to compute the required amount of actual 
relaxation, or penalization. The user/operator can decide whether to ignore these 
constraints or incorporate additional resources (e.g. from available or contracted 
ancillary services) to fulfil these constraints based on the actual required relaxation or 
penalization values. Soft penalization and constraint relaxation are the two traditional 
and simplest approaches used to reconstruct a (mathematically) feasible model from 
the infeasible one, but these approaches typically require to relax or penalize larger 
number of constraints (as previously demonstrated). A better approach would be to 
build a feasible model by relaxing or penalizing only a minimum number of constraints 
(i.e. MISC, ideally). 
In that context, this section presents such a methodology to resolve infeasibility and 
build a feasible SCM case, which can be later solved by the conventional solvers. The 
methodology is divided into feasibility remodelling phase and solution phase. In the 
feasibility remodelling phase, two feasible models, one by penalization and the other 
by the relaxation of constraints, are built from the original infeasible model. In 
practical situations, the user may be interested to reconstruct only one feasible model. 
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In the solution phase, these feasible models are solved using conventional solver to 
minimize the original objective function (e.g. fuel cost, as used in this thesis). 
Infeasibility resolution is confirmed, “if and only if there exists a solution that satisfies 
all constraints as well as minimizes the objective function”.  
5.6. IDRF Results 
5.6.1 Loading of Infeasible Test Cases  
The implementation and scalability of the proposed IDRF framework are 
demonstrated with several infeasible cases (Table 5.1). The main aim of the subsequent 
analysis is to verify their infeasibility and then to identify the MinPCS (or MISC, if 
possible).  
5.6.2 Verification of Infeasibility 
The selected infeasible cases were already tried with several conventional solvers in 
Chapter 4, where it is confirmed that all solvers failed to find a feasible solution. These 
results were shown in Table 4.13. Moreover, the condition number of the Newton 
Jacobian matrix, J (3.38), for all these cases is calculated here and shown in Figure 
5.3. Monotonously increasing condition number confirms that the selected infeasible 
cases are indeed infeasible and are subjected to further processing in the next stage. 
 
Figure 5.3 Condition Number of Newton Jacobian Matrix (IC1-IC10) 
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5.6.3 Identification of MinPCS  
This stage employs three modified metaheuristic solvers to identify the set of best 
MinPCS’s by minimizing SPINF as objective function (i.e. fitness function). However, 
in order to demonstrate the benefits of modified metaheuristic approach, infeasibility 
diagnosis is also carried out with traditional infeasibility measures (SINF and SSINF) 
and the non-modified metaheuristic solvers. While the solvers with the modified 
metaheuristic approach are denoted as MPSO, MGA and MSA in the results, the 
solvers with no modifications follows their original name (PSO, GA, SA). This 
notation is used only in this chapter just for the easy explanation of the results but in 
the remaining of this thesis modified metaheuristic solvers are used without letter “M” 
to their standard abbreviations.  
It is worth mentioning that SINF, SSINF and SPINF are employed as objective or 
fitness functions for the considered modified metaheuristic solvers; and the target here 
is to minimize these objective functions. Each solver for each infeasible case is 
executed 50 times and the runtime of each execution is set to 5 min (solver terminates 
execution after 5 min). The maximum and the minimum number of constraints 
(MaxPCS and MinPCS) identified over 50 runs, the objective value or infeasibility 
measure (equivalent to SPINF), and the solver success rate to find MinPCS for 
minimized SINF, SSINF, and SPINF objectives are shown in Table 5.5, Table 5.6 and 
Table 5.7 respectively. For example, in case of the PSO for IC1 from Table 5.5, the 
results can be read as follows: PSO can find a solution with two violations 44 times 
out of 50 runs (i.e. 88% success rate) with the amount of violation equal to 59.70. In 
the remaining 6 times, it finds a solution with the number of violations greater than the 
MinPCS (i.e. two here), but less than or equal to MaxPCS. 
The size of both MinPCS and MaxPCS is varying with the implemented solver and 
the minimized infeasibility measure. There is a large spread between MaxPCS and 
MinPCS for the minimized SINF and SSINF, when compared to the minimized 
SPINF. This is especially noticeable for larger networks (IC6-IC10). For example, the 
spread between MaxPCS and MinPCS for IC8 with SA is 29 for minimized SINF and 
26 for minimized SSINF, while it is 4 for minimized SPINF. There are two reasons 
for this large spread: a) SINF and SSINF are sensitive to constraint scaling issues, b) 
basic metaheuristic solvers are unable to maintain good diversity between their search 
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agents (i.e. particles, Figure 5.4). That is why modified solvers with SPINF are 
superior to the basic metaheuristic solvers with SINF and SSINF.  
Table 5.5 MinPCS Identification with Minimized SINF 
 MaxPCS MinPCS SINF (equivalent to SPINF) Success rate 
(%) 
 PSO GA SA PSO GA SA PSO GA SA PSO GA SA 
IC1 3 3 3 2 2 2 59.70 59.70 60.90 88.0 86.0 8.0 
IC2 1 1 1 1 1 1 36.38 36.38 36.38 100.0 100.0 100.0 
IC3 7 7 7 7 7 7 47.10 47.33 47.50 100.0 100.0 100.0 
IC4 6 6 6 6 7 6 74.02 74.00 74.00 100.0 68.0 100.0 
IC5 11 8 6 4 4 2 54.43 59.01 51.74 8.0 12.0 26.0 
IC6 7 20 4 1 1 1 42.43 42.28 43.04 72.0 56.0 76.0 
IC7 19 23 17 6 6 6 27.99 26.36 32.44 32.0 52.0 12.0 
IC8 38 17 35 11 6 9 42.88 27.03 13.65 10.0 22.0 14.0 
IC9 10 22 20 2 12 13 24.42 39.35 50.69 72.0 10.0 12.0 
IC10 3 3 5 3 3 3 11.88 11.75 12.28 100.0 100.0 90.0 
Table 5.6 MinPCS Identification with Minimized SSINF 
 MaxPCS MinPCS SSINF (equivalent to SPINF) Success rate (%) 
 PSO GA SA PSO GA SA PSO GA SA PSO GA SA 
IC1 3 3 3 2 3 2 60.70 71.84 62.03 14.0 100.0 12.0 
IC2 1 1 1 1 1 1 36.38 36.38 36.38 100.0 100.0 90.0 
IC3 7 7 7 7 7 6 46.91 47.08 50.58 100.0 100.0 6.0 
IC4 6 7 7 6 6 6 74.02 74.93 74.05 100.0 74.0 86.0 
IC5 8 15 9 4 2 2 54.47 55.11 52.50 8.0 6.0 32.0 
IC6 3 22 8 2 2 2 41.79 42.11 42.18 84.0 56.0 84.0 
IC7 29 20 35 6 6 6 22.35 24.67 25.65 42.0 54.0 14.0 
IC8 29 16 34 6 6 8 84.70 31.87 23.93 6.0 20.0 6.0 
IC9 12 37 36 2 3 13 25.31 16.19 53.76 42.0 6.0 6.0 
IC10 3 4 4 3 3 3 11.82 11.59 11.35 100.0 90.0 88.0 
Table 5.7 MinPCS Identification with Minimized SPINF 
 MaxPCS MinPCS SPINF Success rate (%) 
 MPSO MGA MSA MPSO MGA MSA MPSO MGA MSA MPSO MGA MSA 
IC1 2 2 2 2 2 2 59.19 59.19 59.19 100 100 100 
IC2 1 1 1 1 1 1 36.38 36.38 36.38 100 100 100 
IC3 4 4 4 4 4 4 41.40 41.43 41.72 100 100 100 
IC4 4 4 4 4 4 4 74.38 74.38 74.83 100 100 100 
IC5 2 2 2 2 2 2 51.32 51.17 51.63 100 100 100 
IC6 2 2 2 1 1 1 42.12 41.43 42.93 100 100 100 
IC7 8 8 9 6 6 6 21.60 23.03 25.43 94 98 36 
IC8 8 8 10 6 6 6 23.96 24.82 24.67 38 80 26 
IC9 2 2 2 2 2 2 24.30 24.16 24.33 100 100 100 
IC10 3 3 3 3 3 3 10.99 11.82 10.36 100 100 100 




Figure 5.4 Particle diversity with proposed modifications to PSO 
Modified solvers with minimized SPINF always find the best MinPCS (i.e. solution 
with the minimum number of violated constraints) in all cases, except IC7 and IC8. 
These cases are very severe, as they involve a large number of post-contingency 
constraint violations. The solvers have to perform an extensive search to find the 
solution with the lowest number of constraints (i.e. MinPCS equal to 6). That is the 
reason why the solver's success rate is lower than 100% for these cases for modified 
metaheuristic solvers. However, the success rate of the modified solvers is far better 
than the of basic solvers.  
To compare the relative performance of the solvers, best MinPCS is selected from 
Table 5.5, Table 5.6 and Table 5.7. The best MinPCS is the one that has the lowest 
number of constraint violations and lowest infeasible measure (SINF, SSINF, SPINF). 
The solver's ability (i.e. success rate) to find the best MinPCS is listed in Table 5.8. 
The results demonstrate that modified solvers can always find the best MinPCS in all 
cases, while basic solvers fail to find the best MinPCS for the majority of these cases, 
with only a few examples of matched performance (most notably SA with SSINF). 
The performance of MPSO is superior to all other solvers, as it has the highest success 
rate for all the infeasible cases.  
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Table 5.8 Relative success rate of various solvers to find best MinPCS 
  SINF SSINF SPINF 
 Best  
MinPCS 
PSO GA SA PSO GA SA MPSO MGA MSA 
IC1 2 86.0 8.0 14.0 0.0 12.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 86.0 
IC2 1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 90.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
IC3 4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 
IC4 4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 
IC5 2 0.0 26.0 0.0 6.0 32.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 
IC6 1 56.0 76.0 84.0 56.0 84.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 56.0 
IC7 6 52.0 12.0 42.0 54.0 14.0 94.0 98.0 36.0 52.0 
IC8 6 22.0 0.0 6.0 20.0 0.0 38.0 80.0 26.0 22.0 
IC9 2 0.0 0.0 42.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 
IC10 3 100.0 90.0 100.0 90.0 88.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Time performance (computational time) of modified metaheuristic solvers: 
All solvers are executed on a 64-bit Intel® Core i7-3770, 3.4 GHz CPU desktop PC. 
While conventional solver (PSS/E) is implemented in C++ and FORTRAN, 
metaheuristic solvers are implemented in Matlab 2014a. The processor time (averaged 
over 50 runs) required to identify MinPCS is presented in Table 5.9. Even though 
conventional solver is executed substantially faster than the metaheuristic solvers, it is 
unable to provide a close representation of the MISC. Metaheuristic solvers, although 
requiring longer computational times, can find much better representation of the MISC 
in many of the cases. While metaheuristic solver’s execution time varies with network 
size, the severity of infeasibility, and implemented penalty function, the average 
execution time is around 50 s. 
Table 5.9 Execution Time (in seconds) Required by Various Solvers to Find MinPCS 
Test Case MPSO MGA MSA 
IC1 5.775 16.75 19.525 
IC2 4.575 9.725 27.4 
IC3 33.65 37.175 62.075 
IC4 45.325 101.275 60.4 
IC5 26.7 40.2 25.625 
IC6 20.975 43.925 39.95 
IC7 48.325 91.875 135.6 
IC8 75.875 186.225 99.95 
IC9 27.725 26.6 43.675 
IC10 79.15 53.325 63.025 
Aggregated average 36.8075 60.7075 57.7225 
Note: conventional solver’s execution time is less than 0.5s 
5.6 IDRF Results                                                                                    
109 
 
5.6.4 MISC Estimation 
Postprocessing of MinPCS’: In the previous section, several MinPCS’ were 
identified using conventional and metaheuristic solvers by minimizing different 
infeasibility measures. It can be seen from the results that the cardinality and associated 
amount of infeasibility severity (measured/expressed by SINF, SSINF, or SPINF) of 
those MinPCS’ could vary with the applied infeasibility measure and implemented 
solver. Only one of these MinPCS’ should be now selected to represent the MISC and 
it is obvious that it is the one with the lowest cardinality and infeasibility measure. The 
one that fit this criterion is identified from Table 5.7 and its attributes are listed in 
Table 5.10. This MinPCS will be the target/best candidate for MISC. In practical 
situations, if the operator implements or employs only one solver, he will proceed with 
the results produced by only that solver. 
Table 5.10 Best MinPCS under test 
 No Taken  
From 
Indices of violated 
constraints 
Violation Amount 
(absolute value from boundary) 
SPINF 
IC1 2 PSO OL{15, 19} OL{10.133, 3.302} 59.19 
IC2 1 PSO OL{20} OL{4.365} 36.38 
IC3 4 PSO UV{29,30}; OL{33,35} UV{0.022, 0.034}, OL{2.490, 
3.199} 
41.40 
IC4 4 PSO UV{29,30}; OL{33,35} UV{0.013, 0.025}, OL{7.268, 
3.170} 
74.38 
IC5 2 PSO OL{3,9} OL{95.822, 160.782} 51.32 
IC6 1 GA OL(3} OL{207.148} 41.43 
IC7 6 PSO UV{24,27,28,29,52,53} UV{0.010, 0.028, 0.044, 0.051, 
0.042, 0.030} 
21.60 
IC8 6 PSO UV{24,27,28,29,52,53} UV{0.028, 0.038, 0.051, 0.056, 
0.039, 0.024} 
23.96 
IC9 2 GA OL{135, 137} OL{78.888, 18.322} 24.16 
IC10 3 SA UV{24,84,85} UV{0.047, 0.038, 0.014} 10.36 
OL{k} – Overload at line k, OL{K}-Overload of K MW, UV{i} – undervoltage at 
bus i, UV{M} – undervoltage by M pu. 
Testing of Target MinPCS: Target MinPCS will be tested if it can represent the MISC 
according to the criteria specified in Section 5.5.4. The original infeasible problems 
are reformulated by relaxing/expanding the constraints listed in MinPCS with the exact 
amount with which they were violated (Table 5.10). The reformulated problems are 
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resolved with conventional and metaheuristic solvers with infeasibility measure as an 
objective function. It was observed that all conventional and metaheuristic solvers can 
converge and minimize the infeasibility measure to zero, which confirms that the 
MinPCS under test is indeed a (very) close representation of MISC, if not equal to it. 
To support this statement further, one conventional solver (PSS/E) is also tried by 
relaxing the different combinations of constraints in MinPCS with different relaxation 
amounts, rather than the actual amounts. In all these cases, conventional solver 
(PSS/E) failed to converge to zero SPINF, which supports previous conclusion about 
MinPCS’ (suit)ability to represent MISC for a given problem. 
5.6.5 Infeasibility Resolution  
This stage reconstructs a feasible version of the original infeasible problem by one of 
the following two techniques: 
a) Soft penalization of MISC– in which a feasible model is built by treating only the 
constraints in the best MinPCS as soft constraints using linear (LPF) and quadratic 
(QPF) exterior penalty functions.  
b) Constraint relaxation (CR) of MISC – in which a feasible model is built by 
relaxing only the constraints in MISC, with the exact amount with which they were 
violated.  
In either case, the objective function is set back to the original objective function (i.e. 
fuel cost). These reconstructed problems are solved using a conventional solver 
(PSS/E) to minimize the original objective function (i.e. fuel cost, here). The solver’s 
convergence status, optimal fuel cost, the actual amount of violation at the optimal 
solution are listed in Table 5.11. It should be noted that the violation amount is 
calculated against the original limits of the constraints in the best MinPCS and is 
converted to a SPINF equivalent value.  
Table 5.11 shows that conventional solver (with penalty functions and constraint 
relaxation) can successfully solve all the reconstructed problems and converge to a 
(constrained) optimal feasible solution in which all constraints are satisfied. This 
confirms that the reconstructed problem is not infeasible anymore. More importantly, 
the presented analysis and introduced methodological framework is demonstrate that 
metaheuristic solvers can help convergence of the conventional solvers. 
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Violation (equivalent of 
SPINF) 
Objective Value 
@MinPCS @LPF @QPF @CR @LPF @QPF @CR 
IC1 ✓ 59.18 62.43 62.42 59.19 800.9 800.9 805.3 
IC2 ✓ 36.38 36.63 36.64 36.38 823.3 823.3 825.1 
IC3 ✓ 42.30 53.10 52.46 42.30 847.1 847.1 865.5 
IC4 ✓ 74.37 99.07 101.40 74.37 810.3 810.2 824.2 
IC5 ✓ 51.32 73.18 74.36 51.32 71112.0 71035.1 78104.1 
IC6 ✓ 41.43 86.58 83.88 41.43 63792.9 64113.1 77159.9 
IC7 ✓ 19.28 13.92 14.27 14.36 44870.7 44871.0 44870.8 
IC8 ✓ 22.80 23.67 23.75 22.87 42333.4 42333.5 42333.7 
IC9 ✓ 24.16 24.23 24.02 24.16 12823.9 12873.3 12832.6 
IC10 ✓ 9.91 8.81 8.81 8.82 12799.7 12799.7 12802.8 
The actual amount of constraint violation in the optimal solutions is varying with 
applied resolution techniques and it could be different from the best MinPCS violation, 
but not for much (it is almost equal). This is obvious, because constraint relaxation 
technique enlarges the search space by the specific amount and the solver is then able 
to find the solution within that search space, again confirming that the proposed IDRF 
can estimate or identify the MISC with the best MinPCS for a given infeasible SCM 
problem. 
Relaxation-based infeasibility resolution technique is providing a solution with a bit 
lower violation amounts compared to LPF and QPF penalisation-based infeasibility 
resolution techniques. However, the solver (with constraint relaxation) can achieve 
this reduced violation only at the increased fuel cost (IC3-IC6).  
While the constraint relaxation technique prohibits the solver to accept a solution 
outside the (modified) feasible boundary, soft penalization technique can allow the 
solver to accept a solution outside the (modified) feasible boundary. That is why the 
soft penalization technique can provide a reduced fuel cost solution, but at the expense 
of higher violation, and constraint relaxation technique can provide a reduced violation 
solution, but at the expense of higher fuel cost. 
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Once infeasibility is resolved, IDRF completes the execution process by reporting the 
following information to the user: MinPCS, constraint violation or relaxation amount 
for each constraint in MinPCS, and the feasible reconstructed model. Based on these 
data, the user can decide whether to ignore reported constraint(s) or mitigate them. The 
mitigation requires the user/operator to implement additional controls, which are not 
amongst the available corrective controls in immediate post-contingency state, but are 
activated as “emergency controls”, e.g. from the ancillary services, such as demand 
side management, transmission switching, load shedding, etc.  
5.7. Conclusions  
The OPF remains to be one of the most important mathematical formulations for 
planning, operation, and analysis (including market applications) of power supply 
systems. When dealing with infeasible OPF formulations, typically occurring due to 
severe contingencies resulting in overstressed operating conditions, the commercial 
OPF solvers fail to converge and return only a very limited information, which is very 
difficult to interpret by the engineers and operators. Essentially, the mathematical 
indication of infeasibility is related to practical physical conditions important for the 
secure system operation and any further attempt to operate the network under these 
conditions might result in system (angle and/or voltage) instability. When the system 
is overstressed, it is more important to as quickly as possible identify the root causes 
for the infeasibility (i.e. MISC), than to solve the OPF/SCM problem in its original or 
relaxed forms. Accordingly, there is an obvious need to incorporate an efficient and 
reliable infeasibility diagnosis and resolution frameworks or approaches into existing 
emergency controls (EMS) at energy control centres.  
This chapter presented such as infeasibility diagnosis and resolution framework 
(IDRF) generally aimed at diagnosing and resolving infeasibility in nonlinear 
OPF/SCM formulations. The framework is built on a modified metaheuristic approach 
and a new infeasibility measure. The applied modifications are devised to improve the 
performance of the framework for finding the best possible representation of the 
MISC. The practical relevance of the framework is demonstrated with several 
infeasible SCM cases. It is expected that the presented framework could significantly 
help network operators and engineers in dealing with infeasible OPF/SCM problems, 
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as and when they arise. The framework can be easily implemented as an additional 
functionality (or computational routine) in commercial OPF software, as the 
information on the MISC, or at least its close representation, can guide conventional 
solvers whenever they diverge, or fail to converge.  
The various considered cases and corresponding sets of results indicate that the 
framework can reliably identify close/accurate representation of the MISC for the 
majority of the cases in less than 40 seconds on a standard desktop PC. Furthermore, 
the presented framework was implemented in MATLAB environment, and the 
computational performance can be improved by implementing it in C++ or 
FORTRAN, which are much faster (at least 10 times, [200]-[201]) than the MATLAB 
compiler. Computational time can be further reduced by exploring inherent task-level 
parallelism at objective function calculation stage and data-level parallelism at the 
optimization stage. 
Without loss of generality, the framework can be easily extended to handle 
infeasibility in other optimization problems in power systems engineering (e.g. 
security constrained OPF and economic dispatch). The author is of opinion that the 
framework has significant potential for application in any field, as long as the problem 
involves a nonlinear optimization. For example, the framework can be extended to 
identify the critical alarms in process control centres (in process industries) during 
“alarm flooding” situations. The other example would the identification of cyber-
attacks from the known system disturbances (see Chapter 8). Finally, although the 
present framework has implemented only three metaheuristic solvers, it is open to the 
researchers of similar interest to develop more efficient metaheuristic (or even 
conventional, if possible) solvers, integrate them into the framework and implement 





Chapter 6  
Constraint Rationalization Framework for Overstressed 
Systems 
This chapter presents a framework to rationalize the critical operating constraints 
based on various priorities of the operator to deal with overstressed operating 
conditions. 
6.1. Introduction 
An important prerequisite for the economic energy dispatch is fulfilment of the 
operational security constraints to retain the security and integrity of the network. 
Violation of any single constraint requires activation of proper corrective controls 
before protection trips other components. Chapter 4 showed that the violation of some 
security constraints is inevitable during overstressed conditions (e.g. following a 
severe contingency) as the operator cannot devise a feasible generation dispatch 
without implementing some emergency corrective control actions [43]. 
From system operations viewpoint, every constraint violation triggers an alarm, so the 
operator can notice the violation and take necessary action. If the number of alarms is 
low, an operator can rationalize the causes of their violations and implement most 
effective corrective actions optimally (e.g. at minimum cost), based on his previous 
experience. If the network experiences many constraint violations (e.g. more than ten), 
it will be extremely difficult for the operator to devise and implement effective 
corrective control actions, which are “optimal” from both technical and economic 
viewpoint. This situation, from process industries terminology, is called “alarm 
flooding” [90]-[91].  
Therefore, it would be helpful for an operator to have a computational tool that can 
rationalize critical constraints, either based on the general control requirements, or 
specific operational priorities. Moreover, such a tool can guide the operator in finding 
the network “bottlenecks” or limiting factors that make power dispatch infeasible. 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 demonstrated that this situation can be modelled as an 
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infeasible optimization problem, which has become infeasible due to a minimal set of 
constraint violations and will become feasible if these constraints are removed (or 
relaxed) from the problem formulation. 
These minimal set of constraints are denoted as the minimal intractable subsystem of 
constraints (MISC) and Chapter 5 presented an infeasibility diagnosis and resolution 
framework (IDRF) to identify MISC from purely mathematical sense. In other words, 
IDRF rationalizes the constraints without paying any attention to control or operator 
priorities (e.g. costs of corrective controls, available emergency reserves, available 
time, etc.). When constraint rationalization is executed with operator priorities, the 
number and/or size (i.e. amount of violation) of the identified problematic constraints 
set might be different from the MISC. Accordingly, the most problematic constraints, 
from the operational sense, are denoted as critical constraints (CC) and corresponding 
set as the critical constraint set (CCS) in this chapter.  
In this context, this chapter presents a metaheuristic constraint rationalization 
framework (CRF), which is capable of incorporating various operator priories. 
Accordingly, the presented framework rationalizes/filters the violated constraints into 
critical constraint set (CCS) and noncritical constraint set (NCCS), enabling the 
operator/user to execute the rationalization based on five operator priorities: cost of 
available non-emergency corrective actions, allocated available computational time, 
pre-specified size of CCS, available reserves, and available time before the next 
contingency occurs. Hence, the number and size of CCs in the corresponding CCS 
may vary based on the specific selected priority.  
In modern electricity networks, the direction of generation to demand is changed due 
to increased penetration of distributed (typically renewable-based) generation and 
closing of the traditional thermal power plants, hence the power flows are also 
changed. The existing transmission lines were designed according to the original 
power flows (of that time) in order to cope with peak demand, but not peak times of 
renewable generation [92]. Hence, constraint management has become extremely 
important, as there is evidence that system operators spend millions of dollars every 
year on constraint management services [93]. The simplest and somewhat trivial 
solution to resolve constraint violations is to bring all the (non-emergency and/or 
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emergency) reserves online wherever possible, but this solution would be infeasible 
either economically, or technically (e.g. ramping up times and further adverse 
dynamics during emergency conditions).  
Most of the existing literature on constraint management has focussed on resolving 
constraint violations through various controls: distributed generation [94]-[95], 
FACTs devices [96]-[97], changes of network configuration [98], etc. However, a very 
few works focussed on identifying the critical constraints based on operator priorities 
and then use the locations and types of these constraints to devise optimal and most 
effective corrective actions. Moreover, majority of the previous approaches uses an 
optimization formulation (similar to OPF), but again a very few works (e.g. [81]) has 
focussed on analysing constraint management during the overstressed operating 
conditions, where these formulations become infeasible and some constraint violations 
cannot be resolved with non-emergency corrective controls. The authors in [28] 
divided the violated constraints into several controllable constraint groups (CCG) and 
then used constraint similarity and pattern recognition to identify the dominant 
constraint(s) in each group, suggesting that operator needs to take care of only these 
dominant constraints in each CCG. However, the application of CCGs and 
identification of dominant constraints for infeasible or overstressed conditions is not 
discussed.  
A critical operating constraint forecasting (COCF) framework is proposed in [99] to 
predict constraints which can become critical in short-term (during the next hours). A 
set of linear equations (not ac power flow equations) are developed to estimate the 
changes in line power flows and bus voltages for a given daily load profile and/or 
operational scenario. Violated constraints are ranked, based on four different types of 
schemes, which are developed using the absolute or percentage violation of a 
constraint from its boundary value. The highest ranked constraints are considered 
critical. However, this framework does not discuss infeasible situations, in which the 
critical constraints may not be decided only based on the violation, but also on their 
prospect for resolution. This is because a constraint becomes critical only when the 
available corrective controls cannot resolve it. In overstressed or infeasible situations, 
a constraint with a lower “violation amount” (e.g. a line which is not with the highest 
overloading) can be more severe than the one with a higher “violation amount”.  
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To the best knowledge of the author of this thesis, the proposed framework (CRF) for 
identifying critical constraints during overstressed conditions based on operator 
priorities and infeasibility diagnosis is not reported previously, at least in the open 
literature.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 presents the description 
and list of analysed overstressed SCM test cases. A dynamic penalty factor updating 
technique to enhance the performance of metaheuristic solvers is proposed in Section 
6.3. Section 6.4 presents the generalized optimization formulation that is used as part 
of the proposed CRF. Section 6.5 presents an overview of the metaheuristic-based 
critical constraints identification process and presents the results to compare the 
performance of fixed and dynamic penalty factor techniques. Section 6.6 presents the 
analytical framework and demonstrates the applications of the framework with results 
on different test networks.  
6.2. Analysed SCM Test Cases with Overstressed Operating 
Conditions 
Several infeasible test cases from Table 6.1 are used to demonstrate the proposed 
framework. These are the same test cases which were developed and validated in 
Chapter 4 (Table 4.3), representing the selected overstressed operating conditions for 
the five test networks (IEEE 14, IEEE 30, IEEE 39, IEEE 57, and UIUC 150-bus 
networks). The list of immediate post-contingency constraint violations and the pre-
contingency fuel cost for these networks is also shown in Table 6.1, where NUV, NOV 
and NOL indicate the number of bus undervoltage and overvoltage violations, and line 
overloads, respectively, while TNSCV indicates the total number of security constraint 
violations. It should be noted that this chapter, if and as required, analyzes all or only 
some of the test cases (listed in Table 6.1) to demonstrate the specific aspects of the 
constraint rationalization framework. The main reason is to limit the attention and 
illustrate the main points of the approaches proposed in this chapter.  
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Table 6.1 List of Analysed SCM Test Cases with Immediate Post-Contingency 
Constraint Violations 











y Fuel Cost 
($/hr) 
IC1: L4-9&L6-13 IEEE 14 0 0 4 4 
790.38 
IC2:L5-6&L9-14 IEEE 14 4 0 7 11 
IC3: L1-2 & T27-28 IEEE 30 4 0 5 9 
799.92 
IC4: L4-12 & T27-28 IEEE 30 5 0 3 8 
IC5: L5-6 & L6-7 IEEE 39 3 0 6 9 
61983.80 
IC6: L21-22 & L26-27 IEEE 39 0 3 4 7 
IC7: T7-29 & L8-9 IEEE 57 35 0 5 40 
41634.03 
IC8: T7-29 & L46-47 IEEE 57 18 1 1 20 
IC9: T71-104 & L101-
142 
UIUC 150 0 0 10 10 
12780.88 
IC10: L24-143 & L101-
142 
UIUC150 3 0 8 11 
Note: Lx-y: Line between bus x and bus y; Tx-y: Transformer between bus x and y 
6.3. Dynamic Penalty Factor Updating Technique  
When constraints are modelled using penalty functions, penalty factors significantly 
influence the performance of the associated solver of any type. Like the conventional 
solvers, metaheuristic solvers also need careful tuning of penalty factors, as otherwise 
search can be driven into an infeasible region. In most of the earlier literature, these 
penalty factors are fixed and mainly applicable to feasible optimization problems. 
However, if penalty factors are changed, this will allow to “modulate” the constraint 
penalization “pressure”, and in that way direct the search to the locations in system 
sate space where more constraints will be satisfied. To illustrate that, a novel dynamic 
penalty factor updating technique (6.1) is presented in this section, which requires 
setting of only the initial values (𝐾ℎ). The penalty factor values are then automatically 
updated over the iterations, based on the actual number of constraint violations. 
Initial penalty factor values (Table 6.2) should be selected based on the priority of the 
constraints. In this thesis, the violation of reactive power generation is considered as 
more severe than the violations of voltage and thermal limits. All penalty factor values 
should be at least in the order 100’s, so a change in objective function with respect to 
a change in constraint violation can be identified and then used to guide the search. It 
6.4 Generalized Problem Formulation for CRF                                                                                    
119 
 
is exactly this sensitivity to the constraint violations that helps metaheuristic solvers to 
minimize the number of constraint violations. In other words, dynamic penalty factor 
updating method helps mimicking the nature of gradient sensitivity with respect to 





Where: 𝐾ℎ- initial penalty factor value for violating a specific constraint in ℎ(𝑥) (Table 
6.2), 𝐾ℎ
𝐼𝑡𝑟 - penalty factor for violating a specific constraint at iteration 𝐼𝑡𝑟, NCV - 
number of constraint violations in specific constraint group at iteration 𝐼𝑡𝑟. 
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6.4. Generalized Problem Formulation for CRF 
CRF framework considers five types of operator priorities: i) cost of available non-
emergency corrective actions (CANECC), ii) available or allocated computational 
time, iii) pre-specified number of critical constraints in the target set, iv) types and 
locations of available emergency reserves, and v) lead-time available to the operator 
before the next contingency occur. While priorities ii, iii, iv are modelled as solver 
termination criteria, the remaining priorities are modelled as the objective function. 
The generalized optimization formulation used in the CRF are expressed by (6.2) - 
(6.5). Unless otherwise stated, the objective function for the four priorities is the cost 
of available non-emergency corrective actions (generation re-dispatch, AVR setpoint, 
tap setting adjustment, reactive compensation, etc.). Here, cost of available non-
emergency corrective actions (CANECC) is considered as the difference between the 
pre-contingency fuel cost and post-contingency fuel cost with (non-emergency) 
corrective actions, assuming the operator’s default priority is to reduce this cost.  
 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑓 (6.2) 
 𝑠. 𝑡.    𝑔 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ℎ ≤ 0 (6.3) 
 → 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝐹 (6.4) 
 𝐹 = 𝑓 + 𝐾 ∗ ∅( 𝑔, ℎ) (6.5) 
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 𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐸𝐶𝐶 = 𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑐 − 𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑐 (6.6) 
Where: 𝑓 – original objective function (OOF), 𝐹 – penalized objective function (POF),  
𝑔, ℎ - equality (3.2) and inequality constraints (3.3), ∅ - penalty function for modelling 
constraint violations, 𝐾 – penalty factor (6.1), 𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑐 – pre-contingency fuel cost, 
𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑐 – post-contingency fuel cost with corrective actions.  
Regarding the penalization, Log barrier penalty function (BPF) from the interior 
penalty function category and step (SPF), linear (LPF) and quadratic penalty functions 
(QPF) from the exterior penalty functions category are implemented to penalize the 
constraint violations. The penalty factor values are dynamically changed using the 
dynamic penalty factor updating technique. The original objective function (OOF) can 
represent the CANECC or lead-time available for handling the next contingency (this 
is discussed in Sub-section 6.6.5.5).  
6.5. Critical Constraint Identification Process  
The flowchart in Figure 6.1 explains the steps involved in identifying the critical 
constraints using metaheuristic solvers. The overall search process is guided by the 
values of the penalized objective function (POF), rather than the gradients of POF. The 
POF is the summation of the original objective function (OOF) plus the penalty cost 
(PC) for violating the constraints, (6.5). The solver search process can be divided into 
two phases: a) PC minimization phase – in which PC dominates over OOF and hence 
the search entirely focusses on minimizing the PC until there are no further PC 
changes, and b) OOF minimization phase – in which OOF dominates over PC, or there 
will be no further change in PC, hence the search focusses on minimizing OOF until 
there will be no change in it.  
In general case, the solver will shift between these two phases based on the nature of 
stochastic solutions generated during the search process (Figure 6.2). While the 
variable scaling technique (Section 5.2.2) always maintain a diversity in the stochastic 
solutions, dynamic penalty factor technique always tries to introduce a change in the 
POF until no further reduction is possible. Hence, metaheuristic solvers can guide their 
search to locations in the search space where only minimum number of constraints are 
violated.  
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Solver keeps track of the PC (i.e. the difference between POF and OOF), which 
indicates the list of constraints that are violated in a given iteration. Zero PC means no 
constraint violation. The remaining constraints in the final PC are the denoted as the 
“critical constraints” because, for a given network configuration and demand, and for 
a given operator priority, these constraints cannot be satisfied with the existing non-
emergency corrective controls. 
 
Figure 6.1 Critical Constraint Identification Process 
6.5.1 Comparison of Fixed and Dynamic Penalty Factor Techniques  
The performance of dynamic penalty factor technique (DynPF) and fixed penalty 
factor technique (FixPF) are compared for one infeasible SCM case (IC1). Three 
metaheuristic solvers (PSO, GA, and SA) with four different penalty functions (BPF, 
NO
YES
Select an overstressed SCM test case
Select a metaheuristic solver and implement it 
Metaheuristic iteration loop
Store Penalty Cost, PC= POF-OOF
and the list of violated constraints in each iteration
Termination criteria?
Identify the list of constraints contributed to final PC.
Record these as the critical constraint violations (CCV). 
Report final solution:
Final POF, OOF, PC and
Start
Select a penalty function and penalty factor update 
technique. Set initial penalty factor values.
Select a constraint rationalization type and
Formulate the relevant SCM problem, (6.2)-(6.5)
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SPF, LPF, QPF) are employed to analyse the selected infeasible test case.  
Each solver with different combinations of penalty functions and penalty factor 
updating techniques is executed in 50 runs, each with up to 600 iterations, and the 
results are shown in Table 6.3. MinNCC and MaxNCC represent the minimum and the 
maximum number of critical constraints identified by each solver over all 50 runs. The 
success rate of the solver, for a given penalty function and penalty factor technique, 
indicates the probability of finding the most minimum number of critical constraints 
(i.e. the minimum of all MinNCCs). Solver’s average time, for a given penalty function 
and penalty factor technique, indicates the average time taken by the solver to identify 
its own MinNCC. In addition, the post-contingency fuel cost is also shown for every 
possible case. The results clearly indicate that the dynamic penalty factor updating 
technique is performing better in all the respects when compared to fixed penalty factor 
updating technique. The variations in the penalized and original objective functions 
(here fuel cost), and the number of constraint violations over the iterations is plotted 
in Figure 6.2 for one test case (IC3).  



































PSO 2 2 2 2 100.0 100.0 25.3 8.8 878.8 885.6 
GA 5 8 2 3 82.0 93.3 7.3 13.0 899.4 837.5 
SA 5 3 2 2 70.8 91.7 123.6 63.6 923.0 862.8 
SPF 
PSO 5 3 2 2 85.2 88.9 9.8 8.5 819.5 808.8 
GA 3 2 2 2 69.2 86.7 135.2 36.4 816.9 805.7 
SA 3 3 2 2 75.0 90.6 12.5 11.5 820.9 814.4 
LPF 
PSO 3 3 2 2 49.1 94.4 23.4 18.4 805.1 797.4 
GA 5 4 2 2 43.2 92.9 229.8 36.2 800.3 798.6 
SA 3 3 2 2 30.8 88.2 256.9 38.7 798.5 799.4 
QPF 
PSO 4 4 3 2 0.0 88.0 112.2 31.8 879.4 881.1 
GA 4 4 4 2 0.0 87.5 295.5 60.3 800.0 862.8 
SA 4 4 4 2 0.0 83.3 144.2 26.5 817.0 855.6 
 




Figure 6.2 Penalized and Original Objective Cost and Constraint Violations (IC3, 
LPF, DynPF, PSO) 
The results in Table 6.3 imply the following observations: 
- While the dynamic penalty factor technique helps metaheuristic solvers 
converging to the MinNCC solution in most of the runs, the number of identified 
critical constraints can vary in a wide range with fixed penalty factor technique.  
- Neglecting some small performance differences between different solvers, the 
consistency of finding MinNCC for a given solver is improved with dynamic 
penalty factor technique. This statement is further supported by the less spread 
between MinNCC and MaxNCC in the case of dynamic penalty factor technique. 
- Solver’s probability of finding the smallest minimum number of critical constraints 
(i.e. the minimum of all MinNCCs) is significantly improved when incorporated 
with the dynamic penalty factor technique. Similarly, the average time required to 
find MinNCC is in most cases also reduced with dynamic penalty factor technique.  
- The combination of QPF with fixed penalty factors is resulting in the extremely 
poor performance of the solvers, indicated by zero percent success rate. QPF is not 
working well even with dynamic penalty factor technique, indicated by the 
relatively large spread between MinNCC and MaxNCC.  
- Dynamic penalty factor technique is also improving the quality of the solution, 
demonstrated by the reduced post-contingency fuel cost when compared to fixed 














 Penalized Objective Function ($/h)
 Original Objective Function ($/h)






























6.6 Overview of Constraint Rationalization Framework                                                                                    
124 
 
penalty factor technique. In some cases, fixed penalty factor technique is giving 
lower fuel cost, but this is achieved at higher MinNCC compared to dynamic 
penalty factor technique.  
- Considering the solution quality, success rate, and the average time to find 
MinNCC, PSO with LPF is performing relatively better than GA and SA.  
- Although BPFs are performing satisfactorily in terms of success rate and the ability 
to find MinNCC, they suffer in solution quality (i.e. converging to higher objective 
values). This is obvious because BPFs, being interior penalty functions, always 
tries to seek feasibility more than the optimality. 
6.6. Overview of Constraint Rationalization Framework 
As mentioned, there might be violations of many constraints across many locations 
during the overstressed operating conditions. Operators should address these 
violations immediately by devising and implementing most effective corrective 
actions at specific locations and implementing minimum-cost resources, in order to 
return the system into a normal, or at least alert state. Failure to do so may result in 
further activation of protection to clear violated constraints and most likely cascaded 
tripping of network components and network collapse, or network splitting.  
Although constraints might be active (i.e. violated) across many locations in the 
network, typically, only a few of them are critical and mitigation of those critical 
constraints will resolve all other constraint violations. Knowing the locations of critical 
constraints, operators can implement techno-economically effective corrective actions 
utilizing minimal system reserves [99]. In addition, such an approach could avoid 
unnecessary switching operations and hence prevent further adverse effect on system 
dynamics in post-corrective state.  
6.6.1 Analytical Framework 
The proposed operational constraint rationalization framework (CRF) is illustrated in 
Figure 6.3 and has the following four main stages: 
1) Initiate disturbance (i.e. contingency) and perform the analysis of steady-state 
security constraints in post-disturbance state.  
2) Try to mitigate constraint violations through non-emergency corrective controls; 
if this does not work, proceed to Stage 3 
6.6 Overview of Constraint Rationalization Framework                                                                                    
125 
 
3) Carry out further analysis of security constraints to identify overstressed 
conditions 
4) Select and activate the specific constraint rationalization type  
The final stage presents a range of potential options for constraint rationalization 
depending on the operator priorities. The detailed discussion of each stage is given in 
the following sections.  
6.6.2 Disturbance Initiation and Analysis of Constraints  
The evaluation process starts by the occurrence of a disturbance, e.g. a fault resulting 
in a contingency. For illustration, the disturbances are deliberately chosen as infeasible 
SCM cases, i.e. these are severe contingencies that result in overstressed operating 
conditions (Table 6.1).  
After protection clears the fault, the system is analysed for constraint violations 
immediately after the contingency and before the application of any corrective 
controls. This is carried out by solving an unconstrained power flow with pre-
contingency (optimal) control set points applied on a post-contingency configured-
network. But, in network operational terms, immediate post-contingency constraint 
violations are monitored through SCADA system. If any of the security constraint is 
active or violated, the next step is to mitigate these violations through available non-
emergency corrective controls. The total number of immediate post contingency 
constraint violations (TNSCV) for the considered cases is listed in Table 6.1. 
6.6.3 Mitigation of Active Constraints Using Non-Emergency 
Corrective Controls 
This stage tries to compute a feasible and secure operating point (if any) with the 
activation of only non-emergency corrective controls that are available to the operator 
(e.g. generation re-dispatch, tap settings, reactive compensation (if any), etc.). This is 
done by solving relevant SCM problem formulation using either conventional or 
metaheuristic solver. The selection of the solver type is not important at this stage, as 
the main point here is to confirm the existence, or non-existence, of a feasible operating 
point that can be achieved with non-emergency corrective controls. The objective here 
is to minimize the cost of implementing non-emergency corrective actions 
(CANECC). 
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In terms of the application of the proposed CRF, the conventional solver (PSS/E) is 
used to confirm the existence (or non-existence) of a feasible operating point. If the 
solver converges with zero constraint violations, feasible operating point exists and 
none of the violated constraints is critical. If the solver diverges, or fails to converge, 
it can be confirmed that a feasible operating point cannot be achieved with only non-
emergency corrective controls and system is already in overstressed operating region. 
This indicates that some of the violated constraints are critical and that they can be 
mitigated only through emergency corrective controls (also denoted as “remedial 
actions”). If the solver fails to converge, the number of constraint violations is still the 
same as TNSCV (but denoted as TNSCV1, in Figure 6.3) because there exists no 
solution. If the solver diverges with many constraint violations (denoted as TNSCV2) 
and if these are less than TNSCV, TNSCV is assigned to these constraint violations 
(i.e. TNSCV = TNSCV2). 
The next step is to further process the violated constraints computed in Stage 1 (if the 
solver fails to converge) or Stage 2 (if the solver diverges with constraint violations) 
to decide whether to perform constraint rationalization to identify the locations of 
critical constraints. As the considered test cases are already infeasible, the 
conventional solver (PSS/E) failed to devise non-emergency corrective control 
solution, and hence the operator would be interested to find the critical constraints.  
6.6.4 Further Analysis of Security Constraints  
This section presents a simple logic with which an operator can decide to rationalize 
the constraints or not. The logic involves the comparison of the total number of 
security constraint violations (TSCV) against a pre-specified acceptable number of 
constraint violations. While this pre-specified number can vary based on numerous 
factors (i.e. network size, operator experience, etc), three is considered as the threshold 
value in this thesis. If TNSCV is less than a pre-specified threshold, rather than 
identifying critical security constraints using constraint rationalization, the operator 
can directly devise remedial actions based on the previous knowledge. However, if the 
TNSCV is higher than the pre-specified threshold, the operator may not be able to 
devise a proper remedial action and/or implement it in an effective way without 
previously rationalizing them. It can be seen from Table 6.1 that the TNSCV for all 
the considered test cases is higher than the pre-specified threshold value (i.e. three), 
6.6 Overview of Constraint Rationalization Framework                                                                                    
128 
 
suggesting that in these cases the operator would benefit from the efficient filtering-
out of critical constraints from the total constraint violations. 
The next step is to identify the locations of the critical constraints, as this information 
can help operators in devising and implementing the most effective remedial actions.  
6.6.5 Perform Constraint Rationalization 
Using the metaheuristic based critical identification process discussed in Section 6.3, 
this section presents an approach to rationalize or filter the critical constraints from the 
total violated constraints. The approach rationalizes the constraints based on five 
operational priorities, where each operational priory is modelled either as an objective 
function, or as the solver termination criteria (Table 6.4).  
If the operator priority is modelled as an objective function, then solver termination 
criteria are set to a predefined execution time (here, 5 min). If the operator priority is 
modelled as solver’s termination criteria, then the objective function is set to cost of 
corrective actions (CANECC), because this is assumed to be the default objective for 
the system operation.  
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6.6.5.1 Constraint rationalization based on the cost of non-emergency corrective actions 
Here, the operator’s objective is to identify the most critical constraints while also 
minimizing the cost of implementing the non-emergency corrective actions to achieve 
that minimum constraint solution. The non-emergency corrective controls considered 
in this thesis are generation re-dispatch, AVR setpoints, transformer tap settings, 
reactive compensation (if any).  
It is assumed that except for the generation re-dispatch, all other non-emergency 
corrective controls are available with no cost for the operator. Hence, only the cost of 
re-dispatch is considered as the cost of corrective actions. There are two reasons for 
this: a) to ease the analysis and b) to represent the practical operational scenarios. To 
the best of author’s experience, system operator, as the owner of the transmission 
system, can request the re-adjustment of the AVR set points, tap settings and any 
reactive compensation (this should belong to system operator) for free. Nevertheless, 
the presented approach can be easily extended to model the cost of any other controls.  
Accordingly, CANECC is modelled as the difference between the pre-contingency 
fuel cost and the post-contingency fuel cost with corrective actions. Two indices 
aggregated-percentage-voltage-violation (APVV), (6.4), and aggregated-percentage-
overloading (APOL), (6.5), are calculated to quantify the violations of all critical 
voltage and critical overload/thermal constraints. The sum of APVV and APOL is a 
measure of the infeasibility (SPINF), (5.2), which was used in Chapter 5 to find MISC.  








𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑖 < 𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑖 > 𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥
} (6.2) 
 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖 = {100 ∗
𝑆𝑖 − 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥
|𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑖 > 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥} (6.3) 
 𝐴𝑃𝑉𝑉 =∑𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑖 (6.4) 
 𝐴𝑃𝑂𝐿 =∑𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖 (6.5) 
where: 𝑉𝑖, 𝑆𝑖 – voltage at bus 𝑖 and apparent power flow in line 𝑖,  𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑖 – percentage 
voltage violation at bus 𝑖, 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖 – percentage overloading of line 𝑖, APVV, APOL – 
aggregated voltage violation and overloading for all critical constraints.  
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All infeasible test cases (IC1-IC10) are analysed to demonstrate this rationalization 
type. Three metaheuristic solvers with linear penalty functions are employed to solve 
the selected infeasible cases. The reason to analyse with only linear penalty functions 
is to limit the attention to the essence of the approach, rather than to the different 
penalty functions. The list of identified critical constraints, constraint violation 
amount, and the cost of corrective actions with three solvers are shown in Table 6.5, 
Table 6.6, and Table 6.7 respectively.  
Table 6.5 Critical Constraints Information at Minimized Fuel Cost (PSO) 
Test 
Case 







IC1 2 OL {15, 19} 0.00 60.69 7.04 
IC2 1 OL {20} 0.00 36.38 6.11 
IC3 4 UV {29, 30}; OL {33, 35} 5.78 48.35 31.39 
IC4 4 UV {29, 30}; OL {33, 35} 5.84 64.14 33.55 
IC5 2 OL {3,9} 0.00 64.72 15249.86 
IC6 1 OL {3} 0.00 50.43 12868.53 
IC7 7 UV {24;27;28;29;52;53}; OV {18} 26.70 0.00 3311.12 
IC8 6 UV {24, 27, 28, 29, 52, 53} 32.83 0.00 775.86 
IC9 2 OL {135, 137} 0.00 25.24 46.27 
IC10 3 UV {24, 84, 85} 20.54 0.00 28.21 
OL{i}: Overloading of line i; UV{i}, OV{i}: Undervoltage and Overvoltage at bus i 
Table 6.6 Critical Constraints Information at Minimized Fuel Cost (GA) 
Test 
Case 







IC1 2 OL {15, 19} 0.00 60.88 8.17 
IC2 1 OL {20} 0.00 36.61 7.79 
IC3 4 UV {29, 30}; OL {33, 35} 5.59 47.16 46.89 
IC4 4 UV {29, 30}; OL {33, 35} 5.84 64.14 76.36 
IC5 2 OL {3,9} 0.00 68.60 15990.96 
IC6 1 OL {3} 0.00 43.92 15674.27 
IC7 6 UV {24;27;28;29;52;53} 35.79 0.00 3355.71 
IC8 6 UV {24, 27, 28, 29, 52, 53} 30.21 0.00 724.79 
IC9 2 OL {135, 137} 0.00 31.30 46.06 
IC10 3 UV {24, 84, 85} 16.92 0.00 34.07 
          CC – Critical constraint; nCC – Number of CC; CCS – Critical constraint set 
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Table 6.7 Critical Constraints Information at Minimized Fuel Cost (SA) 
Test 
Case 







IC1 2 OL {15, 19} 0.00 60.88 9.02 
IC2 1 OL {20} 0.00 37.22 8.82 
IC3 4 UV {29, 30}; OL {33, 35} 5.61 36.48 77.25 
IC4 4 UV {29, 30}; OL {33, 35} 5.84 64.13 59.21 
IC5 2 OL {3,9} 0.00 64.72 15249.86 
IC6 1 OL {3} 0.00 44.02 14978.25 
IC7 7 UV {24;27;28;29;52;53}; OV {18} 28.52 0.00 3513.99 
IC8 9 UV {24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 52, 53}; OV {18} 75.24 0.00 1107.40 
IC9 2 OL {135, 137} 0.00 29.39 45.99 
IC10 3 UV {24, 84, 85} 18.09 0.00 12809.98 
CC – Critical constraint; nCC – Number of CC; CCS – Critical constraint set 
Following observations can be made from the above results: 
- Neglecting the small differences in bus voltage limit violations (APVV) and 
branch overloads (APOL), all solvers, except for two cases (IC7 and IC8), are 
reporting the same set of critical constraints.  
- For the test cases IC7 and IC8, the performance of PSO and SA are inferior to GA, 
as they are unable to identify the minimum set of critical constraints.  
- While the indices of critical constraints identified here and the indices of MISC 
identified in Chapter 5 are same, the amount of constraint violations associated 
with CCS (i.e. APVV+APOL) is either equal to or larger than the violations 
associated with MISC (Table 5.10). This is where CCS differs from MISC. While 
the constraints in MISC are identified to minimize the infeasibility from purely 
mathematical sense, constraints in CCS are identified to minimize the operator’s 
current objective. Hence, CCS and MISC can generally share the same constraints, 
but they could be different as well. 
- While the MISC is unique for a given infeasible problem, the size and violation of 
CCS can be varied by modelling the various operator’s priorities. Nevertheless, the 
size of the CCS will be always equal to or higher than the MISC. This is evidenced 
with test case IC7, where the size of the CCS reported by PSO and SA is a superset 
of the corresponding MISC.  
- The higher cost of corrective actions (CANECC) for IC5 and IC6 indicates that 
these SCM cases are severe and require re-dispatch of expensive generators from 
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their pre-contingency generation set points.  
- Although the cost of corrective actions is seemingly small for other test cases (IC1-
IC5, IC8-IC10), one should remember that the operator might pay much higher 
price for emergency corrective controls, in order to resolve the remaining 
constraint violations (nCC).  
To sum up, the proposed framework not only reduces the cost of non-emergency 
corrective actions to resolve most of the constraint violations (except CCS), but also 
helps the operator to identify where to activate the emergency reserves and what these 
reserves should be. For example, the CCS for IC10 can be resolved by activating 
emergency reactive compensation at Buses 24, 84 and 85, or at the buses that have 
higher reactive power injection sensitivity to voltages at these buses.  
6.6.5.2 Constraint Rationalization Based on Available time 
If the operator knows the service restoration time of the components (lost due to a 
contingency), as well as the time before tripping/losing the next component (e.g. 
overloading of a line due to a contingency), the operator would like to find a list of 
critical constraints based on the available lead time. Hence, the operator priority 
(available lead time) is modelled as solver’s termination criteria while the objective 
function is set to CANECC. It should be noted that the lead-time is specific to network 
types and configurations, types of contingencies and post-contingency constraint 
violations and other numerous factors.  
Nevertheless, for demonstration purposes, this section analyses all ten test cases from 
Table 6.1 with a lead time of one minute. Again, three metaheuristic solvers with linear 
penalty functions are employed to solve the considered test cases.  The minimum and 
the maximum number of critical constraints identified within one-minute execution 
time, as a percentage of immediate post-contingency constraint violations (TNSCV) 
over 50 runs are presented in Table 6.8.  
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Table 6.8 Constraint Reduction within a One Minute (as a percentage of TNSCV) 
Test  
Case 













IC1 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 
IC2 90.91 90.91 90.91 90.91 90.91 90.91 
IC3 55.56 22.22 55.56 22.22 55.56 22.22 
IC4 50.00 25.00 50.00 12.50 50.00 12.50 
IC5 77.78 33.33 77.78 0.00 77.78 0.00 
IC6 85.71 57.14 85.71 57.14 85.71 42.86 
IC7 85.00 0.00 85.00 0.00 80.00 0.00 
IC8 60.00 0.00 65.00 0.00 55.00 0.00 
IC9 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 70.00 
IC10 72.73 63.64 72.73 54.55 72.73 36.36 
The results imply the following observations: 
- Significant reduction in constraint violations: all solvers, for most of the test cases, 
can find a solution with a reduced percentage of constraint violations when 
compared to immediate post-contingency constraint violations. This confirms that 
this kind of constraint rationalization can be very useful for network operators 
when faced with similar situations.  
- For some test cases, solvers may fail to find any solution with reduced constraint 
violations. For example, there are few situations (e.g. IC7 and IC8) for which the 
minimum percentage of constraint reduction is zero, which means solvers are 
unable to reduce the number of immediate post-contingency constraint violations 
within one minute. There might be two reasons for this: the considered test cases 
are too severe, and/or the execution time of one minute is not enough to find a 
minimum constraint solution. 
6.6.5.3 Constraint Rationalization to minimize number of violations to a pre-
specified number  
The objective, in this case, is still minimization of CANECC, but the operator runs the 
optimization solver until some pre-defined number of constraint violations are 
achieved. For example, the operator wants to run the program until he sees an X% 
reduction in the total constraint violations (TNSCV). The target value of the 
percentage reduction is entirely up to the operator’s decision. The operator may take a 
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decision based on his previous experience with similar situations, network knowledge, 
and the present status of the network.  
Nevertheless, for demonstration purposes, this section analyses all test cases from 
Table 6.1) with 50% constraint reduction as a threshold value. Again, three 
metaheuristic solvers with linear penalty functions are employed to solve selected test 
cases. The times (averaged over 50 runs) required to reduce constraint violations by 
50% (or less) for three solvers are listed in Table 6.9. Furthermore, the process of 
constraints reduction over the PSO solver’s execution time for two test cases IC9 and 
IC10 are plotted in Figure 6.4. 
The results indicate that the solvers can reduce number of constraint violations to 50% 
(or less) in a reasonable time, except for the test cases IC7 and IC8. It was observed 
during the analysis that test cases IC7 and IC8, irrespective of the used metaheuristic 
solver, always require higher computational time. This is because the post-contingency 
network experiences many constraint violations at different locations and the solvers 
must perform an extensive search in order to find solutions that can resolve most of 
the constraint violations. Nevertheless, PSO is performing superior to GA and SA. 
Table 6.9 Average Computation Time (s) to Reduce Constraint Violations  
by 50% (or lesser) 
Test Case PSO GA SA 
IC1 5.42 20.37 15.86 
IC2 1.13 6.83 9.22 
IC3 10.70 18.41 24.35 
IC4 17.60 27.53 18.62 
IC5 11.54 24.85 22.13 
IC6 6.60 14.27 8.85 
IC7 99.18 152.27 128.51 
IC8 113.52 202.07 171.08 
IC9 30.02 27.30 41.82 
IC10 51.29 51.36 51.59 
Aggregated 
Average 
34.70 54.53 49.20 




Figure 6.4 Number of constraint Reduction Versus PSO Solver Execution Time 
6.6.5.4 Constraint Rationalization Based on Available Emergency Reserves  
This constraint rationalization focusses on the possibility of shifting critical constraint 
types from one to another (e.g. critical voltage constraints to critical thermal 
constraints). The dynamic penalty factor updating technique allows the operator to 
shift the constraint types in the final critical constraint set by varying the initial penalty 
factor values applied to bus voltage and line thermal limits violations. While voltage 
violations are mitigated by reactive power reserves, thermal violations are mitigated 
through active power reserves. 
If the network possesses more active reserves than reactive reserves, the operators may 
want to find a critical constraint set in which there are more thermal limit violations, 
than voltage bus limit violations. Similarly, the operator may want to find a critical 
constraint set which has more voltage violations if the network has more reactive 
power reserves. Moreover, some reserves may be available only at specific locations 
in the network, or reserves of the same type available at many locations but a single 
bus cannot take care of all constraint violations. 
This is achieved by varying the values of the initial penalty factors for voltage and 
thermal violations, where fewer voltage violations and more thermal violations will be 
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achieved by inputting larges penalty factors for voltage violations and smaller penalty 
factors for thermal violations, and vice versa.  
It should be noted that the shifting of constraint types is not always possible or might 
be very difficult. Very few practical situations allow the operator to perform this kind 
of constraint rationalization. This section analyses two such test cases (IC8 and IC10) 
for which constraint shifting is possible. The analysis here is focussed on the 
possibility of shifting an undervoltage constraint at one bus to multiple overvoltage 
constraints at different buses. This is achieved by assigning lower penalty (i.e. 10) to 
overvoltage constraints compared to undervoltage constraints (i.e. 100). For example, 
the undervoltage constraint at bus 53 (for IC8 in IEEE 57-bus network) is shifted to 
overvoltage constraints at bus 45 and bus 55 (Table 6.10). A similar explanation 
applies to IC10. 
Table 6.10 Constraint Rationalization Based on Reserves 
 Original Constraint Violations Shifted Constraint Violations 
IC8 UV{24, 27, 28, 29, 52, 53} UV{24, 27, 28, 29, 52}, OV{45, 55} 
IC10 UV{24, 84, 85} UV{24, 84}, OV{95, 137} 
6.6.5.5 Constraint Rationalization to Maximize the Leadtime for Next Contingency  
Here the operator is not interested to minimize the number of violations but aims to 
maximize the lead time available before the next contingency, e.g. losing the next 
overloaded line due to activation of overloading protection. This aspect of the analysis 
is very important and useful from the context of modern electricity networks, which 
frequently operate near security limits in order to maximize the revenues, or due to 
contractual obligations. As time is precious, reserving a few minutes of lead-time can 
even avoid a blackout, especially during the overstressed operating conditions. 
Increased lead time will also allow for utilising generators with longer ramp-up times 
and will generally provide more room for the existing controls to respond and devise 
more effective remedial actions.  
The concept of lead time is derived from the dynamic thermal rating of transmission 
lines [11]-[12]. Following a severe contingency, many lines may be overloaded, but 
their temperature may not reach their maximum temperature instantaneously. They 
require some time to reach the maximum temperature and this time is considered as 
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the available time before line tripping takes place. Every overloaded line may have a 
different available time before tripping, and the minimum of the all available times for 
all the overloaded lines is considered as the lead time in this section. A function to 
calculate this lead time is developed (6.6) and is maximized during the optimization 
process. The detailed mathematical formulation of the thermal modelling of overhead 
transmission lines and the derivation of lead time is explained in Appendix B.  




where: 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 – lead time for line k,  𝑇𝑐𝑓 , 𝑇𝑐𝑖 – conductor surface temperatures 
during steady state, 𝜏 – time constant, 𝑇𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡 – maximum temperature limit in post-
contingency state.  
The optimization problem is formulated to maximize the lead-time, (6.7) – (6.8). Two 
test cases (IC1 and IC2) are analysed to demonstrate this approach using only one 
solver (PSO). Table 6.11 presents the results: the maximized lead time, indices and 
violation amount for the violated constraints at maximized lead time. The lead time 
against the solver’s execution is plotted for two test cases (IC1 and IC2) in Figure 6.5. 
The solver terminates execution at 40 s, as there is no change in lead time from 15s. 
The results indicate that the maximum overloaded line (T7-9) for test case IC1 
achieves its peak temperature after around 440 seconds (i.e. slightly above 7 min), 
when the protection will trip that component afterwards. This is the time available for 
the operator to take an action to mitigate the post-contingency critical constraint 
violations. A similar explanation applies to other test cases.  
 Maximize: 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒) (6.7) 
 𝑠. 𝑡𝑜  𝑔 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ℎ ≤ 0 (6.8) 





Indices of violated constraints 
(overloaded lines) 
Amount of violation 
(extra load in percentage) 
IC1 439.24 OL {T7-9, L10-11, L12-13} 
OL {21.02%，10.89%, 
8.90%} 
IC2 428.03 OL{L13-14} OL {27.25%} 
 
 




Figure 6.5 Leadtime Versus Solver Execution Time (IC1 and IC2) 
6.7. Conclusions  
This chapter presented a novel constraint rationalization framework to identify the 
types and locations of critical security constraints during the overstressed system 
operating conditions. The framework acknowledges that the criticality of a constraint 
violation will vary based on the operator’s evaluation and prioritisation of post-
contingency controls and actions. The framework enables the operator to identify the 
critical constraints sets (CCS) according to specified priorities. The framework was 
illustrated by modelling five different types of operator priorities (cost of corrective 
actions, available computational time, pre-specified number of CCS, available 
resources, and available lead time before the next contingency occurs) and it can be 
easily extended to include other priorities which an independent system operator (ISO) 
may want to consider during the overstressed conditions (e.g. minimization of 
corrective actions in post-contingency state). This clearly suggest further potential of 
exploring this aspect of constraint management (and presented framework).  
The framework is demonstrated with several overstressed test cases on considered test 
networks. The presented results indicate the benefits of the framework to the operators. 
The identification of types as well as locations of the critical constraints is very 
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important during overstressed conditions. While the type of critical constraints helps 
operators in deciding what type of remedial actions should be selected or activated, the 
locations of critical constraints help operators to identify where and how to implement 
these remedial actions optimally, so that the network safely transits to a new secure 
operating state, without violation of any dynamic security constraints during the 
transition (This is demonstrated in Chapter 7). 
This framework could improve the decision-making capability at energy control 
centre. For example, an operator typically cannot process more than five alarms at a 
time and the presented constraint rationalization framework could pinpoint the critical 
alarms, so that the operator can devise most efficient decisions quickly. In the worst 
case, if the load shedding inevitable, at least the lowest amount of load to be 
disconnected can be computed, as well as where this load is to be disconnected. In 
order to illustrate these important applications of the proposed framework, Chapter 7 
presents a remedial action framework, in which information on the types and locations 
of critical constraints from this chapter is used to devise the most effective remedial 




Chapter 7  
Remedial Action Selection and Implementation 
Framework 
This chapter presents a framework to select and implement the most effective 
(response-driven) remedial actions to mitigate critical constraint violations during 
overstressed operating conditions. 
7.1. Introduction  
The management of static security constraints (bus voltages and branch thermal limits) 
is one of the continuous and critical tasks performed by operators. In order to 
accommodate higher shares of renewable generation resources and defer 
infrastructural investments, modern electricity networks are extensively operated close 
to their technical security limits. Hence, constraint management remains to play a 
major role in ensuring secure and efficient network operation. Static security 
constraints at any operating point can be divided into noncritical constraints (NCC) 
and critical constraints (CC). To be statically secure, the system must always fulfil 
both types of security constraints.  
Depending on the generation (especially renewable generation) and demand patterns, 
and outages, violations of security constraints will appear and disappear in real-time 
[28]. In principle, there exist two types of corrective controls (non-emergency and 
emergency corrective controls) to mitigate constraint violations. In smart grid context, 
both types of controls can be automatic, or operator initiated. However, in the first 
instance, operators use non-emergency corrective controls (NECC) to resolve 
constraints. If NECC does not resolve all constraint violations, emergency corrective 
controls (ECC) will be activated.  
Following a disturbance, the readjustment of NECC may or may not resolve all the 
resulting constraint violations. If NECC resolves all constraint violations, the 
corresponding disturbance cannot develop overstressed or emergency conditions. The 
constraint violations that can be resolved by NECC controls are denoted as NCC and 
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the ones that cannot be resolved are denoted as CC. The violation of at least one critical 
constraint indicates that the system is overstressed, which typically happens following 
a severe contingency [14]. 
Noncritical constraint violations (NCCVs) can be managed with NECC. On the other 
hand, critical constraint violations (CCVs) require prompt activation of ECCs, referred 
to as remedial actions to prevent further activation of protection, triggering cascaded 
tripping possibly leading to a blackout [3]. The set of NCCVs and CCVs are denoted 
as noncritical constraint set (NCCS) and critical constraint set (CCS), respectively. If 
the transition from pre-contingency to the post-contingency state involves only 
NCCVs, an experienced operator may successfully select the adequate non-emergency 
corrective actions to manage all violated constraints. However, if the transition 
involves CCVs, the most effective remedial actions must be computed algorithmically, 
as it will be difficult for an operator to select appropriate remedial actions based on 
previous experience [100]. 
In this context, control centres are integrating advanced OPF modules to their EMS 
(energy management system) to effectively control emergency reserves and devise 
optimal remedial actions for managing constraint violations [101]. In the case of an 
overstressed system, featuring one or more CCVs (which are not known a priori), 
conventional OPF solvers will fail to converge and compute the required control 
action, as the corresponding optimization problem becomes mathematically infeasible. 
This has already been demonstrated in Chapter-4, Chapter 5 and Chapter-6.  
For a given overstressed system, the identification of CCS is essential from both the 
optimization and the operational points of views. As per the optimization, CCVs are 
the actual cause of infeasibility. From an operational point of view, CCVs indicate 
where in the network and in relation to which network components optimal remedial 
actions should be planned and activated. Unlike in linear OPF programs, no commonly 
accepted method exists in nonlinear OPF programs for identification of CCVs [3]-[ 4]. 
Moreover, the type, location, and amount of violation of CCS can be varied based on 
operator or control priorities. While Chapter-5 presented an infeasibility diagnosis 
framework (IDRF) to identify CCS purely from optimization viewpoint, Chapter-6 
presented a constraint rationalization framework (CRF) to identify CCS from the 
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operations viewpoint. This chapter, using CRF, presents a novel remedial action 
selection and implementation framework (RASIF) to diagnose overstressed conditions 
as well as devise the most effective remedial actions.  
Literature Review: Remedial action schemes (RAS) are extensively used to enhance 
system stability and mitigate thermal overloading and bus voltage violations after 
contingencies [102]. RAS, if implemented properly, can increase the flexibility in 
power system operation [103]. A detailed review of industry experiences with RAS is 
available in [104]. From the author's view, the only difference between the ECCs and 
RAS is that RAS represents the action of implementing an ECC in a specific way and 
in specific situations. RAS is also denoted as special protection schemes (SPS). 
In general, RAS can be divided into event-driven RAS and response-driven RAS [51]. 
Event-driven remedial actions are fit and forget type controls and are executed 
automatically after the occurrence of a specific event. Contrastingly, response-driven 
remedial actions are computed by the EMS after system enters the emergency 
operating region. Unlike event-driven remedial actions, response-driven remedial 
actions can be re-adjusted and re-applied until there is an improvement in system 
performance. The remedial actions discussed in this thesis are response-driven 
remedial actions.   
Traditionally, RASs are designed based on planning analysis and they are event-driven 
and fixed (e.g. RAS attached to a specific or set of contingencies [102]). As the system 
evolves over time, the same contingency can have different severity in different 
operating conditions (e.g. an unexpected generation or demand profile can change the 
definition of a contingency). Consequently, the planning based, and even-driven 
remedial actions can be ineffective from the technical or economic viewpoint. 
Moreover, most of the previous RAS are motivated by only technical rather than 
economic reasons [103]. This assumption no more works in the re-regulated 
environment.  
Recently, an active research work is going on in academia and industry to devise 
response-driven RAS in the operations environment, using system physical models 
and/or real-time measurements. For example, RAS to mitigate small signal and 
transient stability, frequency and voltage stability, and voltage collapse are proposed 
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in [105]-[109]. Moreover, several ISOs are also interested in devising new RAS to 
effectively manage their emergency reserves [110]-[111]. There has been much 
previous work on CM and VVC based on the use of generation rescheduling and load 
shedding [112]- [115], distributed generation [116]-[117], FACTS devices [118]-
[120], demand-side-management [121]-[122], energy storage [123], and transmission 
switching [124]-[126]. 
Earlier studies were mostly concerned with contingencies that will push the system 
into an alert state and paid less attention to overstressed operating conditions, where, 
if adequate control actions are not promptly implemented, changes in power flows and 
power balance will result in the inability of conventional solvers to converge and 
compute the required remedial action. In addition, especially from the context of 
constraint management, the steady state and dynamic security analysis in most of the 
earlier works is addressed separately. Neglecting the violation of steady state security 
constraints and the corresponding protection operations, a system may successfully 
transit from pre- to post-disturbance state. In this case, the state trajectory or system is 
dynamically secure, but the post-disturbance state may or may not qualify for the 
steady state security. If it is not, protection system will trip the overloaded lines which 
introduce further dynamics and the network may not reach the steady state. 
Moreover, there exists no work on computing remedial actions based on the type, 
location and amount of violation of critical constraints to resolve overstressed 
operating conditions. In conclusion, to the best of author’s knowledge, the presented 
framework (RASIF) is the very first methodological attempt to address the issue of 
selecting and implementing the most effective remedial actions for the overstressed 
systems, with the identification of critical constraints as root causes for the 
overstressed operating conditions.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 7.2 outlines the proposed 
remedial action framework and describes the implementation of various remedial 
actions. Simulation results on the test networks are presented in Section 7.3. The main 
contributions, observations, and limitations of the approach are discussed in Section 
7.4. Section 7.5 concludes the chapter. 
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7.2. Overview of Proposed Remedial Action Framework 
7.2.1. Analytical Framework  
As mentioned, (prolonged) operation of the network with CCVs will result in further 
activation of the protection system, leading to a cascaded tripping and (extreme) 
emergency operating conditions. Only emergency corrective controls referred to as 
remedial actions can mitigate these constraint violations and return the system to a 
normal or (at least) alert operating region. 
Typically, under overstressed operating conditions, networks experience the violation 
of numerous constraints (i.e. branch overloading and bus under/over voltage alarms) 
and some of these violations are critical. These CCVs must be addressed immediately, 
or else the network loses its integrity and bifurcated into islands. The operator, being 
in charge, should devise the techno-economically effective remedial actions and 
implement them at the best locations to relieve CCVs. As the network is already 
overstressed, failure to do so might further degrade system security. 
The implementation of devised remedial action should need a minimal number of 
switching and control operations to minimize the usage of system reserves and prevent 
the further adverse effect on system dynamics in the post-corrective state [127]. In this 
context, a novel remedial action selection and implementation framework (RASIF), 
using previously developed constraint rationalization framework (CRF, Chapter-6), is 
proposed here to diagnose overstressed operating conditions, as well as derive and 
implement the most effective remedial actions.   
The framework is illustrated in Figure 7.1 and has the following four main stages: 
1) Analysis of post-disturbance operating conditions – this stage involves 
disturbance simulation and identification of number (TNSCV), type and 
location of violated constraints.  
2) Computation of non-emergency corrective control (NECC) solution – if stage-
1 reports nonzero TNSCV, this stage employs a conventional SCM solver to 
compute an NECC solution with an aim to resolve all constraint violations. If 
the SCM solver cannot find a solution, stage-2 employs IDRF (see chapter 5) 
to confirm the non-existence of the NECC solution.  
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3) Identification of CCVs – if stage-2 confirms no NECC solution, this stage, for 
a given operator priority, identifies the CCVs by using CRF framework (see 
chapter 6). 
4) Classify the SCM problem and employ relevant remedial action(s) – this stage, 
based on the nature of CCVs, classifies the SCM problem into either CM or 
VVC; and implement relevant remedial action(s).  
The final stage considers a range of potential solutions for a remedial action depending 
on whether the CCVs involve thermal or voltage constraints. Accordingly, this thesis 
considers: distributed generation (DG) dispatch, demand-side-management (DSM), 
reactive power control, and load shedding. The stages of the framework are explained 
in the following sections. 
7.2.2. Analysis of Post-disturbance Operating Conditions 
The evaluation process starts by the occurrence of a disturbance, e.g. a fault resulting in 
a contingency. For illustration, the disturbances are deliberately chosen as infeasible 
SCM cases, i.e. these are severe contingencies that result in overstressed operating 
conditions. After the protection clears the fault, the system is analysed for constraint 
violations immediately after the contingency, before the effect of any corrective control. 
This is carried out by solving an unconstrained power flow with pre-contingency 
(optimal) control set points applied on a post-contingency configured-network. But, in 
the operations environment, immediate post-contingency constraint violations are 
monitored through the SCADA system.  
The total number of security constraints violations are denoted as TNSCV. If any of the 
security constraints are violated (i.e. nonzero TNSCV), the next step is to resolve these 
violations by re-adjusting (non-emergency) corrective controls using an SCM solver.  












Network is in normal state and then disturbance happened 
Monitor security parameters (bus voltages and branch flows) and compute Total 
Number of Security Constraint Violations (TNSCV)
Network is steady state unsecure; Need to activate corrective controls
Formulate the SCM problem to compute Non-emergency Corrective Control 
(NECC) solution to mitigate all constraint violations (i.e. TNSCV = 0)
Solve formulated SCM with a conventional solver
Classify SCM problem and select most effective remedial action (RA) 
1. If CCV involves thermal contraints, SCM-->CM; RA --> Load shedding, DSM, 
DG, Network switching, Energy Storage, etc
2. If CCV involves only voltage violations; SCM-->VVC; RA --> Shunt capacitors, 
Optimal NECC solution
is found; TNSCV=0; 
System is SECURE; No 
RA is required. 
TNSCV=0
System is SECURE;




Conventional solver failed to find an NECC solution. SCM problem may be 
infeasible. Pass the problem to IDRF to recheck the existence of the solution.
System is OVERSTRESSED and UNSECURE; Remedial Action is required 
Identify critical constraint violations (CCVs) from TNSCV 
using CRF
Activate selected remedial action scheme 
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7.2.3. Computation of Non-Emergency Corrective Control Solution 
The purpose here is to find a feasible and secure operating point with zero constraint 
violations by solving related SCM problem. This employs a conventional SCM solver 
to find the optimal settings for available non-emergency corrective controls, NECC 
(generator outputs, PV bus voltages, transformer tap settings, reactive compensation, 
etc.). The SCM problem is formulated to minimize the cost of implementing available 
non-emergency corrective controls (CANECC) while satisfying specified equality and 
inequality constraints, (7.1)–(7.2). Please refer to chapter-6 for details about modelling 
CANECC.  
𝑚𝑖𝑛.    𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐸𝐶𝐶 (7.1) 
𝑠. 𝑡.    𝑔 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ℎ ≤ 0 (7.2) 
An interior point optimization method (PSSE) from [155] is employed as the 
conventional SCM solver. If the solver converges, the settings of NECC's define a secure 
system, which can be implemented with no further remedial action required. However, 
if solver fails to converge and compute an NECC solution, the SCM problem under test 
will be forwarded to IDRF in order to confirm the existence and non-existence of the 
NECC solution. If IDRF confirms no solution, the system is overstressed, and additional 
steps are required –the formulated SCM problem, (7.1)–(7.2), will be forwarded to CRF 
to identify the CCVs.  
7.2.4. Identification of CCVs using CRF 
While an overstressed system can experience both critical and noncritical constraint 
violations, corrective actions on critical constraints can manage both. From an 
optimization viewpoint, critical constraints are the minimal set of constraints causing the 
search space to be empty or infeasible. Hence the identification of CCVs is essential for 
devising proper corrective actions to mitigate the overstressed situations.  
This section employs the CRF (see Chapter 6) to rationalize the total violated security 
constraints (i.e. TNSCV) and identify the CCVs. For the demonstration purposes, here 
constraint rationalization is performed to minimize CANECC. But the operator could 
impose any other priority as and when required. 
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7.2.5. Defining Most Effective Remedial Actions  
The final stage is to use the knowledge of the CCVs to define the most effective 
remedial actions for returning the system to secure state. After CCVs are identified, this 
can be done with either conventional or metaheuristic algorithm based SCM. For that 
purpose, two factors are calculated [202]: a) active power injection sensitivity factor for 
branch flows (PISF), which captures the sensitivity of the flow through a branch between 
bus 𝑖 and 𝑗 with respect to a change in active power injection at bus 𝑘, and b) reactive 
power injection sensitivity factor for bus voltages (QISF), which captures the sensitivity 
of the voltage at bus 𝑖 with respect to reactive power injection at bus 𝑘 (slack bus 




















 ; 𝑖 ∈ 𝐵 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘 ∈ 𝐵 (7.4) 
where: B is bus index; L is line/branch index; Δ𝑃𝑘 and Δ𝑄𝑘 are the changes in active and 
reactive power injection at bus k; ΔS𝑖𝑗
𝑘  is a change in apparent power flow in a branch 
(𝑖, 𝑗) due to Δ𝑃𝑘; Δ𝑉𝑖
𝑘 is a change in voltage at bus 𝑖 due to Δ𝑄𝑘. 
If CCVs involve only voltage limit violations, the corresponding SCM is a VVC 
(volt/var control) problem and the effective remedial action should be the one which can 
control reactive power injection at some critical buses. If CCV involves a mixture of 
voltage and thermal limit violations or only thermal limit violations, the corresponding 
SCM is a CM problem and the effective remedial actions should be the one which can 
control both active and reactive power injection. While the precise implementation 
depends on the intervention considered (DG control, DSM, load shedding, etc.) and is 
best described in the case study, the general process is to:  
1. Calculate PISFs (or QISF) for all buses with respect to the critically overloaded 
branches (or critical undervoltage buses) 
2. Select the buses with the highest absolute PISF (or QISF) values as target buses for 
implementing selected remedial action and incorporate corresponding parameters (e.g. 
load or generation at these buses) as new control variables in the SCM formulation;  
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3. Solve the modified SCM employing relevant objective functions corresponding to the 
intervention considered.  
7.2.5.1 Remedial Action – Optimal Control of Distributed Generation 
In the context of smart grid functionalities, optimal dispatch of DG can be viewed as 
a credible approach to support network security and operational reliability. In this 
thesis, optimal dispatch of DG active power is considered to relieve branch thermal as 
well as bus voltage congestions during overstressed operating conditions. The target 
buses are those with the highest PISF (absolute) values. The modified SCM problem 
considers DG active power production as a control variable and has two objective 
functions: minimize overall fuel cost (“OFC”, including DG fuel cost) and active 
power losses (“L”) to optimally dispatch DG in addition to regular generation to 
resolve CCVs. One should note that, in the case of renewable-based DG, the term 
schedule means only output reduction. 
7.2.5.2 Remedial Action – Optimal Reactive Power Injection  
When a system experiences many under/over voltages due to reactive power imbalance, 
an effective approach may be to install and control reactive power reserves at certain 
critical buses. In this thesis, optimal placement, and control of shunt capacitors for 
improved volt-var control (VVC) is employed at buses where critical undervoltages 
occur. The target buses have the highest QISFs with respect to the voltages at critical 
buses. Shunt capacitors of 20 MVAr (each) are placed on the target buses and the values 
of shunt capacitors are considered as a (continuous) control variable in the SCM 
formulation. Again, the modified SCM problem is solved separately for three objective 
functions: minimize fuel cost (“F”), losses (“L”), and shunt capacitor use (“S”). 
7.2.5.3 Remedial Action – Coordinated control of generation and demand 
The “last resort” emergency remedial action available to network operators to resolve 
CCVs is load shedding. Three demand control approaches: (i) hard load shedding (HLS), 
(ii) optimal load shedding (OLS), and (iii) selective optimal load shedding (SOLS) are 
proposed in this thesis. These approaches differ in terms of selected target buses and the 
proportion of demand available to control.  
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Hard Load Shedding (HLS): HLS approach is initiated by the protection system 
(mostly) and sometimes by the operator. The target buses for the HLS approach are 
typically associated with immediate post-contingency violations (i.e. overloaded 
branches, under/overvoltage buses following a contingency). In general, HLS approach 
completely shed the load at the target buses (100% load shedding).  
Optimal Load Shedding (OLS): OLS approach computes the optimal amount of load 
to shed using an optimization program. The target buses for OLS are the buses where 
immediate post-contingency constraint violations occur. OLS consider the loads at target 
buses as control variables and compute the optimal load to shed by using an SCM solver. 
Hence, shed value of the load at the target buses can be anywhere between 0% and 100%. 
Selective Optimal Load Shedding (SOLS): Compared to HLS and OLS, SOLS 
approach chooses only a smaller number of buses as target buses for the shedding. It 
selects target buses based on their sensitivity to influence power flows in overloaded 
branches, or voltages at under/over voltage buses. In other words, these are the buses 
that have the highest active/reactive injection sensitivity factors (PISF and QISF) with 
respect to critically overloaded branches or critical under/overvoltage buses. SOLS 
consider loads at these buses as control variables and then computes the optimal value 
of the load to shed using an SCM solver. Shed value of the load at the target buses can 
be anywhere between 0% and 100%. 
For comparison, the modified SCM problem is then solved with three objective 
functions: minimizing fuel cost (“F”), losses (“L”), and disconnected load (“DL”), in 
order to provide the optimal operating point with zero security constraint violations. 
7.2.5.4 Remedial Action – Demand Side Management 
Similarly, the network operator may activate DSM on all or some of the buses, based 
on previous knowledge, priority, and size of the loads. In general, major industrial 
consumers will distribute their load into “essential”, “semi-essential” and “non-
essential” categories (this statement has been made based on the author's experience 
of working with major industrial consumers). The non-essential load will be around 
30% of the total demand, which can be employed as a manageable demand as and 
when required by the grid. Accordingly, the same approach for load shedding using 
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the OLS and SOLS is applied for DSM, but the DSM analysis assumes that up to 30% 
of the load at target buses is available without (significant) impact on customers. 
7.2.5.5 Dynamic Simulation of Remedial Actions 
A remedial action results in a secure system if and only if the steady state security 
constraints are satisfied at post-control-action state (i.e. post-disturbance state after the 
implementation of remedial action) and the dynamic security constraints during the 
transition from pre-control-action (i.e. post-disturbance state before implementation of 
remedial action) to post-control-action state. Assuming proper controls are included in 
the mathematical formulation of SCM and that the formulation is feasible, the resulting 
solution provides a future (post-control-action) equilibrium operating point which is 
secure only from the steady security viewpoint.  
However, following the activation of the remedial action suggested by the SCM 
analysis, the system may or may not reach the new operating equilibrium based on the 
severity of the disturbance and the dynamic response of various equipment to the 
implemented controls. In order to check the ability of the system in reaching the new 
operating equilibrium, a full time-domain simulation between pre-control-action to the 
post-control-action state should be carried out. Time domain simulations verify the 
satisfiability or non-satisfiability of dynamic security or stability constraints for a 
steady-state secure operating point. It should be noted that time-domain simulation 
should be executed only after the confirmation that there exists a steady-state secure 
operating point (i.e. through SCM analysis) with the considered remedial action. If no 
such steady-state operating point exists, there is no point in performing time domain 
simulation. 
Time domain simulations are performed using [156] for a total duration of 60 sec, with 
the following steps: a) base case OPF on the pre-contingency network is run for the 
first 10 sec, b) the first and second line outages are simulated at 10 sec and 15 sec, c) 
remedial actions (e.g. SOLs) are activated at 20 sec, d) generation and voltage set 
points are readjusted at 25 sec and simulation is run until 60 sec with no further events.  
The considered remedial action is “rotor angle stable” if and only if relative angles of 
all generators reached steady-state values and are within the margin of ±1800. If a 
relative rotor angle exceeds ±1800, that generator is assumed to lose synchronism with 
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the rest of the system.  Similarly, the selected remedial action is assumed to be “voltage 
stable” if the terminal voltages of all generators reached their steady-state values and 
none of them was outside the 0.95 p.u. - 1.1 p.u. range. 
7.3. Results  
7.3.1  Analysis of Post-Contingency Operating Conditions 
Four overstressed SCM test cases (Table 7.1) are used to demonstrate the proposed 
remedial action framework. These cases are developed by simulating infeasible 
contingencies at pre-contingency optimal operating point. These cases develop 
overstressed operating conditions in two test networks (IEEE 30 and IEEE 57-bus), 
which are already validated in Chapter-4 (Table 4.4). Post-contingency operating 
conditions, following these infeasible contingencies, are analysed and the list of 
immediate post-contingency constraints is shown in Table 7.1. Where NUV, NOV and 
NOL indicate the number of under and overvoltage violations, and overloads; and 
TNSCV indicates the total number of security constraint violations. The type, extent, 
and severity of constraint violations vary by the chosen contingency. 
Table 7.1 List of Analysed Test Cases with Immediate Post-Contingency Violations 
Test Case Contingency Network NUV NOV NOL TNSCV 
IC3  L1-2 & T27-28 IEEE 30 4 0 5 9 
IC4  L4-12 & T27-28 IEEE 30 5 0 3 8 
IC5  L5-6 & L6-7 IEEE 39 3 0 6 9 
IC6  L21-22 & L26-27 IEEE 39 0 3 4 7 
IC7  T7-29 & L8-9 IEEE 57 35 0 5 40 
IC8  T7-29 & L46-47 IEEE 57 18 1 1 20 
Note: Lx-y: Line between bus x and busy; Tx-y: Transformer between bus x and y 
7.3.2 Computation of Non-Emergency Corrective Control Solution 
Here, the relevant SCM problem is formulated and solved using a conventional solver 
(PSSE) to compute a possible NECC solution that can resolve all post-contingency 
constraint violations (Table 7.2). The NECC considered here are: generation re-
dispatch, AVR set points, and tap settings. As the considered cases are infeasible, 
PSSE is failed to compute an NECC solution. Furthermore, the nonexistence of NECC 
solution is confirmed by IDRF. 
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Table 7.2 Existence Status of NECC solution 
Test Case Network Existence of an NECC solution 
By PSSE By IDRF 
IC3 IEEE 30 X C 
IC4 IEEE 30 X C 
IC5 IEEE 39 X C 
IC6 IEEE 39 X C 
IC7 IEEE 57 X C 
IC8 IEEE 57 X C 
            X- Solver failure to compute solution; C – Confirmation of no solution 
7.3.3 Identification of CCVs 
The infeasible SCM problem formulated in the previous section is forwarded to CRF 
in order to identify the CCVs. It should be noted this study is already been done in 
Chapter-6, and list of CCVs are mentioned in Table 7.3. It can be seen that a large 
number of immediate post-contingency constraint violations reduce to a much smaller 
set of CCVs (most notably for the IEEE-57 system). Although the computational time 
varies depending on the size of the network and level of stress, it is observed that the 
average computational time to identify CCVs is around 40 sec. 
Table 7.3 List and locations of CCVs 
Contingency Network NUV NOV NOL UV Buses OL Lines Time(s) 
IC3 IEEE 30 2 0 2 29;30 33(L22-24); 
35(L24-25) 
14.34 
IC4 IEEE 30 2 0 2 29;30 33(L22-24); 
35(L24-25) 
21.32 
IC5 IEEE 39 0 0 2 / 3((L2-3); 
9(L4-14) 
36.04 
IC6 IEEE 39 0 0 1 / 3((L2-3) 9.13 
IC7 IEEE 57 6 0 0 24;27;28;29;52;53 / 76.34 
IC8 IEEE 57 6 0 0 24;27;28;29;52;53 / 70.54 
7.3.4 Computation and Implementation of Remedial Actions 
This section presents the results to demonstrate the computation and optimal 
implementation of proposed remedial actions. The analysed remedial actions are: 
distributed generation (DG) dispatch, reactive power control, load shedding, and 
demand-side-management (DSM). In addition, this section also presents the results for 
the stability analysis of remedial actions. One metaheuristic solver (modified PSO, 
introduced in Chapter -3) and one conventional solver (an interior point OPF solver, 
PSSE, from [155]) are used for the analysis. 
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7.3.4.1 Load Shedding 
The load shedding approach is applied to the IEEE 30-bus network as this has a 
mixture of thermal and voltage CCVs. Branches L22-24 and L24-25 are the most critical 
branches, the security constraints of which cannot be fulfilled without shedding load at 
some selected or target buses (Table 7.3). Table 7.4 shows that the PISFs for these 
critical branches are the highest at buses 29 and 30, indicating that they significantly 
influence the MVA flow in the critical branches. For example, for the outage of IC3 (L1-
2 and T27-28), the injection of one MW at bus 29 reduces the flows on L22-24 and L24-
25 by 0.811 MVA and 1.168 MVA, respectively. Based on this logic, bus 29 and bus 30 
are considered as the target buses for SOLS (Table 7.5). The target buses for the HLS 
and OLS approaches include buses 29 and 30 as well as 4 other locations associated with 
immediate post-contingency constraint violations (from unconstrained power flow) as 
indicated in Table 7.5.  
The total disconnected MVA for the 30-bus network with minimized objectives of 
fuel cost, loss, and disconnected load are shown in Table 7.6 with the resulting objective 
values shown in Table 7.7. The tables refer to “PSSE” and “PSO” which show the 
outcomes of conducting the SCM with conventional and metaheuristic approaches. 
These are included to demonstrate that the approach can be used with either method 
(where possible) and to indicate any differences in performance. In most cases of load 
shedding and SCM objective, the PSSE and PSO disconnection volumes and objective 
values are the same or very close. The obvious differences arise with the minimum load 
shedding objective, where the PSO substantially outperforms the conventional 
approach. The largest difference is for the first contingency where the reduction in load 
shedding is 77% for the SOLS and 90% for OLS methods. In addition, the SOLS 
approach results in much lower levels of load shedding compared to the other methods. 
Similarly, load shedding analysis is carried out for 39-bus and the resulting disconnected 
MVA are shown in Table 7.8. 
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Table 7.4 Active Power Injection Sensitivity Factors for IEEE 30-Bus 
ISFs with outages of L1-2 and T27-28 
Branch\bus No B24 B25 B26 B27 B29 B30 
L22-24 -0.696 -0.752 -0.769 -0.781 -0.811 -0.831 a 
L24-25 0.000 -1.089 -1.112 -1.129 -1.168 -1.196 
ISFs with outages of L4-12 and T27-28 
Branch\bus No B24 B25 B26 B27 B29 B30 
L22-24 -0.801 -0.868 -0.887 -0.903 -0.937 -0.962 
L24-25 0.000 -1.086 -1.109 -1.126 -1.167 -1.195 
aBuses with high absolute ISFs  
Table 7.5 Target Buses for Load Shedding 
Conti. SOLS OLS HLS 
IEEE 30-bus 
L1-2&T27-28 29, 30 3, 4, 24, 26, 29, 30 3, 4, 24, 26, 29, 30 
L4-12&T27-28 29, 30 3, 4, 24, 26, 29, 30 3, 4, 24, 26, 29, 30 
 
Table 7.6 Total Disconnected MVA with Load Shedding (IEEE 30-Bus) 
IC3: L1-2 and T27-28 
Type of shed-> SOLS OLS HLS 
Objective PSO PSSE PSO PSSE PSO PSSE 
Min. Fuel cost  13.33 13.33 38.95 38.95 38.95 38.95 
Min. Active Loss  13.32 13.33 34.93 38.95 38.95 38.95 
Min. Shedding  3.07 13.33 3.93 38.95 NA NA 
IC4: L4-12 and T27-28 
Type of shed-> SOLS OLS HLS 
Objective PSO PSSE PSO PSSE PSO PSSE 
Min. Fuel cost  13.33 13.33 38.95 38.95 38.95 38.95 
Min. Active Loss  13.33 13.33 37.38 38.95 38.95 38.95 
Min. Shedding  7.05 13.33 7.29 23.12 NA NA1 
1Not Applicable 
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Table 7.7 Optimal Objective Values with Load Shedding (IEEE 30-bus) 
IC3: L1-2 and T27-28 
Type of shed-> SOLS OLS HLS 
Objective PSO PSSE PSO PSSE PSO PSSE 
Fuel cost ($/hr) 787.27 787.54 703.29 703.48 703.22 703.48 
Active Loss (MW) 3.17 11.50 2.90 11.34 2.68 11.34 
Min Shed (MW) 2.92 13.00 3.32 15.63 NA NA 
IC4: L4-12 and T27-28 
Type of shed-> SOLS OLS HLS 
Objective PSO PSSE PSO PSSE PSO PSSE 
Fuel cost ($/hr) 756.14 756.38 677.00 677.33 694.97 677.32 
Active Loss (MW) 2.57 8.66 1.91 7.72 3.88 7.71 
Min Shed (MW) 6.83 12.89 6.71 14.45 NA NA 
Table 7.8 Total Disconnected MVA with Load Shedding (IEEE 39-Bus) 
IC5: L5-6 and L6-7 
Type of shed-> SOLS OLS HLS 
Objective PSO PSSE PSO PSSE PSO PSSE 
Min. Fuel cost 502.34 532.78 1055.64 1332.28 1332.28 1332.28 
Min. Active Loss 494.43 532.78 1077.72 1107.12 1332.28 1332.28 
Min. Shedding 452.23 532.78 497.83 754.07 NA NA 
IC6: L21-22 and L26-27 
Type of shed-> SOLS OLS HLS 
Objective PSO PSSE PSO PSSE PSO PSSE 
Min. Fuel cost 523.10 532.78 1021.55 1605.18 1605.18 1605.18 
Min. Active Loss 515.74 532.57 847.12 842.72 1605.18 1605.18 
Min. Shedding 443.51 450.73 480.41 471.92 NA NA1 
The branch MVA flows before and after the load shedding are shown in Figure 7.2. 
This demonstrates that, while SCM analysis with only NECC (i.e. SCM with no load 
shedding) can reduce five thermal constraint violations to two (denoted as critical 
overloading in Figure 7.2), SCM analysis with remedial action (i.e. SCM with HLS, 
OLS, and SOLS) can alleviate all thermal constraint violations. 




Figure 7.2 Branch MVA flow with load shedding for IEEE 30-bus (IC3) 
7.3.4.2 Demand side management  
The same process used for load shedding was repeated for DSM with the OLS and 
SOLS approaches (denoted as OLS-DSM and SOLS-DSM in the Tables and Figures). 
The target buses for OLS- and SOLS-based DSM are identified based on PISFs for the 
critical branches (Table 7.5). The resulting disconnected load volumes (MVA) with 
DSM based OLS and SOLS are shown in Table 7.9. Once again, the SOLS approach is 
better than the OLS in all cases, and in some instances substantially outperforms it. The 
conventional and metaheuristic outcomes are similar in most cases, but PSO performs 
better for the load shedding objective.  
The convergence of the PSO solver for one contingency (IC4) is shown in Figure 7.3 
for both OLS and SOLS cases for each of the objectives. This tracks how the total 
number of security constraint violations fall as the iterations progress. In all cases, the 
zero-security constraint violation in the figure indicates that all security constraints are 
fulfilled but that there is some variation in the speed at which this is achieved. All cases 
see a very rapid reduction in violations in the early stages before more steady progress. 
The OLS approach for minimizing fuel cost reaches zero violations most rapidly but it 
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should be noted that this case has the highest amount of load shedding. This suggests 
there may be a degree of trade-off between speed and efficacy. 
Table 7.9 Total Disconnected MVA with SOLS-DSM and OLS-DSM 
IC3: L1-2 and T27-28 
Type of shed-> SOLS OLS 
Objective PSO PSSE PSO PSSE 
Min. Fuel cost  4.00 4.00 11.68 11.69 
Min. Active Loss  4.00 4.00 9.86 11.69 
Min. Shedding  2.99 4.00 3.38 11.69 
IC4: L4-12 and T27-28 
Type of shed-> SOLS OLS 
Objective PSO PSSE PSO PSSE 
Min. Fuel cost  8.55 8.55 11.68 11.69 
Min. Active Loss  8.55 8.55 11.64 11.66 
Min. Shedding  7.72 8.55 4.18 8.81 
 
Figure 7.3 Total number of security violations with iteration of the PSO (IC4) 
7.3.4.3 Optimal Control of Distributed Generation (DG) 
The use of DG dispatch is demonstrated using the IEEE 30-bus system whose critical 
thermal constraints (L22-24 and L24-25) cannot be fulfilled without the injection of 
active power. The bus PISFs for those critical branches are presented in Table 7.4 and 
buses 29 and 30 are again the target buses for DG placement and control. The DG are 
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both considered as 5MW units capable of being dispatched from zero to maximum. 
Their fuel cost is modelled as a polynomial with the following equations: 0.02Pg + 15 at 
bus 29 and 0.043Pg + 20 at bus 30. The DGs are assumed to provide only active power. 
The characteristics of the other generators in the system remain unchanged. 
The system is dispatched with either minimum fuel cost or loss objectives for each 
set of contingencies (IC3 & IC4). The results (Table 7.10) show the loading of the 
existing conventional generators and the two DG. The outcomes of the conventional and 
metaheuristic algorithms are broadly similar. However, the dispatch to meet the fuel cost 
objective is quite different to that of minimal losses and much greater use is made of the 
DG at bus 30 in minimizing losses. In addition, it is also observed that the post-
contingency dispatch of conventional generators is significantly changed from the pre-
contingency dispatch which indicates that the system operating point has moved quite 
far away from the pre-contingency optimal operating point. 
The branch MVA flows for one contingency (IC3) before and after DG dispatch are 
shown in Figure 7.4. As all the branch constraint violations are relieved after the 
introduction of DG, it suggests that knowledge of the locations of critical constraints 
makes DG effective in alleviating line and voltage congestion, irrespective of the 
objective function considered. DG does not necessarily need to be located at the critical 
branches to be effective. For example, the target buses (bus 29 and 30) in this study are 
not associated with the critical branches (L22-24 and L24-25), Table 7.3.  
Table 7.10 Optimal DG Dispatch with relevant Objective Values 
Gen IC3: L1-2 and T27-28 IC4: L4-12 and T27-28 
@ OFC Loss OFC Loss 
Bus No PSSE PSO PSSE PSO PSSE PSO PSSE PSO 
1 130.0 129.72 50.00 53.04 158.79 150.34 50.01 57.24 
2 63.37 63.62 77.03 77.00 44.32 46.61 71.35 78.90 
5 25.29 25.18 49.38 50.00 20.00 17.88 49.99 50.00 
8 35.00 32.09 34.92 34.62 11.03 13.71 34.98 34.91 
11 21.00 21.38 29.94 30.00 10.01 15.42 29.98 20.11 
13 16.58 18.90 35.13 33.13 40.00 40.00 39.97 36.27 
29 (DG) 4.83 4.90 4.99 4.80 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.87 























Figure 7.4 Branch MVA flow with load shedding for IEEE 30-bus (IC3) 
7.3.4.4 Optimal Reactive Power Injection 
Unlike the previous interventions, reactive power control is demonstrated on the IEEE 
57-bus system as the CCVs include only undervoltage violations (Table 7.3) and the 
SCM is a VVC problem. Table 7.11 shows the extent of the undervoltages post-
contingency (IC7) before the SCM dispatch with reactive support. These can be seen to 
be between 1 and almost 7 percentage points below the 95% undervoltage limit. 
Reactive support (capacitors) are available at each of the critical buses and the SCM run 
for the three objectives (fuel, losses and reactive injection). The resulting optimal 
reactive power injection values for one contingency (IC7) are shown in Table 7.12.  
There are fairly similar overall volumes of reactive support and objectives between 
PSSE and the PSO for the fuel cost minimization case. The allocation of the injections 
between buses is quite different, however. For the loss minimization case, the PSO 
performs slightly worse than PSSE in terms of the amount of reactive support required 
overall and has almost twice the level of losses. The objective of minimizing reactive 
support sees a substantial reduction in volumes with the PSO and zero or near zero 
injections at two of the three locations. This would suggest PSO may be more efficient 
in terms of the number of capacitors used. 
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Table 7.11 Bus Undervoltages for IEEE 57 Bus (Below 0.95 pu limit) 
Contingency Bus undervoltages (%) with fuel cost min. 
B24 B27 B28 B29 B52 B53 
T7-29&L8-9 1.93 4.43 6.20 6.96 6.02 4.82 
T7-29&L46-47 1.08 2.45 3.99 4.61 3.19 1.72 
Contingency Bus undervoltages (%) with loss min. 
B24 B27 B28 B29 B52 B53 
T7-29&L8-9 2.14 4.23 5.97 6.71 5.72 4.49 
T7-29&L46-47 1.80 3.46 5.09 5.75 4.49 3.12 
Table 7.12 Optimal Reactive Power Injection with relevant Objective Values (IC7) 






Bus No PSSE PSO PSSE PSO PSSE PSO 
B24 7.58 3.60 3.05 4.71 2.87 0.03 
B27 2.63 7.14 4.09 1.84 3.67 1.17 
B28 2.45 2.57 4.30 4.76 3.63 4.23 
B29 2.53 3.97 4.36 6.82 3.58 3.95 
B52 2.39 1.02 3.80 1.30 3.38 5.90 
B53 5.54 4.75 3.38 4.73 3.09 0.00 
















Figure 7.5 Voltage profile for 57-bus system with and without reactive support (IC7) 
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The effect of the reactive support is clearly visible in Figure 7.5 for contingency T7-
29 and L8-9 before and after the reactive injection. While the post-contingency, 
unconstrained power flow represents 35 undervoltage violations, the approach suggests 
reactive power injections at only six buses will fulfil those undervoltage violations. 
Hence, the presented approach requires reactive injection at a minimum number of buses 
which, in turn, minimises switching actions. 
7.3.4.5 Dynamic Security Validation of Remedial Actions  
Time domain simulations of the transition from pre- to post-contingency steady state 
secure operating points is done for two reasons: a) to additionally check whether the 
system can reach new stable operating state, or not, and b) to check whether the 
presented remedial action framework does not result in any voltage or angle instability. 
The results of dynamic simulations for generator terminal voltages, rotor angles and 
speeds for IEEE 39-bus network with the activation of SOLS following a double line 
contingency (IC5) are shown in Figure 7.6. It can be observed that all the relative rotor 
angles and speeds have reached steady state, and none of the relative rotor angles are 
exceeded ±1800 margin (Generator G9 is considered as the reference machine). In 
addition, the terminal voltages of all the machines have reached steady state which are 
same as the AVR set points computed by the remedial action. This confirms that the 
proposed remedial action does not initiate any voltage and angle instability problems.  




a) Relative rotor angles 
 
b) Relative rotor speeds 





















































































c) Terminal voltages of generators 
Figure 7.6 Dynamic stability simulations for generator terminal voltages, rotor angles 
and speeds for IEEE 39-bus network with the activation of SOLS following a double 
line contingency (IC5) 
7.4. Discussion  
It is widely accepted that the management of constraints can be a more economically 
efficient option than further investment in the transmission network [21]. Accordingly, 
system operators invest significantly in procuring various ancillary services (active 
and reactive power) to resolve constraint violations during overstressed and 
emergency operating conditions.  
The proposed remedial action methodology incorporating the concept of critical 
constraint violations (CCVs) presents a useful unified computational framework to 
diagnose overstressed situations; and suggest a selection of effective remedial actions. 
These are based on CCV classification and effective implementation using injection 
sensitivity factors to minimize the usage of system reserves (for economic operation) 
as well as required number of switching actions (for secure transition from pre- to post-
disturbance steady-state equilibriums). This contribution can be demonstrated from the 
following observations.  
Although there are differences in disconnected load, DG value, and capacitor values 
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with various objective functions, all the proposed remedial actions find the secure post-
disturbance operating point with zero constraint violations.  
The proposed demand control approach (SOLS and SOLS-DSM) require smaller 
disconnection volumes at a minimum number of buses compared to the HOLS 
(activated by under-voltage or under-frequency protection at the local level) or OLS 
(activated by the operator using computer controls over the regulated region). Taking 
advantage of adaptive relays, the protection settings of which can be changed in real 
time, SOLS can be integrated into existing protection systems.  
The traditional undervoltage or under-frequency load shedding tends to shed the loads 
at the buses experiencing undervoltage or under-frequency (i.e. overloads) to prevent 
the network from entering the insecure region. However, from an economic and secure 
operation viewpoint, these buses may not be the most effective for constraint 
management in large and highly interconnected networks. This is evidenced by the 
implementation of SOLS in which the target buses for demand control are not the ones 
associated with overloaded branches.  
The reactive compensation approach requires minimum reactive support at a minimum 
number of buses to alleviate voltage congestion. Hence, it can help reduce unwanted 
switching surges, voltage dips and swells, and the relevant consequences, which are 
often associated with the switching operation of capacitor banks. 
The important point to reiterate about this approach is that it does not replace existing 
methods of handling challenging situations. Rather, in providing a computational 
means of identifying and classifying the CCVs it can extend the reach of support to 
system operators. The approach could form part of offline analyses and be offered as 
part of a lookup table or some form of case-based reasoning method. This method 
could conceivably be incorporated as part of online systems, as the straightforward 
manner in which the PSO solver can be parallelized means its elapsed time will be 
sufficiently short. This allows it to be broadly competitive with conventional methods 
requiring a few seconds to provide the solution. PSO needs only about 40 seconds (on 
average) to identify the CCVs and 30-100 seconds to compute the remedial action. 
But, once the CCVs identified, system operator can use conventional solvers to speed 
up the remedial action computation process.  
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For large practical systems, computational time can be reduced by employing inherent 
task-level parallelism at the objective function calculation stage and data level 
parallelism at the optimization stage. Furthermore, handling of a high number of 
constraints in metaheuristic algorithms can be addressed by developing domain-
independent constraint handling approaches.  
In addition to operational application, this approach can also be used during planning 
to indicate optimal location and sizing of DG, shunt capacitors, energy storage, etc. 
The remedial action framework can also be used for strategic (day ahead, weekly, or 
monthly) planning and invitation of potential bidders for ancillary services to minimize 
the investment. The repeated SCM analysis, for example, with severe contingent 
events over forecasted energy demand or various load distributions (using the Monte 
Carlo approach) can be used to plan various active and reactive power ancillary 
services for improved congestion management and volt-var control, respectively. 
7.5. Conclusions  
This chapter presented a remedial action framework for improved security constraint 
management to mitigate situations of network overstress. The practical relevance of 
the proposed framework is demonstrated on three widely used IEEE test networks and 
is of significant value to system operators (and potentially planners). From the 
optimization perspective, it can help resolve planners resolve infeasibility in 
optimization models by identifying the critical constraint violations and devising 
effective preventive actions. From the operational perspective, it eases the dynamic 
transition between pre- and post-contingency static equilibrium points (calculated 
from steady-state analysis) as it requires minimum switching actions to implement the 
remedial actions. By identifying the minimum number and extent of CCVs, i.e. by 
detecting critical alarms from a possibly larger number of activated post-contingency 
alarms, the presented framework can also help the system operators to deal with “alarm 
flooding”. By effectively handling the critical security constraints and allowing the 
network to operate at or near technical security limits, it offers potential to exploit 





Chapter 8  
Conclusions  
8.1. Summary 
Security constraint management (SCM) remains to play a critical role for the analysis 
of secure and stable operation of power supply systems. Arguably, SCM is more 
important than ever before, as modern electricity networks are more frequently 
operated closer to their technical limits, i.e. under stressed and even overstressed 
system operating conditions. The main aim of this thesis is development of improved 
and efficient approaches for the analysis and management of security constraints under 
overstressed system operating conditions. The summary of the work is given below. 
Chapter 2 presented a theoretical background and discussed the importance of the 
SCM problem in modern electricity networks. It has defined the stressed and 
overstressed operating states, in aligning with the existing classification in the 
literature. It also explained that overstressed operating conditions can be approached 
and interpreted as infeasible mathematical formulations of the SCM problem.  
Chapter 3 presented a detailed discussion of the mathematical formulation of the SCM 
problem and an in-depth analysis of feasible and infeasible SCM cases. It also provided 
an intuitive explanation of the computational processes behind the conventional and 
metaheuristic methods for solving the SCM problem. In order to resolve infeasible 
formulations, and in that way mitigate overstressed operating conditions, this chapter 
introduced two concepts: minimum intractable subsystem of constraints (MISC) and 
critical constraint set (CCS). While MISC represents a minimal set of constraints 
causing the infeasibility purely from a mathematical viewpoint, the CCS is defined as 
a set of the (most) critical constraints, whose violations prevent the operator from 
devising a feasible dispatch with available non-emergency corrective controls and for 
a given operational objective or control priority.    
Chapter-4 has developed and validated a set of several feasible and infeasible SCM 
cases for several (standard) test networks. It has been proved that conventional 
nonlinear programming solvers were failed to analyse infeasible cases. In other words, 
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they were failed to diagnose the MISC as well as failed to provide information on a set 
of problematic constraints (at least). 
Chapter 5, employing a modified metaheuristic framework, has proposed an 
infeasibility diagnosis and resolution framework (IDRF). The framework was 
validated on several test networks and the obtained results prove that the proposed 
IDRF can reliably find the close representation of the MISC for all considered 
infeasible cases.  
Chapter 6 has proposed a constraint rationalization framework (CRF) to resolve CCS 
based on five different operator’s priorities: a) cost of available non-emergency 
corrective actions, b) allocated available computational time, c) pre-specified size of 
CCS, d) available reserves, and e) available time before the next contingency occurs. 
The framework was again validated with several infeasible cases and the obtained 
results demonstrate that the framework can successfully find the CCS in all considered 
cases.  
Using IDRF and CRF, Chapter 7 has established a remedial action selection and 
implementation framework (RASIF). This framework has used the information on the 
type of constraints in CCS to select the best remedial action(s), and locations of 
constraints in CCS to find the most effective network locations to implement the 
selected remedial action(s). As before, the framework has been demonstrated on 
several test networks using both static and dynamic simulations. These results have 
shown that the implementation of suggested remedial actions requires minimal system 
reserves and minimum number of switching actions, when compared to the existing 
approaches.  
8.2. Implications of the Presented Research 
This thesis has provided numerous approaches, and required theoretical backgrounds, 
for dealing with overstressed operating conditions in modern electricity networks. The 
presented approaches effectively extend the state-of-the-art in security constraint 
management of modern power supply systems and are therefore expected to be of 
significant value to system operators and system planners. These approaches should 
improve the general decision-making capability of energy control centres in handling 
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challenging situations, especially in the context of modern electricity networks. A 
detailed discussion of the research implications is presented below: 
8.2.1 Definition and Detection of Overstressed Operating 
Conditions 
The existing classification of system operating conditions have neither defined the 
stressed and overstressed operating conditions, nor said where exactly these conditions 
would fall within the existing framework. The previous definitions have not properly 
linked the stressed and overstressed system operating conditions into the existing 
classification of network operating points/states and did not provide a methodology to 
diagnose them. Traditional constraint management procedures were not associated 
with the specific tools that can differentiate between the stressed and overstressed 
operating conditions, as confirmed by the number of previous power system blackouts 
[51].  
To address this gap, this thesis proposed a simple methodology to define and detect 
stressed and overstressed system operating conditions, based on the status of steady 
state security constraint violations. The methodology can be used by network operators 
for improved resolving of the overstressed operating conditions and for taking 
necessary mitigative actions. The prompt detection of overstressed conditions is 
particularly important, as in these conditions system is much more vulnerable to even 
small disturbances and as the probability of cascaded outages is significantly higher.  
8.2.2 Analysis and Modification of Metaheuristic Approaches for 
Handling Infeasible SCM Formulations 
While most of the previous research in metaheuristic optimization has entirely 
focussed on developing algorithms for finding accurate optimal solutions to feasible 
optimization problems, the analysis of infeasible optimization problems with 
metaheuristic approaches is not yet explored. This thesis, for the first time, has 
investigated the suitability of metaheuristic solvers for handling infeasible SCM 
models and for identifying, or as closely as possible representing the MISC. 
Accordingly, the thesis has proposed several modifications to the basic metaheuristic 
solvers, in order to improve their efficiency in finding/representing the MISC. From 
that perspective, this thesis has effectively opened a new research direction in 
metaheuristic optimization of infeasible models.  
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8.2.3 Test Cases for Validation of Infeasibility Diagnosis Techniques 
Optimization models, especially SCM/OPF models, which are commonly used to 
make planning and operational decisions in modern electricity networks, are becoming 
progressively larger and more complex, due to increased network interconnections, 
renewable energy penetration, complex controls, and frequent operation under stressed 
and even overstressed conditions. As models continue to grow larger, they can more 
easily become infeasible and identifying and resolving these infeasibilities becomes 
increasingly difficult. 
It is expected that there will be an increased research interest in devising new 
techniques to diagnose infeasibility in SCM/OPF models in the future. It is, therefore, 
very important to diagnose and localize the infeasibility, not only to resolve it from the 
optimization viewpoint, but also to identify parts of the electricity transmission and 
distribution networks (“bottlenecks”) where additional reinforcement and upgrading 
are required, or additional system support services should be contracted, so that non-
emergency and emergency corrective actions can be devised in the most cost-effective 
ways to deal with the constraint violations.  
This thesis has developed and validated several infeasible SCM cases with widely used 
test networks, so researchers can both select and validate the most suitable approach 
from the presented infeasibility diagnosis techniques and approaches. These cases 
exactly represent the overstressed operating conditions for several test networks. 
Moreover, on a wider scale, these cases could serve as general infeasible optimization 
models, so that researchers from any field can use them. By providing a set of validated 
infeasible models, this thesis may help scientific community in progressing research 
in a general field of infeasibility diagnosis. In addition to infeasibility diagnosis, these 
test cases can also be useful for the researchers aiming to devise remedial actions for 
resolving overstressed system operating conditions.  
8.2.4 Infeasibility Diagnosis and Resolution Framework for SCM 
Building on a modified metaheuristic framework, this thesis has developed a novel 
infeasibility diagnosis and resolution framework (IDRF) for nonlinear SCM models. 
Existing commercial OPF programmes, which typically rely on conventional solvers, 
are unable to diagnose the infeasibility in nonlinear SCM models and the information 
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they return in these cases is not of much use to the engineers and operators for 
resolving the infeasible models.  
Essentially, the mathematical indication of infeasibility is related to specific practical 
conditions that are important for a secure system operation, and any further attempt to 
operate the network under these conditions might result in the further activation of 
protection systems, or in angle/voltage instability. Especially when the system is 
overstressed, ability to quickly identify the root causes of the infeasibility (i.e. MISC) 
is more important than solving the OPF/SCM problem in its original or relaxed forms.  
In this context, the proposed IDRF framework could be used by engineers and network 
operators for efficient handling and resolving of infeasible SCM models, as and when 
they arise, as demonstrated by considering several infeasible SCM cases. Essentially, 
the presented frameworks can be easily implemented as an additional functionality (or 
computational routine) in commercial OPF software, where the information on the 
estimated MISC can guide conventional solvers whenever they diverge or fail to 
converge. 
8.2.5 Constraint Rationalization Framework for Overstressed 
Operating Conditions 
The accurate identification of types and locations of critical constraints is very 
important for the resolution of overstressed conditions, as the violations of these 
constraints prevents operator to devise a feasible re-dispatch of generation and 
adjustment of other controls. While the types of critical constraints help operators in 
deciding what types of remedial actions should be selected, the locations of critical 
constraints help operators to identify where and how to optimally implement these 
remedial actions, so that network can safely transit to a new secure operating state, 
without violating any dynamic security constraints during the transition. 
This thesis, to the best of authors’ knowledge, is the first to propose a constraint 
rationalization framework (CRF) for identifying the types and locations of critical 
constraints during overstressed operating conditions. The most important feature of 
this framework is that it acknowledges that the “criticality” of a constraint violation 
may vary based on the operator’s evaluation and prioritization of post-contingency 
controls and actions. The proposed CRF enables the operator to identify the CCS, 
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according to the previously discussed five different types of operator’s priorities, but 
this framework can be easily extended to include other priorities, which an ISO may 
want to consider (e.g. minimization of the number of corrective actions in post-
contingency state). 
The potential of the presented framework was demonstrated with several overstressed 
study cases in considered test networks. The framework does not require any 
additional hardware and, hence, it could be implemented as an add-on computational 
tool to the existing energy management software (EMS) in energy control centres in a 
straightforward manner. Additionally, the outcome of CRF can be linked to the 
remedial action schedule/routine within the EMS, to activate only the specific remedial 
actions, which are deemed appropriate in dealing with particular overstressed 
conditions. Operators can enable or disable the CRF, as and when required, e.g. when 
linking it to a day-ahead planning tool to identify the critical constraints that may 
appear within the next 24 hours with the forecasted demand and committed generation. 
In conclusion, if implemented in energy controls centres, the presented framework 
could significantly improve decision-making capability, as well the confidence levels 
of operators, in taking specific actions to mitigate the consequences of overstressed 
operating conditions. For example, an operator typically cannot process more than five 
alarms at a time and the proposed CRF could pinpoint the critical alarms, so that 
operator can devise most efficient decisions quickly. In the worst case, if the load 
shedding inevitable, the presented CRF can help in ensuring that the lowest amount of 
load is shed, as well as where exactly this load is to be shed.  
8.2.6 Remedial Action Selection and Implementation Framework   
After introducing CRF and IDRF, this thesis also proposed a remedial action selection 
and implementation framework (RASIF) to resolve or mitigate overstressed system 
operating conditions. The framework uses information on the types of constraints in 
CCS to select the proper remedial actions, where the most influential buses are selected 
as the most effective ones for the implementation of the selected remedial actions. The 
RASIF considers selected SCM problem as a vol-var control problem if CCS involves 
only voltage violations, and as congestion management problem if CCS involves a 
combination of line overloads and bus voltage violations, or just line overloads.  
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Based on the location and amount of available emergency reserves in relation to the 
type of SCM problem, the framework shows how to select minimal emergency 
reserves to fully resolve, or at least to limit the consequences of overstressed operating 
conditions. The most important feature of this approach is that it verifies the 
satisfiability of both steady state and dynamic security constraints. First, it finds the 
best emergency corrective solution that satisfies all steady state security constraints. 
Afterwards, if and only if all steady-state constraints are fulfilled at the post-corrective 
state, the framework proceeds further to verify that the transition to that post-corrective 
steady state secure state is possible by checking the dynamic security constraints via 
full-time domain simulations.  
The practical relevance of the proposed framework is demonstrated on widely used 
test networks and is deemed to be of significant value to system operators and system 
planners. Unlike the event-based remedial actions, RASIF devises actions based on 
the evaluated system response, or system state in relation to the level of system stress. 
Hence, the remedial actions devised using this framework require minimal amount of 
system reserves and minimal number of switching actions. After a careful tuning, the 
framework can be linked with the on-line automatic control system in energy control 
centres, to automatically issue the most optimal remedial action commands to the 
target buses through the SCADA system. Moreover, RASIF with CRF can be 
integrated into the day-ahead operational planning tools, to plan ahead any remedial 
actions against any overstressed operating conditions that may appear in the next 24 
hours. In addition to all that, by effectively handling the critical security constraints 
and allowing the network to be operated at, or near technical security limits, the 
presented framework has potential for further exploitation of the unused (“hidden”) 
network capacities, e.g. to host more renewable generation, or to supply higher 
demands. 
In conclusion, to the best of author’s knowledge, this thesis is the very first 
methodological attempt at analysing, modelling and resolving the overstressed system 
operating conditions using mathematical formulations of infeasibility, where 
infeasibility diagnosis is used to identify critical constraints in terms of different 
operator’s priorities. After doing that, the framework then implements the 
corresponding optimal remedial actions, based on the types and locations of critical 
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constraints. The important feature of the proposed frameworks is that they do not 
intend to replace the existing approaches for managing security constraints during 
overstressed operating conditions. Rather, in providing the computational means of 
identifying CCS and devising remedial actions, the frameworks can extend the reach 
of available support to system operators. 
8.3. Limitations of the Research 
8.3.1 Computational Time 
One of the inherent characteristics of the proposed frameworks, which might be 
considered as a “downside”, is that they rely on metaheuristic solvers, which take 
(much) longer computational time than conventional solvers. However, it should be 
noted that in the most, if not all of the considered overstressed/infeasible cases, the 
conventional solvers were unable to diagnose the infeasibility (they effectively 
“detect” infeasibility by not converging, or diverging, but do not provide any useful 
qualitative or quantitative information about infeasibility), but metaheuristic solvers 
can. On average, the proposed frameworks need only about 40 seconds (for considered 
test networks and on a standard desktop PC) to diagnose the infeasibility and to 
identify the CCS, and then around 30-100 seconds to select and compute the remedial 
actions. Nevertheless, the estimated 40 seconds of computational time for considered 
networks is completely feasible for offline applications and reasonable for online 
applications and once the CCS are identified, the system operator can use conventional 
solvers to speed up the overall computation process 
At present, the proposed frameworks and metaheuristic solvers were implemented 
entirely in Matlab environment, so it is inferred that the computational performance of 
the presented frameworks can be improved by implementing and optimizing them in 
C++ or FORTRAN (as in commercial OPF solvers), which, as discussed in the thesis, 
are much faster than the Matlab compiler [200]-[201]. Moreover, computational times 
can be further reduced by exploring inherent task-level parallelism at the objective 
function calculation stage, as well as data-level parallelism at the optimization stage. 
This would then allow metaheuristics solvers to be broadly much more competitive to 
conventional solvers, e.g. requiring only a few seconds to provide the target optimal 
solution. 
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8.3.2 Applicability to Practical Networks 
The proposed frameworks were tested on a relatively small number of different test 
networks, with only up to 300 buses, and they have to be tested on more realistic 
networks of larger sizes, as well as on practical networks. Nevertheless, the author is 
of the opinion that the proposed frameworks, in their present form, can be applied 
directly to real transmission networks of similar size, e.g. New Zealand transmission 
network, or a network covered by a single TSO.  
8.4. Recommendations for Future Work   
This PhD research (“journey”) has given me an opportunity to go through some 
fundamental research problems in power systems engineering, as well as in 
optimization theory. At the end of this research, I would like to offer my thoughts on 
some prudent and promising lines of research (amongst many other that I have 
contemplated), which are broadly related to this thesis and, to the best of my 
knowledge, yet to be pursued.  
I strongly believe that the work presented in this thesis can be applied to several other 
problems in power systems engineering, as well as other fields: the IRDF and CRF 
have potential for applications to any optimization problem and some of the relevant 
research directions are mentioned below. 
8.4.1. Infeasibility Diagnosis with Conventional Approaches 
As mentioned earlier in the thesis, infeasibility diagnosis, and especially the 
identification of MISC, is an NP-hard optimization problem. There exists no reliable 
technique for conventional solvers to identify the exact, or even approximate MISC, 
in non-convex nonlinear infeasible optimization problems, and this is one of the 
challenging research fields to work on. Any improvement in this field could be of 
significant use to both the scientific community and industry. This thesis is one such 
attempt to identify the MISC, but it relies on metaheuristic solvers, and future research 
can focus on developing more efficient techniques for conventional solvers, in addition 
to metaheuristic solvers to diagnose the infeasibility. 
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8.4.2. Infeasibility Handling in Security Constrained Economic 
Dispatch (SCED) 
If unit commitment solution after the market clearance cannot satisfy all (relevant) 
security constraints, SCED problem becomes infeasible and then market operators 
employ out-of-market corrections to make the system feasible. These out-of-market 
corrections basically involve constraint relaxation through fixed penalty prices, which 
requires additional generators to be committed/dispatched [203]. Accordingly, one can 
research the application of the proposed IDRF (or similar tools) to derive the exact 
amount of constraint relaxation, or penalisation values for resolving only the critical 
constraints. This approach may require fewer out-of-marker corrections (and therefore 
committing fewer generators) than the existing procedures, hence reducing the 
volatility in prices after the market clearance. 
8.4.3. Detecting Cyber-Attacks from Known Disturbances  
If an accurate system model is available, differences in actual system response from 
the simulated response can be modelled as an optimization problem. If both responses 
closely match, it could be inferred that the system is running normally and that there 
is no system fault or cyber-attack on the system. If the actual response does not match 
the simulated response, the actual response could be further checked against several 
simulated responses, each representing a known system disturbance. The set of known 
disturbances includes all possible system faults and cyber-attacks (which should be 
available from both historical records and previously simulated cases). If the actual 
response does not match one of the physical system faults or disturbances but matches 
some of the previously known cyber-attacks or if that disturbance actually did not take 
place in the system, it could be inferred that the system is likely under cyber-attack. 
8.4.4. Rationalization of Alarm “Flooding”  
One of the challenging problems in process industries is to identify the critical alarms 
amongst a larger number of activated alarms (e.g. more than ten alarms) during process 
emergencies, which is known as “alarm flooding”. One can model this problem as an 
infeasible optimization model and identify critical alarms by using approaches for 
handling the infeasibility similar to these presented in this thesis.  
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8.4.5. Infeasibility Handling in Engineering Design and Scheduling 
Problems 
The application of IDRF to engineering design and scheduling problems can also be 
further researched, in order to identify the critical design requirements that cannot be 
satisfied, or are very difficult to satisfy. An example would be identification of “critical 
paths” that cannot be covered in case of flight scheduling problems. 
8.4.6. Extending the General Capabilities of the CRF 
The general capabilities of the CRF can be enhanced or extended by including other 
control priorities of the operators. For example, the operator might be interested in 
finding CCS with reduced number of controls, or with specific set/combination of 
controls in post-contingency state, or with only a minimum number of control 
adjustment actions (e.g. on/off switching) during the transition to a secure state, or to 
unconditionally preserve supply to specific/emergency loads, etc. 
8.4.7. Extending the General Capabilities of the RASIF  
The general capabilities of the RASIF can be enhanced or extended by including other 
corrective controls, for example transmission switching, energy storage, etc. One can 
also research the application of RASIF for strategic (day-ahead, weekly, or monthly) 
planning and subsequent invitation or incentivising of potential bidders for specific 
ancillary services to minimize the overall cost of system reserves. The repeated 
security constraint management analysis, for example, with severe contingency events 
over forecasted energy demand, or for various load distributions (using the Monte 
Carlo approach) can be used to plan various active and reactive power ancillary 
services aimed at improving congestion management and volt-var control, 
respectively. 
8.4.8. Integrated Assessment of Static and Dynamic Security 
Assessment  
The system stability in modern electricity networks is becoming more sensitive to even 
small disturbances due to continuously reducing inertia and damping levels. Hence, 
the dynamic security assessment is going to play a critical role than ever before. In this 
context, future research could be concentrated on three following directions.  
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First, in most of the previous literature, the employed dynamic assessment procedures 
did not pay much attention to the satisfiability of steady state security constraints at 
pre- and post-application of any corrective control. As mentioned previously, a 
corrective action can be dynamically secure (i.e. the transition is secure) but the post-
control equilibrium state may be statistically in secure. Future research should be 
focused on the combined assessment of static and dynamic security.  
Second, mathematical models representing the operation of modern electricity 
networks are becoming involved with non-smooth functions (e.g. invertor 
mathematical model, energy storage mathematical model), which limit the application 
of conventional gradient approaches to performing security analysis. In these cases, 
metaheuristic approaches could be a potential solution and researchers should 
concentrate on finding the practical cases and problems to exploit the potential of 
metaheuristics.  
Third, previous research works have paid very less attention to the sequence of 
application of controls when more than one remedial action is required to mitigate 
constraint violations. For example, if the operator is suggested to implement “re-
dispatch” and “partial load shedding” as remedial actions, which one has to be applied 
first and which one has to be applied second to prevent unwanted dynamics. The 
improper sequence of the application of controls can lead to dynamically insecure 
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Appendix A  
Test Networks Data 
The data for the analysed test networks is divided into three parts: static data, dynamic 
data and fuel cost and emission data. Static data represents the power flow (bus, 
branch, generation) data, and is available in references [157, 191, 192]. Dynamic data 
represents the parameter settings for synchronous machines (Table A.1) with the 
associated automatic voltage regulator (AVR, Table A.2)) and power system stabilizer 
(PSS, Table A.3). The dynamic data is used in Chapter 7 to validate the stability of 
proposed remedial actions. Fuel cost and emission data represent the fuel cost 
coefficients (Table A.4) and emission coefficients (Table A.5) to compute the dispatch 
cost as well as emission released by the generators. The modelling information of fuel 
cost and emission is already mentioned in (3.4) and (3.5). 







Xl Ra Xd Xd' Xd'' Td0' Td0' Xq Xq' Xq'' Tq0' Tq0'' H D0 D1 
1 39 1000 0.03 0 0.2 0.06 0.01 7 0.003 0.19 0.08 0.03 0.7 0.005 50 0 0 
2 31 1000 0.35 0 2.95 0.697 0.01 6.56 0.003 2.82 1.7 0.03 1.5 0.005 3.03 0 0 
3 32 1000 0.304 0 2.49 0.531 0.01 5.7 0.003 2.37 0.876 0.03 1.5 0.005 3.58 0 0 
4 33 1000 0.295 0 2.62 0.436 0.01 5.69 0.003 2.58 1.66 0.03 1.5 0.005 2.86 0 0 
5 34 1000 0.54 0 6.7 1.32 0.01 5.4 0.003 6.2 1.66 0.03 0.44 0.005 2.6 0 0 
6 35 1000 0.224 0 2.54 0.5 0.01 7.3 0.003 2.41 0.814 0.03 0.4 0.005 3.48 0 0 
7 36 1000 0.322 0 2.95 0.49 0.01 5.66 0.003 2.92 1.86 0.03 1.5 0.005 2.64 0 0 
8 37 1000 0.28 0 2.9 0.57 0.01 6.7 0.003 2.8 0.911 0.03 0.41 0.005 2.43 0 0 
9 38 1000 0.298 0 2.10 0.57 0.01 4.79 0.003 2.05 0.587 0.03 1.96 0.005 3.45 0 0 
10 30 1000 0.125 0 1.0 0.31 0.01 10.2 0.003 0.69 0.08 0.03 1.5 0.005 4.2 0 0 





Table A.2 AVR settings (IEEE Type-1) for IEEE 39-bus 
Sr No Bus No Tr Ka Ta Tb Tc Vt Emin Emax 
1 39 0.01 200 0.015 10 1 1.03 -5 5 
2 31 0.01 200 0.015 10 1 1.03 -5 5 
3 32 0.01 200 0.015 10 1 1.03 -5 5 
4 33 0.01 200 0.015 10 1 1.03 -5 5 
5 34 0.01 200 0.015 10 1 1.03 -5 5 
6 35 0.01 200 0.015 10 1 1.03 -5 5 
7 36 0.01 200 0.015 10 1 1.03 -5 5 
8 37 0.01 200 0.015 10 1 1.03 -5 5 
9 38 0.01 200 0.015 10 1 1.03 -5 5 
10 30 0.01 200 0.015 10 1 1.03 -5 5 
Tr – low pass filter time constant; Ta, Tb, Tc – regulator time constant; Vt – terminal 
voltage, Emin, Emax – lower and upper limit for regulator output 
Table A.3 Power System Stabilizer (Multiband) settings for IEEE 39-bus 
Sr No Bus No G FL KL FI KI FH KH 
1 39 1 0.2 30 1.25 40 12 160 
2 31 1 0.2 30 1.25 40 12 160 
3 32 1 0.2 30 1.25 40 12 160 
4 33 1 0.2 30 1.25 40 12 160 
5 34 1 0.2 30 1.25 40 12 160 
6 35 1 0.2 30 1.25 40 12 160 
7 36 1 0.2 30 1.25 40 12 160 
8 37 1 0.2 30 1.25 40 12 160 
9 38 1 0.2 30 1.25 40 12 160 
10 30 1 0.2 30 1.25 40 12 160 
G – global gain; FL, FI, FH – frequency of low, intermediate, high frequency band; 
KL, KI, KH – gain of low, intermediate, and high frequency band 
Table A.4 Fuel Cost and Emission Coefficients for IEEE 14 Bus 
Bus  
No 
Fuel cost Coefficients Emission Coefficients 
a b c d*10-6 e*10-6 f 
1 0.00375 2.00 0 6.49 -555 0.0409 
2 0.0175 1.75 0 5.64 -605 0.0254 
5 0.0625 1.00 0 4.59 -509 0.0426 
8 0.00834 3.25 0 3.38 -355 0.0533 
11 0.025 3.00 0 4.59 -509 0.0426 






Table A.5 Fuel Cost and Emission Coefficients for IEEE 30 Bus 
Bus  
No 
Fuel cost Coefficients Emission Coefficients 
a b c d*10-6 e*10-6 f 
1 0.00375 2 0 6.49 -555 0.0409 
2 0.0175 1.75 0 5.64 -605 0.0254 
5 0.0625 1 0 4.59 -509 0.0426 
8 0.0083 3.25 0 3.38 -355 0.0533 
11 0.025 3 0 4.59 -509 0.0426 
13 0.025 3 0 5.15 -556 0.0613 
Table A.6 Fuel Cost and Emission Coefficients for IEEE 39 Bus 
Bus 
No 
Fuel cost Coefficients Emission Coefficients 
a b c d e f 
30 0.0064 3.90 0.0064 0.0031 -0.24 10.3391 
31 0.0111 3.70 0.0111 0.0031 -0.24 10.3391 
32 0.0104 2.80 0.0104 0.0051 -0.41 30.0391 
33 0.0088 4.70 0.0088 0.0051 -0.41 30.0391 
34 0.0128 2.80 0.0128 0.0034 -0.38 32.0001 
35 0.0094 3.70 0.0094 0.0034 -0.38 32.0001 
36 0.0099 4.80 0.0099 0.0047 -0.39 33.0006 
37 0.0113 3.60 0.0113 0.0047 -0.39 33.0006 
38 0.0071 3.70 0.0071 0.0047 -0.40 33.0006 
39 0.0193 6.90 0.0193 0.0047 -0.40 36.0001 
Table A.7 Fuel Cost Coefficients for IEEE 57 - Bus 
Bus No a b c 
1 0.07758 20 0 
2 0.01000 40 0 
3 0.25000 20 0 
6 0.01000 40 0 
8 0.02222 20 0 
9 0.01000 40 0 





Appendix B  
Dynamic Thermal Model of Overhead Transmission Line  
B.1 Dynamic Thermal Rating of overhead transmission line (OHTL)  
 
𝑞𝑐 + 𝑞𝑟 +𝑚𝐶𝑝
𝑑𝑇𝑐
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑞𝑠 + 𝐼
2𝑅(𝑇𝑐) 
(B.1) 
B.1.1 Convection Heat Loss Rate per Meter 
Forced convection heat loss rate 





] 𝑘𝑓𝐾𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒(𝑇𝑐 − 𝑇𝑎) (B.2) 





𝑘𝑓𝐾𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒(𝑇𝑐 − 𝑇𝑎) (B.3) 
Natural convection heat loss rate 
 𝑞𝑐𝑛 = 0.0205𝜌𝑓
0.5𝐷0.75(𝑇𝑐 − 𝑇𝑎)
1.25 (B.4) 



















] (𝑇𝑐 − 𝑇𝑙𝑜𝑤) + 𝑅(𝑇𝑙𝑜𝑤) 
(B.6) 
B.2 Linearization of OHTL Thermal Model 
B.2.1 Convection Heat Loss 
 𝑞𝑐 = 𝐾𝑐(𝑇𝑐 − 𝑇𝑎) (B.7) 
where 
 𝐾𝑐 = max (𝑘𝑐1, 𝑘𝑐2, 𝑘𝑐𝑛) (B.8) 
 
 


















 𝑘𝑐𝑛 = 0.06478𝜌𝑓
0.5𝐷0.75 (B.11) 
B.2.2 Radiated Heat Loss Rate 
 𝑞𝑟 = 𝐾𝑟(𝑇𝑐 − 𝑇𝑎) (B.12) 
Where 
 𝐾𝑟 = 𝐷𝜀(0.0233 + 0.0003𝑇𝑎) (B.13) 
B.3 Linearized Thermal Model 





+ 𝐾(𝑇𝑐 − 𝑇𝑎) = 𝐼










B.3.1 Steady-state Conductor Surface Temperature 
 






B.3.2 Transient Conductor Surface Temperature (After a Step-change of line current) 






Where 𝑇𝑐𝑓 and 𝑇𝑐𝑖 are steady-state conductor surface temperatures with final line 







B.4 Integration of OHTL thermal model as OPF constraints 
B.4.1 Normal Operation 
In normal state, a maximum temperature limit 𝑇𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑂 is applied to steady-state 
conductor surface temperatures. This temperature limit can be transferred to a current 










B.4.2 Post-contingency Operation 
With a given post-contingency maximum temperature limit 𝑇𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡, the maximum 
allowable operating time (or lead time) to reach this temperature is given as: 
 
𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 =  −𝜏ln[
𝑇𝑐𝑓 − 𝑇𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡
𝑇𝑐𝑓 − 𝑇𝑐𝑖
] 
(B.20) 
 
